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PREFACE 
New Zealand's history is punctuated with the devastation 
wrought by nature. Yet, only within the last few years has the 
country possessed a permanent and comprehensive emergency organi-
sation - civil defence - capable of responding to the ever-
present threat of earthq4ake, fire, flood and storm. 
The present civil defence organisation is of relatively 
recent origin, though New Zealand's interest in the subject is not 
new, and dates to the early 1930 1 s. Previous civil defence 
measures were, however, either ill-conceiv·ed or ephemeral and, 
until recently, the obvious danger of natural disaster was consis-
tently subordinated to the demands for protecting the country 
against hypothetical threats of enemy attack. 
Although the bulk of this thesis is concerned with the 
development of civil defence since the creation of a Ministry of 
Civil Defence in April 1959, the more historical aspect of the 
subject cannot be ignored, for not only are previous civil defence 
measures of significance in their own right, but certain features 
associated with them were to be perpetuated after 1959. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: 1924-1957 
New Zealand has always shown a readiness, when required, to 
adopt the ideas and practices of other countries. This has 
been especially true in the field of civil defence where British 
experience in particular has been heavily, if at times unques-
tioningly, drawn upon. This chapter, essentially historical, 
traces the development of civil defence measures in this country 
I 
and Britain over a period of forty years, from the Great War 
until the late 1950's. Within this period British influence on 
New Zealand civil defence became firmly established. But while 
this influence was in many respects to prove beneficial, the 
connection established between c~vil defence and wartime passive 
defence was, in part, to be responsible for the delay in' this 
country's full appreciation of a problem which did not concern 
British civil defence - the problem of natural disaster. 
Britain·: The origins of civil defence 
The Great War witnessed the advent of aerial bombing and 
for the first time civilian populations became of important 
strategic significance. The sporadic German raids over Britain 
led quickly to a realisation of the potential of such tactics and 
prompted an enquiry into methods by which a future threat of this 
type could be countered. In 1924 the Committee of Imperial 
Defence set up an air raid precautions (A.R.P.) sub-committee to 
study the problem. 1 This committee and other advisory bodies 
1T.H. O'Brien, Civil Defence, History of the Second World War, 
United Kingdom Civil Series~ ed., Sir Keith Hancock. (London, 
H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1955), pp. 13 ff. 
2 
continued their investigations until the mid 1930's when the 
deteriorating international scene required the implementation of 
an air raid protection and civil defence scheme. The Cabinet's 
approval of £100,000 for A.R.P. equipment in 1935 registered the 
beginning of civil defence in Britain. 1 
As it developed from 1935 onwards, British civil defence was 
designed to form the passive defences of the country against 
enemy attack. Though New Zealand was to establish a similar 
organisation when war broke out, the inception of civil defence 
in this country was motivated by entirely different circumstances. 
New Zealand: The Public Safety Conservation Act 
In 1929 part of the Nelson region was devastated by an 
earthquake. Fortunately, the epicenter was located in a sparsely 
populated area and only seventeen peopl~ were killed. 2 Two years 
. 3 
later 260 people died in the Napier earthquake. 
This earthquake struck a city which was totally unprepared. 4 
The nearby town of Hastings was also severely damaged and tn both 
centres citizen committees were immediately established to 
organise and implement rescue and relief operations. Although 
central Government rapidly provided various forms of assistance, 
coping with the disaster remained essentially a local responsi-
bility.5 The citizens' committees remained in control for some 
1T.H. O'Brien, Civil Defence, p. 52. 
2The Murchison earthquake registered Force 7 on the Richter Scale. 
3The Napier earthquake registered Force 7~ on the Richter Scale. 
4 For a brief description of the Napier earthquake see Eugene C. 
Grayland, New Zealand Disasters (Wellington, A.H. & A.W. Reed, 
1957), pp. 124-32. 
5 Later in the year the Government passed the Napier Earthquake Act 
which provided finance for the rebuilding of the devastated area. 
3 
time following the earthquake, though in the case of the Hastings 
committee it handed over to the Borough Council after two weeks 
as it was 'hampered in every way by lack of authority and by a 
1 lack of much needed support'. 
In the absence of any existing emergency legislation some 
conflicts of authority had inevitably occurred during the rescue 
and relief operations, and the Government's introduction of a 
fublic Safety Conse'rvation Bill in the following year was partly 
in response to this problem~ 
The Government's primary motive for introducing the legis-
lation was the desire to control and prevent civil disturbances, 
such as the rioting which had taken place in Auckland during 1932 
as a result of the economic situation. 2 Provisions to deal with 
the consequences of natural disaster were also incorporated in 
the Bill, but in view of their limited scope they appeared as 
little more than an afterthought in a Bill primarily concerned 
with civil disorders. 
The legislation gave the Government power to declare a state 
of emergency in any part of the country in cases of both civil 
disorder and natural disaster and, if a proclamation could not 
be issued immediately, responsibility for the situation was to 
rest with the senior police officer in the locality. The 
relevant section of the Bill stated: 
1Edwin F. Scott, 'Report on relief organisatibn out of Hawke's Bay 
earthquake', in Christchurch (N.Z.) Public Utilities sub-
committee retort on "Public Emergencies arising from 'major 
disaster"' Christchurch, unpublished, 1934), p. 16. 
2
rn respect to the anti-riot provisions, the Public Safety Conser-
vation Act, based on the British Emergency Powers Act of 1920, 
is one of the most repressive pieces of legislation ever enacted 
in New Zealand. 
In any case of public emergency, whether arising from 
earthquake, fire, flood~ public disorder, or otherwise 
howsoever, in which, owing to the suddenness of the 
occurrence, the interruption of communications, or any 
other cause, the foregoing provisions of this Act 
cannot be put into operation immediately, the senior 
officer of the Police Force present in the locality 
shall assume responsibility for the issuing of all 
orders and instructions necessary in his opinion for 
the preservation of life, the protection of property, 
and the maintenance of order. 1 
4 
The parliamentary debate was almost completely concerned 
with civil disorders and' very little was said about the problem 
of natural disaster. The Prime Minister, G.W. Forbes, in 
introducing the Bill to the House, made one of the longer comments 
on its relation to natural disaster when he stated: 
I consider that it can be safely left to the Police to 
take charge in cases of fire, upheaval, earthquake, or 
anything of that kind, and to remain in charge during 
such times of the emergency. The senior office of the 
Police will be the rallying point. 2 
The only significant thing the Bill achieved was to define 
the position of the Police during an emergency. No provision 
was made for the planning of disaster counter measures by either 
ce~tral Government or the lobal authorities. 
Although the Public Safety Conservation Act represented the 
only consideration shown by the Government for the problem of 
natural disaster at that time, some urban local authorities set 
up organisations of varying degrees of efficiency to meet the 
threat of any future disasters. These organisations were to 
provide the nucleii around which wartime civil defence was built. 
1New Zealand Statutes~ f.yQl:lc~"],~fety Cqnservation Act, 1932, 
Section 4. 
2 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 232, p. 175, 19 April, 1932. 
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12,~itain: Continuing development 
Responding to the deteriorating European scene, the British 
Government in 1935 embarked upon a rearmament programme and began 
to proceed rapidly with the development of civil defence, which, 
as part of Horne defence was given first priority in the rearma-
ment programme. 
During the previous decade, the idea of having a single 
government departme·.t1t re~·ponsible for civil defence, at least in 
peacetime, had been dismissed. This was reappraised i~ 1935 
and an A.R.P. Department was created in the Home Office 'to act 
on behalf of the various Government Departments concerned with 
air raid defence' . 1 In the same year the local authorities were 
approached by the Government to co-operate in the setting up of 
A R P . . 2 •.. organ~sat~ons. 
The trend towards centralised administration of civil defence 
was taken a step further in 1938 with the appointment of a 
Cabinet Minister, Sir John Anderson, who was to co-ordinate all 
those departments involved with civil defence 3 and be directly 
responsible for the A.R.P. The extension of Government prepa-
rations at this time, beyond the immediate demands of the passive 
defences of the A.R.P., resulted in the emergence of the term 
'civil defence' to describe 'almost all the exceptional war-time 
1T.H; O'Brien, Civil Defence, p. 60. 
2
under the Air Raid 'Precautions Act of 1937 local A.R.P. schemes 
required the approval of the Home Secretary. 
3The,se included Food (Defence Plans) Department of the Board of 
Trade, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Labour, the 
Board of ~ducation and Scottish Department of Education, and the 
Ministry of Health and Department of Health for Scotland - D.N. 
Chester, ed., The Organisation of British Central Government 
1914-1956 (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 244. 
1 
measures to be undertaken by civil departments'. Until war 
6 
broke out, Anderson administered his duties as Lord Privy Seal, 
but then became both Home Secretary and Minister of Home 
Security. The latter portfolio gave him responsibility for all 
the passive defence services previously administered by the Home 
Secretary, together with the function of co-ordinating the war-
time services of all other civil departments. 
Between the central administration in London and the local 
authorities came the regions. The adoption of a regional 
approach to c~vil defence had been prompted by experience with 
the Civil Emergency Organisation formed soon after the end of the 
Great War. This organisation, operating on a regional basis, 
was used during the General Strike of 1926 and had remained in 
skeleton form ever since. 
Each civil defence region2 was the responsibility of a 
Regional Commissioner, appointed by the Crown, who was to provide 
the co-ordination between centrql Government and the local 
authorities. In this capacity he was to ensure that Government 
directives were carried out and assume supervisory control over 
the civil defence activities of those Government departments 
operating within his region. If communications between the 
Home Security headquarters and the regions were broken through the 
devastation of London, or invasion, each Regional Commissioner 
could, at his own discretion, 'take over full powers of civil 
government and be held indemnified for everything done in good 
·T.H. O'Brien, Civil Defence, p. 117. 
2 In 1941 th.irteen regions covered Eng land, Scot land and Wales. 
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faith'. 1 Under 'normal' conditions the Regional Commissioners 
operated in an essentially supervisory and co-ordinating role, 
the formal contact between the regions and the local authorities 
being provided by regional officers of the A.R.P. 
Despite tqe urgency with which the British Government viewed 
the situation in the late 1930's many local authorities were 
slow and reluctant in becoming involved with civil defence, 
particularly where it incurred local expenditure. There was a 
tendency on the part of mapy,to regard A.R.P. as a burden and a 
matter not really of their concern. This attitude caused the 
Government on a number of occasions to reiterate its view that 
'A.R.P. was not a service to the Government, but one to the 
community in which there was a part for all to play. 
Apart from the higher level positions in the local organisa-
tions, membership was voluntary. The Government wished to 
maintain strong emphasis on A.R.P. as a local voluntary service 
rooted in local leadership and enthusiasm, and adapting plans 
evolved at the centre to local differences. Problems arose, 
however, due to the shortage of full-time personnel, a result of 
the low wages being paid, the low prestige of the service, and 
also because the question of compensation for injury or death 
had not been resolved. 
Further problems arose in the field of industrial civil 
defence2 where employers, in many cases, were slow in organising 
1T.H. O'Brien, Civil Defence, p. 185. 
2 Industrial civil defence refers ~o civil defence as it concerns 
the protection of people within factories, shops, commercial 
buildings, railway stations, etc. 
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A.R.P. units and air raid shelters for their workers. Greater 
progress with this aspect of civil defence was not made until the 
Civil Defence Act was passed in 1939. 
Following the outbreak of war and through the ensuing period 
of the 'Phoney War', many unforeseen contingencies arose. 
Military planners had considered that Germany might deliver a 
lightning blow against Britain as soon as war was declared, or 
even before. When this blow failed to come a considerable amount 
of criticism was levelled at the Government for what was generally 
termed over-insurance. The central problem was one of 
maintaining a state of readiness in many services in vulnerable 
areas for an indefinite period. This tended to affect numbers, 
efficiency, and morale. Boredom amongst volunteers and the lack 
of public prestige, particularly in the face of newspaper 
criticism caused many people to leave the service. This 
particular situation was remedied, though many new problems arose, 
with the onset of German bombing in 1940. 
One of the many features of British civil defence which was 
to have a close parallel in New Zealand, was the recruitment of 
retired military men into civil defence. In Britain many of the 
Regional Commissioners and Regional Officers of the A.R.P. were 
retired military personnel who constituted: 
The vanguard of a military penetration of significance 
(into civil defence).· Persons of military training and 
experience were to contribute substantially .•• to civil 
defence in peace and war. If their conceptions of 
administration were sometimes in conflict with civilian 
views and methods, this result was unavoidable; for civil 
defen~e was both civil and military. 1 
1T.H. O'Brien, Civil Defence, p. 181. 
9 
When the demand for a civil defence scheme arose in New 
Zealand, characteristically, this country turned to Britain, and 
had the benefit of being able to adopt a system of civil defence 
which, although still evolving, was at an advanced stage of 
development. But while this ~as advantageous for New Zealand, 
it did not prevent the repetition of some of the problems which 
had beset British civil defence at ~arious times. 
New Zealand: Wartime civil defence 
Because of its geographical isolation, New Zealand's re-
action to the deteriorating international situation was slower 
than Britain's. In preparing for civil defence the Government 
decided in 1938 to initiate the development of emergency precau-
tions organisations throughout the country. The responsibility 
for preparing a general scheme was placed with the Department of 
Internal Affairs, which, after consultation with the principal 
local authorities in 1939, issued two handbooks under the title 
of Emergency Precautions Scheme (E.P.S.); one for urban 
authorities, the other for rural. 
The E.P.S. was designed to meet emergency conditions arising 
from enemy attack, epidemics, earthquakes, and other natural 
disasters, although obviously at this time the first contingency 
was the main concern. The local authorities were requested by 
the Government to adopt the E.P.S. and their response, 
1 1 generally speaking ..• was good 1 • 
As well as adopting the British principle that community 
1A.J.H.R., 'Report of the National Service Department, H.11A, 
1943, p. 9. 
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safety was primarily a local authority responsibility, membership 
of the E.P.S. organisations was also placed on a voluntary basis. 
But during the early stages of development personnel problems 
occurred, with the work tending to fall onto the willing few 
enthusiasts. This problem was particularly acute in the main 
centres and large towns, and persisted until early in 1942. 
With the advance of the Japanese· into South East Asia and 
the Pacific Islands, the bombing of New Zealand, which had 
previously been thought unlikely, was now considered a possibility. 
Responding to this threat, the Government felt it necessary to 
introduce an extensive fire watching service in the main centres, 
but the availability of personnel impose4 limitations on the 
feasibility of such a scheme. The Government then decided that 
as the E.P.S. was for the safety of the community as a whole, 
membership should be made compulsory. This applied to all 
British subjects between the ages of 18 and 65 if they were not 
serving in the armed forces. 
The period of greatest E.P.S. activity.took place during 
194.2 when the Japanese threat was at its height. In January of 
that year the Government introduced the Emergency Shelter Regula-
tions which provided for the construction of public ~nd industrial 
shelters. The main centres and ports, considered the most likely 
and· vulnerable targets, were given the highest priority. The 
construction of shelters was the responsibility of the local 
authorities though the Government made substantial subsidy contri-
butions. 1 By the end of March 1943, there were sufficient 
1The subsidy ratio was 75% Government, 25% local authorities. To 
31 March 1943 the Government had paid out £700,000 in shelter 
construction ~ubsidies. A.J.H.R., H.l1A, 1943, p. 16. 
1 
shelters in the country to protect 150,000 people. 
Local authority fire brigades were supplemented by E.P.S. 
11 
fire sections which were intended to provide the main protection 
for residential areas. An Emergency Fire Service was also 
formed to supplement the regular fire brigades in their protection 
of the commercial areas of the main centres and ports. Although 
these fire services were never called into action as the result 
of enemy attack, the National Service Department commented that: 
Throughout the severe emergency: period in 1942 a very 
high standard of keenness and enthusiasm was evidenced, 
and, having regard to the limitations imposed by the 
short supply of essential imported equipment, particu-
larly fire hose, a very reasonable standard of efficiency 
was attained. 2 
The threat of Japanese air attack was felt so keenly during 
this period that the Government had drawn up plans for the 
evacuation of the civilian population from vulnerable areas if 
it became necessary, and, in the event of invasion, a plan for 
a scorched earth policy had been formulated by the Army and was 
to be implemented by the E.P.S. 
Op~rational and Administrative Organisation of the E.P.S. 
The E.P.S., with the Home Guard, Women's War Service Auxiliary 
and the Emergency Fire Service formed the Emergency Reserve Corps. 
This Corps was established in August 1940 and formed part of the 
na~ion's military establishment. 3 The E.P.S., however, was not 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 17. 
3Administrative responsibility for the E.P.S. had been transferred 
from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of 
National Service in June 1940. 
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under military control, 1 executive authority being invested in 
each local body operating an E.P.S. organisation. 
Closely following British practice, the country was sub-
divided into three regions, each the responsibility of a Regional 
Commissioner. The regions in turn were sub-divided into a total 
of sixteen districts, each admi~istered by a Controller. The 
regions corresponded to the three existing military districts 
and the functions of the Commissioners were similar to those of 
their British counterparts, to the extent that they were 
responsible for co-ordination between the E.P.S. organisations 
and the armed forces, and for supervising all the E.P.S. services 
within their regions. 
At the local authority level, a central committee of 
councillors possessed overall responsibility for the E.P.S. 
organisation, while operational control rested with a headquarters 
unit. (See Fig. I.) 
At the head of the E.P.S. was the Minister of Civil Defence, 
R.G. Se.mple, 2 who had jurisdiction over all Government civil 
1 I~dividual E.P.S. organisations were the responsibility of the 
local authorities, but as E.P.S. formed part of the Emergency 
Reserve Corps which was controlled by the military it was not 
at first clear who, in the last analysis, controlled the E.P.S. 
The question was r~ised in Parliament in 1941, and in an attempt 
to clarify the situation, the Minister of National Service, 
R.G. Semple stated: 
The organisation is under Civil control .•• It can be 
assumed that in the event of an enemy attack on a district 
which has no E.P.S., the military would take immediate 
control, but that, being assured of an efficient organisa-
tion to provide for the requirements of the Civil population, 
it would not take such action unless the scale of attack 
created a degree of confusion making such a course 
imperative. N.Z.P.D., Vol. 259, p. 100, 20 March, 1941. 
2
semple also held the portfolio of National Service. 
Fi~ure I: - THE WARTIME ORGANISATION OF CIVIL DEFENCE 
Minister of Civil Defence 
Civil Defence Branch National Service Department 
Dominion Fire Controller Dominion Lighting Controlle~ 
Regional Commissioners 
I 
District Controllers 
rl Government E.P. serv·ices (Personnel and Co-ordination) 
I 
Local Authority Central Committees 
I 
Local Authority H.Q. 
Controlle~s of Units 
Law & Order 
I 
Medical Communications Accommodation 
District Wardens 
I 
Block Wardens 
Street Wardens Building Wardens I School Wardens Shelter Wardens 
(if any) (if any) (if any) 
Source: A.J.H.R., Report of the National Service Department, H.IIA, 1943, p.l9. 
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defence activities, an arrangement similar to that in Britain. 
To facilitate the co-ordination of Government resources, E.P.S. 
sections were established within the individual departments both 
1 in Wellington and at district levels throughout the country. 
The disbandment of the E.P.S. 
As the Japanese threat to New Zealand rapidly diminished 
during the latter part of 1942 shelter construction was halted at 
the end of the year and civil defence operations were gradually 
scaled down. 2 In 1944 responsibility for civil defence was 
handed back to the Department of Internal Affairs, and at the end 
of the war most local E.P.S. organisations were disbanded, though 
a few reverted to their pre-war status. 
Fortunately, the E.P.S. organisations throughout New Zealand 
were never put to the test by enemy action but on two occasions 
during the war they acted in their natural disaster role. In 
July and again in August 1942 Wellington and Masterton were 
severely shaken by earthquakes. 3 Loss of life was, however, 
minimal, and the E.P.S. organisations in the two cities worked 
in conjunction with the public utilities and units of the armed 
forces to clear away rubble and demolish dangerous buildings. 
The Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act 
During the· war New Zealand had developed what appeared to be 
a highly organised and co-ordinated civil defence organisation. 
1Those departments involved were Hospitals, Public Health, 
Railways, National Road Transport, the Broadcasting Commission 
and Electricity. 
2At its peak of activity some 150,000 people had been involved 
with the E.P.S. 
3For a brief account of these earthquakes see E.C. Grayland, 
New Zealand Disasters, pp. 147-154. 
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Yet, when new civil defence measures were introduced nine years 
later, the wartime experience was largely ignored. 
In 1953 the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Bill was 
placed before Parliament. The Government appeared to be 
following the lead set by other countries, notably Britain and 
the United States, which had introduced civil defence legislation 
in 1948 and 1950 respectively, as a response to the latest 
1 . 1 development of military techno ogy - atom1c weapons. 
The emergencies referred to in the Local Authorities Emer-
gency Powers Bill were: 
.•• earthquake, fire, flood, or oth~r natural7 phenomenon, 
or from action in time of war by enemy powers- or enemy 
sympathisers, which causes or is likely to cause in New 
Zealand large scale loss of or injury or damage to life, 
health, or property. 3 
While the Bill was concerned with the threat of both enemy attack 
and natural disaster, its timing suggested that the threat of 
attack was the primary motive for introduction. Furthermore, 
the legislation appeared two years after a civil emergency 
officer had been appointed to the Department of Internal Affairs 
following a recommendation from the Defence Council. 
The Bill, which took the form of empowering legislation 
permitted local authorities 'at any time (whether during a period 
1In Britain, the 1948 Civil Defence Act had perpetuated many 
features of wartime civil defence, though the office of Regional 
Commissioner was not re-established. The Act, which was basi-
cally empowering legislation placed overall responsibility for 
civil defence with the Home Secretary but gave individual 
ministers jurisdiction over certain aspects. 
2
•Enemy powers' appeared to refer to the Soviet Union, which in 
1953 had exploded its first atomic weapon. 
3New Zeala~d Statu~, The Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act, 
1953, Section 2. 
16 
of emergency or otherwise)' to 'make arrangements' for the rescue 
of injured persons, clearing the streets of debris and providing 
. f f . 1' . 1 accommodat1on and wel are ac1 1t1es, etc. To undertake these 
functions local authorities could appoint committees and 
controllers, establish emergency posts and provide training 
facilities. Financial assistance~ if required, would be 
available from the Local Authorities Loan Board, but this was to 
be the only financial contribution by the Government. 
Apart from the financial arrangements there were a number of 
other weaknesses in the legislation. The Bill did not make it 
mandatory for local authorities to set up emergency organisations, 
except in the case where the Minister of Internal Affairs issued 
written instructions during an emergency, or in the imminent 
threat of one. Also, there was no provision for legal requisi-
tioning, and no sanctions to enforce compliance with local 
authority directives~ Further, there was n6 provision for 
compensation for injury or death when carrying out emergency work. 
Introducing the Bill into ·the House the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, W.A. Bodkin, stated: 
The Bill seeks to provide the necessary machinery to enable 
local bodies to set up an organisation to meet the situation 
that would arise following national disasters such as an 
earthquake, or a flood, or any other national calamity. It 
in no way interferes with the Public Safety Conservation Act, 
because that measure's main objective is to prevent civil 
disorders and to ensure the preservation of law and order 
..• It ~ets up an organisation comparable with the E.P.S. 
organisation set up during the war .•• Earthquake disasters 
do not affect the whole Dominion, so that a national organi-
sation is not what is required at that time but more a local 
organisation that will act quickly in case of a disaster in 
its immediate locality. 2 
1Ibid., Section 3. 
2 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 300, p. 1855, 15 October, 1953. 
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As enemy action was specifically referred to in the Bill and had 
apparently been the primary motive for its introduction, the 
Minister's omission of any reference to the contingency was 
perhaps surprising, though it suggested that the Government 
considered such an event as Lmlikely. The Minister's speech 
was also noteworthy for its complacency and the inaccuracies it 
contained. The organisatio~ envisaged in the Bill was in no way 
'comparable with the E.P.S. 1 which had involved a co-ordinated 
central Government commitment to the local authorities. In this 
legislation the complete onus was placed on the local authorities 
- there was no central Government involvement. The Minister's 
claim that 'earthquake disasters do not affect the whole 
Dominion' was in opposition to scientific evidence. 1 
The relationship between the Bill and the Public Safety 
Conservation Act was questioned by A.H. Nordmeyer for the Opposi-
tion. He argued that the former Act gave the police overall 
responsibility in a locality where an emergency occurred, if 
communications with the outside were cut off. He pointed out 
that under the new legislation the local authority would have 
complete power in an emergency. 2 The conflict, however, was 
not resolved when, with generally little interest being shown, 
the Bill passed onto the Statute Book. 
Although the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act placed 
the major responsibility for community safety on the local autho-
rities, the Government also undertook its own separate emergency 
planning. A plan, Government action in a maior em~rgency 
1For a discussion of the earthquake problem in New Zealand, 
Chapter V. 
2 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 300, p. 1857, 15 October, 1953. 
see 
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(G.A.M.E.), consisting of standing instructions to be followed 
by various Government departments and personnel, was approved by 
Cabinet in April 1954. 
In the plan the Post Office was responsible for informing 
the Government when a disaster occurred. Upon notification a 
Cabinet sub-committee and an operational centre would be estab-
lished, and, if necessary, the Prime Minister or his nominee 
would lead a field committee to the scene of the disaster by 
' 1 
whatever means possible. Once on the scene, the committee 
would contact the Cabinet sub-committee, which was to be 
responsible for the mobilisation of Government resources. 
The procedure detailed in the plan appears to have been 
cumbersome and over-centralised with Government assistance 
apparently being dependent on the ability of the field committee 
to leave Wellington. Furthermore, the procedure for calling in 
Government assistance seemed likely to incur considerable delays. 
In the case of a disaster striking Wellington the plan 
provided for an emergency committee of Government district 
officers to be established in Auckland and responsible for 
bringing assistance to the capita1. 2 This provision, having the 
appearance of a form of regional government, is of more than 
historical significance, for, as it will be shown, the idea of 
regional government during an emergency was often to be discussed 
in the 1960's but never acted upon. 
1 In addition to the 'Prime Minister or his nominee the committee 
was to include the Commissioner of Police and the Chiefs of the 
General and Air Staffs. 
2 ' 
The details of G.A.M.E. are taken from, Study Group of the N.Z. 
Institute of Public Administration, 'Organisation for Disaster', 
N.Z. Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 22, No. 1, Sept. 
1959, pp. 59-60. 
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A retrospective view of civil defence during the 1950's was 
made in 1960 when the Deputy Director of Civil Defence stated: 
The broad policy from 1953-58 in New Zealand emergency 
planning was to concentrate on major earthquakes and 
thereby cover most of the risks common in wartime attack. 
During that period people were thinking in terms of the 
atom bomb. 1 
More to the point, it appeared that little thought was given to 
the problem of either an.atomic attack or a major earthquake. 
It is doubtful if more than a few people knew of the existence of 
I 
G.A.M.E. and the implementation of the Local Authorities Emer-
gency Powers Act did not meet with much success. 
of the local authorities was 1 at best'sporadic 1 • 2 
The response 
Although the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act and 
G.A.M.E. contained many limitations, they remained the basis of 
civil defence in New Zealand during the 1950's and into the 
1960's, before the former was repealed by the Civil Defence Act 
in 1962, and the latter belatedly replaced by a new plan, 
Government Action in Major Disaster in 1966. 
Since the late 1920's New Zealand's vulnerability to natural 
disaster, particularly earthquakes, had been made only too obvious 
- Murchison 1929, Napier 1931, Wellington-Wairarapa 1942. · Yet, 
with the exception of the war years, when the threat of a Japanese 
attack was the paramount concern, this country failed to appre-
ciate the need for a permanent emergency organisation. The fact 
1Address to the Homeserviceman's Association. Reported in the 
Christchurch Star, 29 August 1960. 
2Ministry of Civil Defence, Notes for Government Members 
(Wellington, 1968), p. 1. 
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that the Emergency Precautions Scheme was allowed to lapse at the 
end of the war and the inadequacy of the Local Authorities Emer-
gency Powers Act in the post-war period both underlined New 
Zealand's failure to recognise the persistent danger of natural 
disaster. Not until the mid 1960's was a change in attitude 
evident. 
2] 
CHAPTER II 
RENEWED CONCERN: THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK 
After 1953 what interest there had been in civil defence 
disappeared. During the period 1953-58 no mention of the Local 
Authorities Emergency Powers Act was made in Parliament; the 
annual reports of the Department of Internal Affairs referred 
. 1 1 d th 1 f f th c t" d to 1t on y once, an e annua con erences o e oun 1es an 
Municipal Associations remained silent on the topic throughout. 
The MinisttY_of Civil Defence 
The question of civil defence was not raised again until 
1958 when a section of the Government's White Paper, Review of 
Defence, called for the 'planning, preparation, training and 
public education for civil defence in war', and stated that a 
Ministry of Civil Defence would be established. 
The need for civil defence was based on the reasoning that: 
The safeguarding and educating of the civil population 
_against the nuclear effects of war must, for the first time, 
become an essential part of national defence plans. The 
geographical position of New Zealand no longer affords the 
country security from the worst impact of global conflict. 
A nuclear war and the hazards to c~vilian population of 
radioactivity will not necessarily be confined to the 
countries of the main combatants. Radioactivity knm-.Js 
neither frontiers nor distance and the contamination of 
nuclear weapons could assume \vorld wide proportions •.. The 
defence plan must also take into account the possibility of 
a direct attack on this country with nuclear or non-nuclear 
weapons. Even a single submarine armed with guided 
missiles would offer a considerable threat to our shores. 2 
This reasoning was~ however, qualified with the view that: 
] ~d.H.R.:., Report of the Department of Internal Affairs, H.22, 
1954, p. 14. The Act was referred to in a review of new legis-
lation affecting local authorities. 
2 Ibid., Review of Defence, A.l2, 1958, p. 15. 
Civil defence planning is not related to any belief that 
a nuclear threat to New Zealand is imminent, but it is 
considered that we should have the foundations of such an 
organisation ready. 1 
The proposals for civil defence may be seen as a reaction 
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to rapidly developing military technology. During the previous 
five years, though particularly in 1957, there had been major 
advances in the development of nuclear weapons and their methods 
of delivery. In 1957 Russia and the Unit~d States had test-
fired intercontinental ballistic missiles, Russia had launched 
the first satellite, and the U.S. was known to be building missile 
firing submarines. The development of these new delivery systems 
meant that New Zealand's isolated geographical position no longer 
provided it with what had hitherto been virtual immunity from 
nuclear attack. 
The 1958 Defence Review, however, gave no indication that 
New Zealand was even a potential nuclear target. The underlying 
assumption behind the White Paper seems to have been that although 
the chances of an attack on New Zealand were remote, its geogra-
phical isolation did not obviate a pre-emptive nuclear strike. 
As the main issue of the 1958 White Paper was the abolition 
of compulsory military service, the civil defence proposals 
passed virtually unnoticed in Parliament and the press. Because 
of its controversial content, the Opposition charged the Govern-
ment with deliberately delaying the publication of the White Paper 
until after the annual conference of the Returned Servicemans 
? 
Association (R. S .A.) at Wellington in June 1958.'"" At the 
11 b'id . ' p . 16 . 
2For Opposition accusations 
cation of the White Paper, 
2 July, 1958. 
--------------------------------
i 
of the Government delaying the publi-
see N.Z.P.D., Vol. 316, p. 366, 
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conference, however, a call was made for the establishment of a 
l 
. . . ] 
civi defence organ1sat1on. Whether this move on the part of 
the R.S.A. was pure coincidence or the result of 'leaked' infor-
mation is a matter of conjecture, but by publicising the need for 
civil defence the conference provided the Government with an 
opportune time to relea$e the White Paper. Yet, when it was 
eventually debated in the 1958 Parliament no mention was made of 
civil defence - a minor issue compared with the politics of 
military service. 
Parliament: Reaction 
If little interest was shown in the civil defence proposals 
contained in the White Paper, this was equally true of the estab-
lishment of the Ministry of Civil Defence as a branch of the 
Department of Internal Affairs on 6 April 1959. Parliament was 
not in session at the time and when theHouse resumed in June the 
new 'Ministry was an established fact, and within the wider context 
of the issues before Parliament, c~vil defence generated only 
passing interest. 
The Minister of Finance, A.H. Nordmeyer, made the first 
statement to Parliament on civil defence policy in October, when 
he stated: 
It was hoped to have a much more effective system of civil 
defence which could operate not only in the event of war but 
also in event of an earthquake or other major disaster. 2 
,, 
It had now become apparent that the original rationale for civil 
defence had been extended. This was in keeping with previous 
1 . For a r~port of the R.S.A. conference, see Evening Post, Welling-
ton, 19 June, 1958. 
2 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 321, p. 2398, 13 October, 1959~ 
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civil defence measures, introduced primarily in response to 
defence considerations then, almost as an afterthought, extended 
to cover natural disaster. 
As a reflection of the limited interest in civil defence, 
it was not until July 1960 that a full debate on the subject took 
place. At this point the Minister of Defence, P.G. Connelly, 
took it upon himself to inform the House of the need for protec-
tion against nuclear attack, although the civil defence portfolio 
was, in fact, the responsibility of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, W.T. Anderton. Connelly informed the House t~at a 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile test fired across the 
Pacific in 1958: 
was only 1.4 miles off its target at the end of 7,760 miles 
... Fired from any of the countries of South East Asia it 
could have blown Auckland to pieces. 
Interjection: Hon. R.M. Algie, Why not Dunedin? 
Connelly: Because Dunedin is of no military significance. 
The destruction of Auckland would mean the major destruction 
of the three arms of our services. Had the missile been 
fired from eastern Russia, China, Korea, Formosa, Thailand, 
Iridonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, it would have hit almost 
any city in New Zealand. The development of nuclear sub-
marines is another factor. We have been advised that by 
next year the three major navies of the world will have 
submarines capable of standing 1,500 miles offshore and, 
while submerged, firing a missile to hit a target on land 
... We should let the people know what they should do in 
matters of civil defence against the attacks which could be 
launched on this country in the way I have mentioned. 1 
The Opposition appeared to be in sympathy with the Government 
on the need for civil defence but attacked it for the delay in 
implementing a scheme. W.B. Tennant (Manawatu) pointed out that: 
While we talk in hushed and subdued tones about the possibi-
lity of atomic warfare - apparently we are not supposed to 
] Ibid., Vol. 322, pp. 213-14, 1 July, 1960. 
talk about this in public - every white country in the 
British Commonwealth is preparing and has in fact in 
most cases implemented preparations for such a (civil 
defence) schemeo 1 
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He noted that Connelly's speech: 
highlights the need for something to be done in the matter 
of civil defenceG If the situation does not warrant the 
setting up of such an organisation, then why did the 
Government twelve months ago write to every local body 
asking for the setting up of a civil defence organisation? 
If the situation internally or internationally warrants 
the establishment of the organisation - as the Government 
ev·idently believes it does - then the Government should 
accept its responsibility to give the necessary leadership, 
leadership which is at present pitifully absent. 2 
The Government was certainly open to critic ism as its 
approach to civil defence betrayed a lack of serLous intent. 
The Ministry had been established thirteen months before, yet, 
in that time it had remained little more than a creation on paper; 
progress in implementing a civil defence scheme had been non-
existento There was not even any clear indication of the format 
the organisation would take, and conflicting ministerial state-
ments on the purpose of civil defence indicated the absence of a 
coherent policy. In fact, it was not until October 1960 that 
the Minister gave an account of civil defence policy in the House. 
In fue course of his speech Anderton explained that officers of 
his Department: 
were concentrating on the danger of earthquakes which was 
as important as any other danger ••• It seemed unwise to 
him to concentrate efforts against the possibility of 
nuclear attack, but if there should be such an attack the 
most important thing was to guard against the dangers of 
fall-out rather than blast. 3 
1Ibid., p. 410, 7 July, 1960. 
2 Ibid. 
3-----:-IQi£., Vol. 324, p. 2732, 4 October, 1960. 
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This statement appeared in conflict with that made by the Minister 
of Defence in July. In fact, there seemed to be considerable 
confusion in Anderton's mind about the current civil defence 
policy. He was clearly labouring under difficulties, particu-
larly as his Ministry was not yet in a position to offer him 
expert advice. When this did become available much of it was 
contrary to information initially made public by the Minister. 
Local government reaction to the new civil defence proposals 
The civil defence proposals of 1958 appear to have pass~d 
unnoticed by the local authorities, and not until 1961 was there 
any significant discussion on the topic. In the light of the 
new developments it was rather surprising that the only interest 
·.shown in the Local Authorities Emergency. Powers Act came after the 
new scheme for civil defence had been proposed. At the 1959 
conference of the Municipal Association 1 a remit was put forward 
by the Wellington City Council requesting the Government to pay 
compensation from the funds of the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission to any person injured during the operations of a local 
authority emergency organisation. 2 The remit was carried by the 
conference but rejected by the Department of Internal Affairs on 
1The Municipal Association along with the Counties Association 
represent the intarests of all the territorial local authorities 
in the country. Both Associations meet annually to discuss 
matters affecting local government and to consider remits from 
individual local authorities - most of which are requests to the 
Gover.nment seeking changes to legislation affecting their opera-
tion. The day to day running of the Associations is the respon-
sibility of permanent secretaries and relations with central 
Government are well developed. Access to Ministers is well 
defined and both Associations are represented on the many Govern-
ment committees and agencies concerned with local body admini-
stration. 
2 New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Forty-
sixth Conference, 1959, p. 90. 
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the grounds that: 
The general policy of the Government is that the cost of 
civil defence schemes at the local level should be borne 
by the local authorities ... The purpose of the Earthquake 
and War Damage Fund is to provide a means whereby property 
can be reinstated, whereas the primary purpose of civil 
defence is to protect persons. 1 
The Wellington remit was the first of a long series of similar 
remits to be put to successive conferences requesting financial 
assistance from the Government for civil defence, and one of a 
number which mistakenly considered the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission as a source of funds. 
The Minister of Civil Defence made good use of the platform 
provided for him at the annual conferences of the Municipal and 
Counties Associations to expound the purpose of civil defence 
and the structure of the proposed organisation. One of the 
earliest ministerial pronouncements was made to the Counties 
Association in June 1959. In discussing the concept of civil 
defence the Minister commented: 
No· one here, I am sure, will misunderstand the meaning of 
the word defence in this context. It has no military 
aspect and does not mean meeting an invading force on the 
beaches or in the streets as the Horne Guard was ready to do 
during the war. It means defence of the civil population 
in a protective sense, and is really a modernised version 
of the E.P.S. as we knew it in those dreadful days. 2 
The Minister went on to say: 
I would not like you to imagine that this is an entirely new 
venture and that we have come to it rather belatedly. We 
have had a civil emergency scheme for quite a few years now. 
It came into being with the Local Authorities Emergency 
1Minister of Internal Affairs to the Secretary of the Municipal 
Association, Letter, 10 February, 1960. 
2New Zealarid Counties Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-
fourth Conference, 1959, p. 21. 
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Powers Act of 1953, and my Department then prepared a scheme 
for cop~ng with major emergencies from :natural causes such 
as earthquakes, fires, tornadoes .•. The c~vil defence 
scheme will not be separate and distinct from the civil 
emergency scheme. In fact, the two will be merged into one 
to produce a single scheme of civil defence against 
eventualities of all kinds. Consequently all the prepara-
tions will be geared to the wartime situation but they will 
nevertheless, be usable in any lesser emergency. 1 
The Minister's statement indicated that the primary concern of 
civil defence was to be with wartime emergency. He also stressed 
' 
to the Counties Association the importance of local authority 
participation in civil defence: 
The scheme will be developed through two agencies closely 
linked together. (Firstly), the Ministry of Civil Defence 
controlled by the Minister working through the Director of 
Civil Defence in the usual way. (Secondly), a civil 
defence corps operating in local units organised by the local 
bodies concerned, and supported by the local police and fire 
services. 2 
At this stage, the regional element of the organisation appeared 
not to have been finalised, though applications for Regional 
Commissioners were called for within two months. 
In. December 1959, the Minister informed the Municipal 
Association that: 
At the local level the obligation is on the local authorities 
to organise operationally for the protection of their local 
populations and power to do this is given in the Local 
Authorities Emergency Powers Act. The Government feels that 
the local authorities should bear the costs of establishing 
operational units, and past experience has shown that those 
which have organised Emergency Precautions Schemes have not 
been involved in any great expenditure. 3 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 22. 
3Minister of Civil Defence to Secretary of the Municipal Associa-
tion, Letter, 16 December, 1959. This letter was the result of 
representations made to the Minister concerning the financing of 
the civil defence scheme. 
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The importance of local authority participation ~n civil defence 
was being stressed to a degree which they were unprepared to 
tolerate, and which, at a later date, led them to demand a co-
ordinated central Government commitment to civil defence. The 
Minister's remarks about 'expenditure• left the local authorities 
unconv.inced, and critical of the proposed method for financing 
local organisations. Moreover, the emphasis placed on nuclear 
warfare led some members of the Municipal Association to expound 
the view that civil defence was a national matter and as such the 
costs of a protection scheme should be met by the Government. 
The greater problem was, however, the Government's failure 
to inform the local authorities of their specific responsibilities. 
In September.1959 a pamphlet had been distributed by the Ministry 
outlining proposals for the civil defence scheme, but they were 
only of a general nature. Not until late in 1960 was the 
Ministry able to provide more detailed proposals, but again 
generalities were emphasised rather than specifics. 1 
In the eighteen months following the establishment of the 
Ministry of Civil Defence the local authorities were justifiably 
critical of Government inactivity. The Minister's address to the 
Municipal Association in 1960 may be seen as an attempt to 
counter criticism of Government inaction: 
I should mention that there need be no emotional propaganda 
that could create a fear complex with the public, but if 
civil defence schemes are developed gradually and effectively 
in line with the proposals promulgated much will have been 
achieved. 2 
1For details of these proposals see Chapter IV, pp. 60-63. 
2New Zealand Municipal Association, ProceediDgs of the Forty-
seventh Conference, 1960, p. 11. 
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'Gradually' was very much the operative word, in view of the 
negligible progress being made. At the same conference, the 
President of the Municipal Association voiced his concern at the 
slow progress and the lack of definite proposals, particularly 
financial, when he reviewed the situation: 
The Government has called for applications for positions 
of Regional Directors (Commissioners). Apart from this, 
however, there is no indication that the Government is 
meeting the cost, or any substantial part of the cost, of 
any such civil defence scheme, and it would appear that the 
Government is looking to the local authorities to meet the 
costs involved. This matter has been taken up with the 
Minister of Civil Defence since it is considered that it is 
a national,matter upon which the Government should give some 
definite lead insofar as costs are concerned. 1 
The representations to the Minister failed as the Government 
considered the responsibility for underwriting the cost of civil 
defence schemes rested with the local authorities. The 
Government had appropriated £10,000 for civil defence during the 
1959 session of Parliament and the Minister considered this to be 
a 'not inconsiderable financial contribution by Government 1 • 2 · 
This money was, however, for establishing the Ministry of Civil 
Defence, the appointment of Regional Commissioners and for 
training purposes. 
With the return of the National Party to power in November 
1960, F.L.A. Gotz was appointed Minister of Civil Defence. There 
was, however, no discernible change in the new Government's 
approach to civil defence. In his first address to the Municipal 
Association in 1961 the Minister reiterated much of what his 
1 Ibid.' pp. 28-9. 
2Minister of Civil Defence to the Secretary of the Municipal 
Association, Letter, 16 December, 1959. 
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Labour predecessor had said, but added a new list of horrors which 
could strike the nation. Anderton's plea to the same Association 
the previous year, not to create a 'fear complex' went unheeded 
as the Minister pointed out that: 
(Civil defence) is to inform the pedple of the dangers that 
can exist in a world moving as fast as ours is today, to 
protect them from toxic gases, nuclear fall-out, from 
poisons, from epidemics, from plagues - not that we expect 
these things; we do not; but we cannot lose sight of the 
fact that weapons of unspeakable horror exist in the world 
today and we have a duty to safeguard our people .•. So 
long as such weapons exist and the occasional earthquake 
still occurs then so long must we be prepared to guard 
against the effects of these things ..• I wish (civil 
defence) were not necessary, but it is necessary, even as 
a protection against earthquakes and devastating floods. 
Just as it is our duty to guard against them, so it is our 
duty, no less, to guard against potential dangers which can 
come from the skies. 1 
In contrast to Gotz's emotional rhetoric, his deprecating 
attitude towards, and failure to emphasise the known danger of 
natural disaster in New Zealand, the delegates to the conference 
to.ok a more realistic-view of the situation when a remit was put 
forward_ proposing that: 
All preliminary investigations concerning the civil defence 
and disaster scheme be carried out on a national basis and 
that when such research is completed local authorities be 
delegated power to implement the proposals brought forward 
by the national body. 2 
The underlying concern of the remit was financial, and a rider 
att.ached considered that an expensive disaster scheme might be 
unwarranted if preliminary research were carried out. If such a 
scheme were required, however, it was suggested that methods of 
combatting different types of disasters should be known. 
1New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Forty-
eighth Conference, 1961, pp. 11-12. 
2 Ibid., p. 91. 
At the 1962 conference of the Municipal Association some 
delegates expressed misgivings about the way in which civil 
defence was being approached. One considered that: 
the whole thing had been bungled. The very term civil 
defence suggested something of a military nature, and the 
local bodies did not want anything to do with something 
that savoured of being the fourth arm of the defence 
forces. 1 
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Another expressed the widely held view that 'they should forget 
about atomic fall-out and should set about organising small 
2 flying squads for flood, search and rescue, fire and earthquake'. 
The Mayor of Wellington, F. Kitts, saw the central direction of 
civil defence as an attack on local authority autonomy. He 
said: 
The matter should be handled by the local authorities them-
selves. If it is passed to the Government, a further 
weakening of local control would ensue, with a lessening 
in the autonomy of local bodies. 3 
Although there was no opposition to the principle of civil 
defence a general lack of interest in the scheme was evident. 
The President effectively summed up the attitude of the local 
authorities when he said: 
The organisation of local schemes still appears to be 
lagging and there does not appear to be any great enthusiasm 
on the part of our members to commit their local authorities 
.•• It does appear that the local authorities expect a 
greater lead from the Government than has so far been give:n. 4 
The passing of the Civil Defence Act later in the year, important 
1New. Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Forty-ninth 
Conference, 1962, pp. 92-3. 
2 Ibid . , p. 9 2 . 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 20. 
as it was, did not provide the necessary 'lead' for local 
authority planning, and not until 1963 was the Ministry in a 
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position to do this. Financial assistance was not forthcoming 
until 1966. 
The civil defence proposals in the 1958 Defence White Paper 
appeared as a rather startled reaction to rapidly changing 
military technology, with Soviet rocket testing in the Pacific 
having brought the new developments uncomfortably close to home. 
The reasoning behind the White Paper was, however, too hypothe-
tical to incur criticism, and anyway, there was always the escape 
clause, 'Civil defence planning is not related to any belief that 
1 h N Z 1 d ... ,1 a nuc ear t reat to ew ea an 1s 1mm1nent . 
Although the White Paper may now, with twelve years hind-
sight, be regarded as perhaps an over-reaction to an undefined 
threat, it must be remembered that the late 1950's were the 
beginning of a new era in weaponry, with its associated vocabulary 
of I.C.B.M.'s, nuclear deterrents, massive retaliation and the 
like. Those who observed the developments saw a threat to New 
Zealand. The Dunedin Evening Star in July 1960 commented in an 
editorial: 
1 
New Zealanders would be foolish to assume that in the event 
of a third world war the remoteness of their country from 
the major storm centers would be a guarantee of security 
against enemy attack. In this nuclear age most parts of the 
earth's surface are vulnerable to sudden onslaught, and 
since the Dominion would automatically become involved in 
any conflict engaging the British Commonwealth and the 
United States, it follows that our people must be prepared 
A.J.H.R., Review of Defence, A.l2, 1958, p. 16. 
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to defend themseLves in time of emergency. 1 
As New Zealand is a nation of very limited military and 
strategic significance, discussion of the country's potential as 
a nuclear target must necessarily be speculative. 2 In 1958, 
however, the Labour Government did consider there was a threat, 
though remote, and New Zealand should therefore be prepared. 
Yet the delay in.· implementing a civil defence scheme after the 
publication of the White Paper raised doubts as to how seriously 
the Government viewed the threat. 
Had the Department of Defence perhaps given greater prior 
consideration to the requirements of a civil defence scheme before 
responsibility for implementation was transferred to the new 
Ministry of Civil Defence, the completion of detailed proposals 
may have been possible at an earlier date. But, the Government, 
assisted by the emotive rhetoric of some of its ministers, laid 
itself open to criticism on the grounds that if it took the 
1Evening Star, Dunedin, 28 July, 1960. 
2For a ~peculative discussion see W. David Mcintyre, Britain. New 
Zealand and the Security of South East Asia in the 1970s 
('Wellington, N.Z. Institute of International Affairs, 1969), pp. 
27-28. Here the author utilises an argument of Liddell-Hart in 
discussing a stance of neutralism or non-ali~nment for New 
Zealand. Liddell-Hart has suggested that a small ally of a 
nation possessing nuclear weapons could be used as a 'nuclear 
hostage' in a dispute with another nuclear power. The strategy 
would permit the belligerent power to demonstrate its nuclear 
capability without engaging in a direct confrontation with the 
other nuclear power. The hopeful result of the strategy could 
be the settlement of the dispute without full scale nuclear war, 
and with the loss only of an 'expendable ally'. Such a 'theory', 
of course, defeats the purpose of alliances. 
Should New Zealand at any time contain significant military 
installations the position could be changed. It has been argued 
that the American submarine navigation station in North West 
Australia constitutes a potential nuclear target. See J.G. 
Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, Melbourne Univer-
sity Press, 1965), p. 223. 
problem seriously, then, 'why was it not doing something about 
it? I 
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The Ministry was not, however, in a position to begin 
implementing a civil defence scheme until after Regional Commis-
sioners were appointed in June 1960. Until that time, the 
Ministry had remained little more than a paper creation since its 
establishment thirteen months before. 
The disturbing, though almost predictable, feature of the 
renewed interest in civil defence was the extent to which it had 
been motivated almost solely by the hypothetical threat of 
nuclear attack and not by reference to the known' threat of 
natural disaster. Although it was envisaged that the proposed 
organisation would fulfil a dual function, the initial emphasis 
on the threat of nuclear attack prevailed until 1964. At"1that 
time, as a later chapter will show, the threat was deemed to 
exist no longer and belatedly the rationale for civil defence 
became the country's vulnerability to natural disaster. But 
this is to anticipate the discussion. The mbst immediate demand 
in 1960 was to provide a legislat~ve basis on which the new 
organisation could be established. 
CHAPTER III 
LEGISLATION: THE CIVIL DEFENCE ACT, 1962 
The establishment of the Ministry of Civil Defence1 in 
April 1959 did not require any major reorganisation with the 
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Government or the Public Service. The decision to incorporate 
the new Ministry in the Department of Internal Affairs 2 appears 
to have been based on the Department's historical responsibility 
for local government, and its administration of previous civil 
defence schemes. 
The Government did not appoint new staff to the Ministry, 
but decided that civil defence positions would be held in 
conjunction with those of the Department of Internal Affairs. 
Consequently the Secretary of the Department took the additional 
title of Director of Civil Defence and an Assistant Secretary 
became Deputy Director. The absence of staff permanently res-
ponsible for civil defence at the national level was not altered 
until 1965 when a full-time Director was appointed. 
One of the earliest decisions made by the Ministry, and one 
which was to largely determine the structure of the civil defence 
1The designation ministry, rather than department, was in response 
to the anticipated role of the Ministry in co-ordinating those 
Government departments involved with civil defence. It is inter-
esting to note that during the National Administrations of the 
1960's the designation Ministry had been used to signify a co-
ordinating function in cases of department amalgamation, for 
example, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Transport. Notwith-
standing the co-ordinating functions of the Ministry of Civil 
Defence it retains a rather unique character as a ministry with-
in a department. 
2 The Department of Internal Affairs is a general purpose depart-
ment responsible for a multitude of activities ranging from the 
issuing of passports and raffle licences to the protection of 
wildlife. In the capacity of Ministry for Local Government the 
Department also has a general purview over local authority 
affairs. 
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. . d .. f R. lC · · l organ1.sat1.on, was a vert1.s1.ng or eg1.ona omm1.ss1.oners. The 
original intention had been to have four, but only three were 
appointed. 2 They were men of considerable standing; Brigadier 
J.T. Burrows and Commodore P. Bourke were retired military 
officers, and Sir Geoffrey Peren, a retired academic. 3 
As well as being responsible for the development of civil 
defence within their own regions, the Regional Commissioners were 
to take a major part in the decision-making process within the 
Ministry. The most important component of this process was a 
f h ld h h . W 11 . . 4 Th con erence, e every two to t ree mont s 1.n e 1.ngton. e 
conferences, usually chaired by the Deputy Director of Civil 
Defence (Assistant Secretary of Internal Affairs) were attended 
on a regular basis by the Regional Commissioners, periodically by 
the Director (Secretary of Internal Affairs) and occasionally by 
the Minister. 
Until the appointment of a full-time Director the conferences 
tended to be very informal with discussion often diverging widely 
1The terms of employment for the Regional Commissioners were part-
time, requiring a minimum of twenty hours per week. Initially 
it was envisaged that more time would be required then diminish-
ing as civil defence developed. Details of employment taken 
from the New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 24 August, 1959. 
2 It had initially been intended to create four regions, two in 
each Island. But with the appointment of only three Regional 
Commissioners the South Island became a single region. I was 
informed by the former Director of Civil Defence, Brigadier R.C. 
Queree, that the decision to revert to three regions was because 
of the absence of Internal Affairs Department representation in 
Dunedin. (In;erview: Wellington, 2 September, 1969.) It 
would seem, however, that the main reason was the inability to 
obtain a fourth Regional Commissioner. 
3Burrows was appointed to the Southern Region based on Christ-
church. Bourke was appointed to the Northern Region based on 
Auckland .. Peren was appointed to the Central Region based on 
Palmerston North. 
4 The reports of these conferences will be cited in footnotes as 
H[ead] O[ffice] C[onferenc~] R[eports], Month, Year. 
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from the agenda. After 1965 they lost a degree of their infor-
mality, and some of their importance as a body, when it became 
apparent that more decisions were being taken independently at 
the Directorate level. To some extent, this was understandable 
as the conferences did not have a defined role within the 
administrative structure of the Ministry. ln fact, many of the 
topics considered at the conferences, after the passage of the 
Civil Defence Act in 1962, should have been, in theory, the 
responsibility of the national civil defence committee (N.C.D.C.) 
1 
which was set up by the Act. But the N.C~D.C. did not meet 
until February 1964, and then in rather embarrassing circum-
2 
stances. 
The first conference was held in June 1960 following the 
appointment of the three Regional Commissioners. This was two 
years after the publication of the 1958 Defence Review and fifteen 
months since the establishment of the Ministry. This delay led 
to the conclusion in the previous chapter which questioned the 
degree of Government concern for the threat outlined in the White 
Paper. Furthermore, it also illustrated the extent to which the 
Ministry of Civil Defence had remained little more than a paper 
creation, prior to the appointment of the Regional Commissioners. 
Following the first conference, 3 the Regional Commissioners 
ret·urned to their regions to publicise the importance of civil 
defence to the local authorities and obtain from them a commitment 
1For details of the committee composition and functinns see 
Chapter III, p. 40. 
2For details see Chapter Vl, pp. 100-103. 
3The June conference was almost wholly concerned with defining the 
functions of the Regional Commissioners. For details see 
Chapter VI, P• 95. 
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in principle to the scheme. From the discussions, it was ma.de 
readily apparent to the Regional Commissioners that the proposed 
organisation required a co-ordinated central Government commitment 
and legislative definition. The point was well made, for the 
Department of Internal Affairs commented in 1961 that: 
Those local authorities which are anxious to play their full 
part in civil defence planning, and the Ministry itself, are 
handicapped by a lack of legislative definition of the role 
of central Government in this field. 1 
The Director had briefly raised the topic of legislation in 
June 1960 when he informed the Regional Commissioners that as the 
Ministry did not have any statutory directive powers, legislation 
ld b . d 2 wou e requ1re . At first it appeared that the inadequate 
Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act would be resurrected but 
. 1 . d th t . h . . 3 1t was soon rea 1se a a new approac was 1mperat1ve. The 
result was the Civil Defence Bill which gave legislative 
definition to an organisation designed to command and co-ordinate 
resources in case of hostile attack or natural disaster. 
The Civil Defence Bill 1962 
The Civil Defence Bill, 4 passed by Parliament in December 
1 A.J.H.R., Report of the Department of Internal Affairs, H.22, 
1961, p. 44. 
2H.O.C.R., June 1960. 
3During their discussions with the local authorities the Regional 
C6mmissioners advised those wishing to establish civil defence 
organisations that they had power to do so under the Local Autho-
rities Emergency Powers Act. The Minister of Civil Defence also 
made a similar reference to the Act when he addressed the 
Municipal Association in 1959. See Chapter II, p. 28. 
4All references to the Civil Defence Act, 1962, are to the 
Reprinted Act, April, 1969 which incorporates the principal Act 
and amendments of 1965, 1967 and 1968. Unless otherwise stated 
references to the principal Act will be given as Civil Defence 
Act, 1962. 
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1962, was a substantial piece of legislation containing over 
fifty clauses in five parts: Administration, Civil Defence 
Regions, Declaration of National Emergency or of a State of Major 
Disaster, 1 Duties and Powers of Local Authorities, Miscellaneous. 
Administration 
This section of the Bill detailed the role of the Director 
of Civil Defence in both his administrative and operational 
capacities. In the former role he was to be responsible for 
advising and assisting the Minister and the local authorities. 
In a national emergency or a state of major disaster, he was to 
be responsible for: 
Co-ordinating the use of ... the personnel, material and 
services made available by Departments of State, other 
Government agencies, statutory corporations, public bodies, 
other organisations, and otherwise for the purpose of civil 
defence .•• 2 
Provision was made for a national civil defence committee. 
This committee was to consist of the heads of a number of Govern-
ment departments and agencies, 3 with its general function being: 
To advise and assist the Minister and Director in the 
planning and implementation of all measures considered 
necessary or desirable for the establishment, maintenance, 
and effective operation of civil defence. 4 
1The term 'major disaster' was replaced in the principal Act with 
the term 'civil defence emergency' by the Civil Defence Amendment 
Act, 1968. 
2ci~il Defence Act, 1962, s8, subss3. 
3Permanent members of the committee include, the Director of Civil 
Defence, Commissioner of Police, Commissioner of Works, Secretary 
for Transport, Chief of the Defence Staff, Director-General of 
Health, Director-General of the Post Office, General Manager of 
Railways, Chairman of the Social Security Commission, Secretary 
of Industries and Commerce, Director-General of Broadcasting. 
Other persons may be appointed from time to time- Ibid., slO, 
subss2. · 
4 Ibid., sll, subssl. 
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A further section made provision for planning committees. Where 
they produced plans which involved Government departments or 
agencies it was mandatory for them to carry out the requirements 
imposed. 
C~vil Defence Regions 
Under this heading the Bill gave legislative definition to 
the regional approach to civil defence, and detailed the powers 
and functions of the Regional Commissioners. Their role was to 
be similar to that of the Director, involving both administrative 
and operational functions. They were to be responsible for 
assisting the local authorities generally in the preparation of 
civil defence plans, and co-ordinating resources in time of 
disaster or emergency. To facilitate co-ordination regional 
civil defence committees were established, their functions being: 
To assist the Regional Commissioners to plan the use of, 
co-ordinate, and use for the purposes of this Act, 
personnel, material, and services made available within 
the region ••• by Departments of State, other Government 
ag~ncies, statutory corporations, public bodies, other 
organisations, or otherwise. 1 
Declaration of National Emergency or of a State of Maior Disaster 
This section of the Bill embodied the dual purpose of civil 
defence. Provision was made for the Executive Council, with or 
without the Governor-General, and for the Prime Minister to 
declare a state of national emergency which was defined as: 
An emergency due to an actual or imminent attack on New 
Zealand by an enemy, or to any actual or imminent warlike 
act whether directed against New Zealand or not, whereby 
loss of life or injury or distress to persons or danger to 
the safety of the public is caused or threatened to be 
1Ibid., s20, subss3. 
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caused in New Zealand, or any part of New Zealand. 1 
Section 22 gave the Minister of Civil Defence power to declare 
states of national or regional major disaster; a major disaster 
being: 
Any fire, explosion, earthquake, eruption, seismic sea wave, 
flood, storm, tornado, or other happening (not attributable 
to an attack by an enemy or to any warlike act) •.. 2 
The chairman or civil defence controller of a local authority was 
empowered to declare a state of local major disaster if a state 
of major disaster had not been declared, and the Regional Commis-
sioners were empowered to declare states of regional major 
disaster. States of both emergency and disaster were to last 
for twenty-eight days and couLd be extended. 
Duties and Powers of. Local Authorities 
A provision in this part of the Bill stated that 'every local 
authority shall prepare a local civil defence plan', which was to 
be submitted to the Regional Commissioners for approva1. 3 
Provision was· also made for local authorities to unite for civil 
defence purposes. When states of emergency or disaster were 
declared the local authorities were empowered to undertake 
act~vities ranging from the clearing of streets to 'the relief of 
distress and for welfare generally 1 • 4 If local authority 
per'sonnel were unable to carry out any of these activities, 
responsibility would then rest with the senior officer of the 
police in the locality. 
1Ibid.' s2. 
2 Ibid.' s2. 
3 Ibid., s27, subssl. 
4 Ibid.' s38, subssl. 
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If the magnitude of the disaster or emergency appeared to be 
beyond the local authority's ability to cope, it could 'call upon 
the Regional Commissioner to take such steps as he considers 
necessary or desirable 1 • 1 The local authority would then 
exercise powers under the 'direction of the Regional Commis-
. I 2 
s~oner . 
The remainder of this section of the Bill dealt with 
pensions and compensation for persons suffering death and injury, 
as.well as damage to or loss of property during a state of 
emergency or disaster. These provisions, however, only applied, 
to civil defence personnel and only during the period the decla-
ration remained in force. Under section 44 pensions in respect 
to death or disablement would be provided by the Government under 
the War Pensions Act but only for a period of twelve months 
following the enactment of the Civil Defence Bill. After that 
time the provision would apply only to those local authorities 
which had 'established a civil defence organisation' . 3 
For those local authorities who wished to borrow money for 
civil defence purposes, finance would be available from the Local 
Authorities Loans Board. 
Miscellaneous 
Incorporated Ln this section were a number of minor provi-
sions which included the protection of ci'vil defence personnel 
from liability, requisitioning powers for local authorities, 
1Ibid., s39, subssl. 
2 Ibid. 3-- . 
New Zealand Statutes, Civil Defence Bill, New Zealand Parliamen-
tary Bills, passed and lapsed. Nos. 1-60, 1962. 
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powers for the evacuation of buildings, provision for civil 
defence police, and penalties for offences committed against the 
Act. 
The Governor-General was empowered to make regulations 'for 
the purpose of securing the public safety and generally safe-
guarding the interests of the public during any state of national 
emergency or of major disaster' . 1 Finally, the Act amended the 
Public Safety Conservation Act of 1932 to avoid any conflict, and 
repealed the Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act of 1953. 
The Civil Defence Bill gave legislative definition to an 
organisation based. on a three-tier structure; national, regional 
and local, a pattern resembling the wartime Emergency Precautions 
Scheme. 
While the Bill placed the primary responsibility for the 
safety of the community on the local authorities, they were to be 
assisted by a co-ordinated system of Government support. In the 
case of a localised natural disaster the local authority in the 
area would be responsible for carrying out civil defence opera-
tions, but if unable to cope, regional and national assistance 
could be called upon. Where a hostile attack or major natural 
disaster occurred the regional headquarters and the local organi-
sations would be placed under the direction of the :national head-
quarters. In both cases, however, something more than a legisla-
tive definition of functions was required - a detailed plan of 
Government action was necessary, though one was not forthcoming 
until 1965. 
1
civil Defence Act, 1962, s55, subss1. 
The C~vil Defence Bill and the legislative process 
The Civil Defence Bill passed by Parliame.nt at the end of 
1962 differed in a number of respects from the original draft 
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Bill which was first submitted to the Regional Commissioners for 
their comments in October 1960. Two officers of the Department 
of Internal Affairs, P.J. O'Dea and B.D. Crompton, were 
responsible for drafting the legislation, a task carried out 
with considerable speed. One change requested by the Regional 
Commissioners at the October conference was that reference to 
property in the Bill be removed, as civil defence, they argued, 
was only for the protection of people. They also asked for an 
extra clause to be inserted giving the. local authorities some 
powers of requisitioning. It was also considered that civil 
defence planning by the local authorities should be made as 
nearly mandatory as possible without actually directing them. 
This, it was agreed, could be achieved by the use of the word 
'responsibility 1 • 1 Howeve_r, when the Bill fi·nally became law 
the requirement was that local authorities 'shall' plan for civil 
defence. 2 
On more than one occasion the Ministry exhibited a marked 
degree of caution in making mandatory demands on the local 
authorities, probably not wishing to jeopardise the good relations 
which existed between the Ministry and the local government 
Associations. 
The next conference in May 1961 was called for the express 
purpose of discussing legislation but, unfortunately, little of it 
1H.O.C.R., October, 1960. 
2
civil Defence Act 1962, s27, subssl. 
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was recorded. This was particularly disappo~nting as it dealt 
with the extraordinary powers to be exercised by the Government 
in states of national emergency and major disaster. It was 
decided that clauses should be inserted in the Bill empowering 
the Government to make regulations, but without detailing their 
actual scope. The decision to handle the matter in this way was 
taken to avoid delays while the regulations were being discussed 
1 
with the relevant departments. Unfortunately, the urgency 
taken with the Bill was to no avail as it was placed on priority 
'2' of the Government's legislative programme. 
In July 1961 the Director informed the Regional Commissioners 
that the Bill had received a clearance from the Cabinet legisla-
tion committee and was to go to the law draftsman .. He also 
informed them that the Minister was making representations to 
Cabinet in an attempt to get a higher priority for the Bill. 
Although the Director hoped to see it go forward, he noted that 
the time factor and the heavy legislative programme might require 
revision of the Bill in order to leave out any 'contentious 
. • • r 2 
prov~s~ons . The nature of these provisions is not known, 
though it may be assumed they related to the undefined extra-
ordinary Government powers and the provisions for local authority 
requisitioning. 
The Civil Defence Bill was introduced into Parliament by the 
Minister of Civil Defence on 10 November 1961. He expressed the 
hope that, 'by next session local authorities and all other 
organisations and persons involved will have give·n the Bill 
1 H.O.C.R., May, 1961. 
2 . 
Ibid., July, 1961. 
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earnest consideration and made their views known to us 1 • 1 The 
Prime Minister, K.J. Holyoake, however, turned down an 
·Opposition request for a recess committee to study the Bill, and 
eight months were to elapse before it returned to the House. 
Local authority reaction to the Bill 
Earlier in 1961 the draft Bill had been circulated to the 
local authorities for comment. At the annual conference of the 
Municipal Association in 1962, its Secretary questioned certain 
inadequacies in the Bill. He noted that there was no fixed date 
for the completion of civil defence plans, and no provision 
requiring local authorities to adv·ise residents of the contents 
of the plans. This, he said, might hinder the actions of the 
civil defence organisations in time of crisis. He also noted 
that the Bill did not make provision for the holding of regular 
practices, and questioned two sections, 43 and 48, which he felt 
needed further study. The first section dealt with accident 
insurance and the other with compensation for requisitioned 
'. 2 equ~pment. 
The Secretary's comments, which were later submitted to the 
Department of Internal Affairs, showed that the executive of the 
Municipal Association was not concerned about having mandatory 
prov·isions imposed upon its members, particularly in relation to 
the preparation of plans. This was in contrast to the view taken 
within the Ministry where it was felt that mandatory provisions 
should be avoided. 
1 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 329, p. 3496, 10 November, 1961. 
2New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Forty-
ninth Conference, 1962, p. 91. 
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In November 1961 the Regional Commissioners reported that 
the general reaction to the Bill had been favourable at Council 
meetings although some local authorities had not studied the 
Bill, and others had not seen it. 1 
The second draft of the Bill 
In May 1962 the Director announced a major addition to the 
Bill, the provision for a national civil defence committee 
(N.C.D.C.). He mentioned that in its earlier form the Bill 
I • d h d • I 2 had not correctly assoc1ate t eory an pract1ce . The 
decision to create the committee was based on the consideration 
that permanent heaps of certain important departments would 
I 
I 
automatically be involved in any form of emergency. This had 
not been given rec~gnition in the first draft of the Bill which 
had placed all powers with the Director of Civil Defence. 
Essentially, the new committee meant the concept of the regional 
civil defence committee would be duplicated at the national level. 
The Director considered there were a number of advantages in 
haying the new committee. Firstly, decisions reached by the 
Cabinet in relation to emergencies and disasters could be 
enforced immediately by direction from the permanent beads 
I 
concerned. Also the deliberations of Cabinet would be assisted 
as the Ministers would have their advisers close at hand. 
Secondly, general discussions on civil defence would be better 
informed if the permanent heads had a good knowledge of the 
subject. The N.C.D.C., the Director, said, would act as a top 
1 H.O.C.R.,.November, 1961. 
2Ibid., May, 1962. 
level policy group, advising the Government on civil defence 
1 
matters. 
P.J. O'Dea also explained that the Bill established a 
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limited role for central Government in civil defence, a role 
basically to 'assist and advise 1 • 2 Th~ N.C.D.C., he added, had 
been named a committee to avoid 'offending sensibilities' . 3 
The remainder of the May conference was given to a detailed 
discussion of the Bill's individual sections, and in particular 
section 44. As the section stood there was no local authority 
liability in the case of the demise or injury of a civil defence 
worker. It was considered that personnel could be given protec-
tion under the War Pensions Act, but although this provision was 
made, the section was to be substantially amended by the Local 
Bills Committee when the legislation was returned to Parliament. 
Three months later the co-drafter of the Bill, B.D. 
Crompton, informed the Regional Commissioners of the Bill's 
acceptance by Cabinet after returning from the law draftsman. 
It would then be discussed at Caucus, reintroduced to the House 
and then referred to the Local Bills Committee. The committee, 
he said, could amend the Bill considerably but the Minister and 
officers of the Department would endeavour to retain it 
unaltered. 4 
· The conference then proceeded to discuss further changes 
which had been made to the Bill. 
1Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., July, 1962. 
Crompton advised that the power 
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for requisitioning aircraft had been deleted because of strong 
opposition from the Ministry of Civil Aviation. He also 
informed the Regional Commissioners that they would not be given 
powers to impound vehicles or equipment for possible use in civil 
defence. Their powers would only allow them to take charge of 
a vehicle for a specific purpose in connection with saving life. 
'Blanket powers', he added, 'could no longer be included in acts, 
since acts purport to do certain things and any real powers 
1 
authorised must be associated with the acts' purpose'. 
Blanket power to make regulations, however, had been retained, 
subject to the condition that they remain effective only for the 
restricted period of twenty-eight days. 2 
The amended Civil Defence Bill was reintroduced to the House 
on 10 July 1962 by the Associate Minister of Finance, D.C. Seath. 
He outlined the changes which had been made to the Bill since it 
was first brought down, and then referred it to the Local Bills 
C • 3 omm~ttee. 
The Local Bills Committee 
Seath had mentioned in his introductory speech that few 
representations had been received since the Bill was first intro-
duced.4 Those made to the Local Bills Committee were to be few 
also, a fact which suggested that civil defence generated little 
interest. The Municipal and Counties Associations, who had 
agreed the previous year to make joint submissions, showed the 
1Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 330, p. 772, 10 July, 1962. 
4 Ibid. 
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main interest in the Bill. They argued before the Committee that 
local authorities should be gLven wider powers for requisitioning 
property and supplies, and be able to enter more freely into 
contracts during emergencies. They also requested local govern-
ment representation on the N.C.D.C. 
Submissions made by the Home Servicemans Association called 
for the preparation of local authority civil defence plans to be 
made mandatory, and subject to a fixed completion date. 
The New Zealand Law Society asked the Committee to make the 
impersonation of a civil defence officer an offence. 1 
Crompton informed the Regional Commissioners of the submis-
sions in October. It was agreed that a provision placing a time 
limit on the preparation of plans could not be enforced, for 
beyond the clause stating that local authorities shall prepare a 
plan, a greater power could not be g~ven to the Minister. There 
was considerable opposition to the local authority associations 
being represented on the N.C.D.C., and as a compromise it was 
decided to recommend to the Local Bills Committee that they be 
given representation on a national planning committee. The 
questions of requisitioning and contracts were held over as they 
raised legal technicalities. The submissions from the New 
Zealand Law Society were acted upon although they were not 
discussed. 
The Bill returns to the House 
The Civil Defenc~ Bill was reported back to the House from 
the Local Bills Committee on 7 November 1962, seventeen months 
1Details of submissions from H.O.~.R., October, 1962. 
52 
after drafting had begun. Piloting the Bill through the House 
was the responsibility of the Mini~ter of Civil Defence, F.L.A. 
Gotz. 1 
The Minister informed Parliament that the local authorities 
were required to have plans prepared and approved within a year 
of the Act becoming law. This was, however, to be a most 
unrealistic demand, despite the fact that the Bill now contained 
. . 1 2 coerc~ve c auses. In the Local Bills Committee it had been 
decided to make provisions of the War Pensions Act applicable to 
civil defence workers, but only for one year following the 
enactment of the legislation. If by then a local authority did 
not have an approved plan, responsibility for compensation would 
be placed on the local authority. 
As section 44 had been radically amended in the Local Bills 
Committee it appeared that the Ministry had made concessions 
regarding the imposition of coercive provisions. 3 H.J.L. May, 
a member of the committee and Opposition spokesman for civil 
defence, said that some witnesses to the Committee, as well as 
some of its members, had been 'concerned as to whether any civil 
defence scheme would succeed on the basis outlined in the Bill, 
and wondered if it should be made mandatory' . 4 The idea behind 
rewriting section 44, he said, 'was to enable a certain amount of 
1For the Minister's enunciation of civil defence policy in this 
context see Chapter IV, pp. 64-65. 
2 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 332, p. 2503, 7 November, 1962. 
3
of the 58 sections only 4 were amended by the Committee. Minor 
amendments were made to sections 12 and 22. A new section 42A 
was added, and section 44 was completely rewritten. - Report from 
Mr. A.E. Allen (National, Franklin), Chairman of the Local Bills 
Committee. - Ibid. , p. 2507. 
4 Ibid., p. 2505. 
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h 1 1 h .. ,1 pressure to be exerted on t e oca aut or1t1es . 
The attitude of the Opposition 
Prior to the Bill being referred to the Local Bills Committee 
in July the Labour Opposition had concentrated its Lnterest on 
whether a civil defence organisation was to be defined as a local 
authority and, if so, whether the public would be permitted to 
attend its meetLngs. 2 At that stage, the Bill appeared to have 
received very little attention from the Opposition. 
When the legislation was returned to the House in November, 
May explained that 'the Opposition has carefully considered this 
Bill and is very much in favour of the proposal to establish a 
civil defence scheme' . 3 He could hardly hav~ acted otherwise as 
the demand for civil defence had initially come from a Labour 
Government. May went on to add that 'the reaction by many 
people to the term civil defence is that it has something to do 
. h '1' . . I 4 B h b d I h . w1t a m1 1tary organ1sat1on • ut, e o serve , t at 1s not 
correct as a perusal of the Bill will show•. 5 He stressed, 
however, that 'we must place the emphasis on the civil side' . 6 
The militapy overtones of civil defence, particularly in regard 
I 
to personn~l has continued to concern the Labour party. 7 
As the members of the Opposition supported the Bill and the 
1Ibid. 
2 Ibid., Vol. 330, pp. 772-4, 10 July, 1962. 
3Ibid. , Vol. 332, p. 2505, 7 November, 1962. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6Ibid. 7-
For further details see Chapter VII, p. 121, 138. 
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principle of civil defence, they had very little to add to the 
debate and showed only limited interest ove~all. 
given a third reading on 10 December 1962. 
The Bill was 
Civil defence and the Press 
During the passage of the Civil Defence Bill, one point 
raised by the Opposition was to have serious consequences. 
Throughout the preceding four years the press had been generally 
sympathetic, though not particularly interested in civil defence. 
From the close of J962 onwards, however, the press, particularly 
in certain quarters became very critical of the organisation. 
The reason for this was the Minister's opposition to press 
representation on the N.C.D.C. 
M. Connelly (Labour, Riccarton) had asked during the debate 
why the N.Z.B.C. was represented on the committee, but :not the 
d . d 1 accre ~te press. The Minister replied that he could not 'find 
a place for the press in national planning', and justified his 
decisio~ by saying 'the dissemination of news in a time of 
emergency must be carried out at much greater speed than the 
press can achieve, with the slowness of printing and delivery of 
newspapers•. 2 The Minister's statement offended the New Zealand 
press which reacted with a number of editorials and statements 
extolling the importance of newspapers as disseminators of news, 
and criticising civil defence generally, and the Minister for his 
attitude in particular. 
The president of the Newspaper Proprietors Association, 
1 N.Z.P.D., ·Vol. 332, p. 2508, 7 November, 1962. 
2 
.!.E.iQ.. ' p. 2510. 
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P.R. Scoble, described the Minister's exclusion of the press as 
'irresponsible 11 and commented that: 
In time of emergency the public must be kept informed of 
what is going on. And newspapers, together with the radio, 
have a highly significant role to play in keeping the public 
properly informed. If the public is not kept properly 
informed in time of emergency, rumours can spread with 
alarming rapidity ..• 2 
The Dunedin Evening Star informed its readers: 
The Minister of Internal Affairs has some good ideas, and 
some peculiar ones. Among the latter is his inability to 
find a place for the Press at the national level of his 
civil defence organisation ... As a matter of plain common 
sense, he should think again and with a more open mi:nd. 3 
Taking a similar theme to tha~ of the President of the Newspaper 
Proprietors Association, the Christchurch Star editorialised: 
In an emergency, all means of communication would have vital 
roles to play, but there is no substitute for the printed 
word, particularly in the confusion of a national disaster. 
There is no substitute for the ability of a newspaper to 
present the facts of a situation. 4 
A week later the same newspaper expressed its feeling about the 
Civil Defence Bill which it described as: 
A document drawn up by civil servants for civil servants. 
In an emergency, it would dispense with government by the 
people's elected representatives. The country is not in a 
mood to be governed in time of disaster by a: committee of 
civil servants. 5 
In an attempt to pacify the angry press the Minister stated at the 
end of November: 
Newspapers would play a large part in the task of informing 
the public of developments in civil defence, in maintaining 
1
southland News, lnvercargill, 10 November, 1962. ·---
2lbid. 
3Eve.ning Star, Dunedin, 30 November, 1962. 
4Christchurch Star, 19 November, 1962. 
5 Ibii., 28 November, 1962. 
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interest and enlisting support, and in educating people on 
how to act in an emergency. 1 
The damage, however, had been done and from the close of 1962 
civil defence was on many occasions to receive unfavourable press 
coverage. There appeared to be a concerted attempt to report 
as many critical statements and comments as possible, though 
certainly not all newspapers were equally critical or all 
criticism unwarranted. In fact, they were to be indirectly 
influential in spurring the development of civil defence, but by 
the same token they consistently invoked a poor image for the 
organisation. 
The publishers of the Auckland and Christchurch Stars, in 
particular, were not prepared to allow their antipathy for civil 
defence to rest. In July 1963 the Auckland e_tar produced a 
feature article entitled 'Not that Press should mention it, but 
there is a Master Plan for Disaster Day', describing the recently 
released Civil Defence Planning Guide for Local Authorities in 
the most satirical terms. Readers were informed that: 
We have the Great Plan. Fifty-two pages of it. In all a 
prodigious work .•. Plans, plans, plans. Mayors, town and 
country clerks, the whole community of municipal official-
dom are required under the Civil Defence Act 1962, to put 
on their thinking caps and bestir themselves. 2 
A veiled reference to the press's exclusion from the N.C.D.C. 
could not be avoided: 
For all you know, on the awful day the Press may be under 
total censorship, introduced by regulation, by Order-in-
Council pursuant to the Civil Defence Act, 1962 .•• a 
-.-----
1The Press, Christchurch, 30 November, 1962. 
2 Auckland Star, 15 July, 1963. 
Censored disaster! 
would be ..• 1 
What a triumph of bureaucracy that 
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Almost to a year following the enactment of the Civil Defence Bill, 
the Christchurch Star reported that a first meeting of the 
N.C.D.C. had not yet been held, and described the committee as: 
A body composed entirely of civil servants. It appears to 
have been conceived by the Public Service to give department 
heads a monopoly in the administration of civil defence. 2 
In a barely disguised reference to the preponderance of retired 
military personnel in civil defence the newspaper added that 'the 
most successful emergency scheme had been the EPS during the war' .3 
This it stated inaccurately 'was operated entirely by people 
drawn from the fields of business and commerce•. 4 
Press criticism of civil defence was to remain on a rather 
petty and uninformed level until 1968. One notable but 
short-lived exception concerned poJicy. Initially the press had 
generally supported the need for a protection scheme against 
nuclear attack, but as time passed it was argued increasingly that 
such a threat was remote and, therefore, civil defence priority 
should be placed on the danger of natural disaster. At the end 
of 1962 the Christchurch Star, for example, commented in an 
editorial that: 
The type of disaster to which the Dominion is most prone is 
that caused by flood and earthquake, and it is such natural 
upheavals that the emergency organisation should be 
orientated. 5 
lIb id. 
2~stchurch Star, 22 November, 1963. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 19 November, 1962. 
But when civil defence policy was changed in 1964 the decision 
passed almost unnoticed in the press. 
* 
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The Civil Defence Bill.which was placed on the Statute Book 
at the end of 1962 had defined the two contingencies which the 
civil defence organisation was designed to cope with, hostile 
attack and natural disaster. Legislative definition, however, 
bore little relation to immediate reality. Within the Ministry 
of Civil Defence, and particularly amongst the Regional Commis-
sioners, the initial emphasis which had been placed on the threat 
of nuclear attack continued. But, paradoxically, this emphasis 
bore little relation to the actual development of the organisation 
which took place during the early 1960's. The next chapter will 
show why this occurred, and how civil defence policy evolved to 
a point when, in 1964, a nuclear attack on the country was ·no 
longer considered a possibility. Only then did natural disaster 
belatedly become the primary concern of civil defence. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CIVIL DEFENCE POLICY: 1960-1965 
The need to protect New Zealand against the possible threat 
of a nuclear attack had been the primary motive for establishing 
the Ministry of Civil Defence in 1959, though in keeping with 
previous civil defence schemes, the purpose of the organisation 
had been extended to cover natural disaster. Throughout the 
early 1960's, however, natural disaster was to remain a secondary 
consideration. In the public mind civil defence was id,entified 
with nuclear attack, yet at no time was the organisation prepared 
to cope with an attack or, for tha.t matter, with a serious natural 
disaster. 
Within the Ministry of Civil Defence the early 1960's were 
characterised by a growing divergence of policy interpretation. 
The Regional Commissioners consistently maintained that providing 
protection against a nuclear attack should remain the basic 
concern. of civil defence. At the ministerial level there was, 
how.ever, a gradual movement away .from the nuclear 1 theme 1 with 
increasing emphasis being placed on the danger of natural disaster. 
This divergence of attitudes culminated in 1964 with a major 
policy re-evaluation when the Minister directed that civil defence 
planning should be based on the 'known forms of natural disaster'. 
To place this policy evolution in perspective it is necessary 
to return to 1960 and consider the first detailed statement of 
civil defence policy, which was intended to provide the basis for 
future developments. 
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'Civil Defence in New Zealand': a written statement of policy 
Prior to the appointment of the Regional Commissioners in 
June 1960 the Ministry's attention was devoted to the preparation 
of Civil Defence in New Zealand, a document designed primarily 
for Government departments, agencies and the local authorities. 
Published in July 1960 under the hand of the Director of Civil 
Defence, J.K. Hunn, the document has an important place in the 
development of civil defence as it was the first attempt to put 
policy into writing. But, when placed in the perspective of 
developments from 1960 onwards, very little of· the policy was in 
fact ever implemented, though it showed very clearly the current 
preoccupation with the threat of nuclear attack at the time. 
Civil Defence in New Zealand stated that if the country were 
to be attacked the main targets would be Auckland, Wellington/ 
Hutt, Christchurch and Dunedin. Planning was to be based ~n two 
assumptions; firstly, where a warning period preceded the attack, 
and secondly, where an attack came without warning. In the 
former case the evacuation of the four main centres would take 
place, the decision to evacuate being made by the Government. 
Following the attack civil defence units would return to the 
devastated city(s) to carry out rescue and relief measures. It 
was not assumed, however, that the total metropolitan population 
of the country could be evacuated. 
Where no warning was given civil defence units from outlying 
districts would come to the assistance of the city(s) following 
the attack. It was not denied that other targets could be 
attacked, but it was considered common sense to evacuate the four 
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most probable targets if a warning period was declared. 1 
As four target zones had been d~fined, this, it was argued, 
I 
enforced the creation of four regions, each controlled by a 
Commissioner. This decision, which has already been noted, was 
changed even before Civil Defence in New Zealand was published in 
July. The regional concept, the document explained, was based 
on Britis~ practice where Regional Commissioners operated in 
liaison with the armed £orces. While there was no apparent 
reason to justify the regional approach, it was strange that 
Britain's rather than New Zealand's own experience of twenty years 
before was not drawn upon for this purpose. The regional 
approach, although originally adopted from Britain in 1940, had 
been a feature of civil defence in this country during the war 
period. It certainly appeared that New Zealand's own c~vil 
defence history had not been studied. 
Following a brief discussion of methods of control within the 
target zones, it was stated that towns outside these areas should 
set up civil defence units which could be utilised in case of 
natural disaster. They would also be able to provide assistance 
to·a major city in the region subjected to an attack. It was not 
thought practicable, however, for counties to set up civil defence 
units, though it was considered that they should possess simple 
plans to cope with any peacetime disaster. 
The question of air-raid shelters was left in abeyance, 
'shelter policy must again be the subject of planning and appro-
priate advice by the Ministry of Civil Defence in conjunction with 
1Ministry of Civil Defence, Civil Defence in New Zealand (Welling-
ton, 1960), p. 8. 
h . • I .l the relevant aut or~t~es . 
The co~cluding section of the document dealt with the 
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relationship of the organisation, already outlined, to the problem 
of natural disaster. Local organisations were considered 
adequate to meet the contingencies of both nuclear attack and 
natural disaster, though in the former situation certain technical 
aspects of rescu~ and relief measures would have to be known. 
In the case of an earthquake it was poLnted out that there would 
be no chance of evacuation because of the absence of warning, 
though in the case of fires, floods or volcanic activity, where 
warnings could generally be issued, evacuation would be possible. 
The final passage emphasised that civil defence was to be 1 an all 
purpose organisatior~ for major emergency in peace and war 1 • 2 
Civil Defence in New Zealand was a statement of intent rather 
than a set of detailed proposals. The immediate reaction of those 
who read it, particularly the local authorities, is not known, but 
it can be assu..med that those who took the trouble to do so must 
have been at least puzzled by some of the content. The discussion 
of warning periods and evacuatio:n, particularly in case of nuclear 
attack, lacked credibility as nothing was said about how warnings 
were to be given a:nd transmitted, or ho~.v the complex task of 
evacuati6n was to be carried out. 
In discussing the threat of nuclear attack the tone of the 
document was sombre. The 1958 Defence Review had been quoted at 
some length but the qualifying statement, 'Civil defence planning 
is not related to a belief that a nuclear threat to New Zealand 
1 Ibid. , p. 13. 
2 IbiQ.., p. 14. 
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I . d 1 was imminent , was om~tte . Nevertheless, to have stated the 
case for civil defence as a protection against a purely hypothe-
tical threat of nuclear attack (which it was anyway), may have 
reduced the document's designed impact. 
Although civil defence was to be 'an all-purpose organisa-
tion' the text strongly indicated that the threat of nuclear 
attack was the primary concern. This resulted in the document's 
most apparent defect, its failure to stress the importance of 
being prepared to cope with natural disaster. 
Poli~.Y .. A.!.scussion within _the Ministry 
Although Civil Defence in New _Zealau_s;! had outlined the broad 
purpose of the organisation, this did not preclude periodic 
interpretation and restatement of policy within the Ministry. 
In October 1960 the use of British civil defence manuals in 
New Zealand was discussed at a conference. While the Regional 
Commissioners co:;tsidered they were suitable, a military represen-
tative attending the conference questioned their acceptance. As 
the. manuals were only concerned with protection against nuclear 
attack, he considered they conflicted with existing policy which 
was 'natural disasters first, nuclear warfare second 1 • 2 Bourke, 
Regio·nal Commissioner for the Northern Region,. questioned this 
interpretation of policy: 
Our line of policy should be firmly based on the requirement 
of nuclear war, as New Zealand would be in the front line and 
any organisation developed with this in mind would be a 
perfect organisation to deal with most natural calamities. 3 
T~~~: Review of Defence, A.12, 1958, p. 16. 
2 H.O.C.R~, October, 1960. 
3 Ibid. 
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Of the three Regional Commissioners, Bourke was consistently the 
strongest advocate for protection against nuclear attack; for 
within his region was Auckland, providing the most 'likely' target. 
The line of reasoning put forward by Bourke prevailed amongst 
the Regional Commissioners throughout the early 1960's and, 
although they did not dismiss the threat of natural disaster, it 
certainly appeared to be a subordinate, if not at times incidental, 
consideration. 
The Regional Commissioners' consistent emphasis on the danger 
of nuclear attack appeared to be the result of limited ministerial 
direction and ~onsultation, thus permitting them considerable 
latitude of policy interpretation. The result was that as the 
Minister began to place diminishing importance on the threat of 
attack, a growing divergence of policy interpretation became 
apparent within the Ministry. This was clearly illustrated 
during the passage of the Civil Defence Bill in 1962. 
Civil defence policy and legislation 1 
During the debate on the legislation the Minister of Civil 
Defence, F.L.A. Gotz, had laid particular stress on the danger of 
natural disaster in New Zealand and his attitude to nuclear attack 
was iri marked contrast to some of his earlier statements. He 
had observed that: 
In the European countries, of course, the fear is largely of 
nuclear war. We in New Zealand are fortunate in that we do 
not think there is such a danger, but still, in planning for 
civil defence, we cannot disregard the risk, and therefore 
if there is a necessity to set up monitoring to detect radio-
activity, or anything of that nature, we will be ready and 
1For a discussion of the legislation see Chapter III. 
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the Government will have played its part. 1 
Although the Minister had not dismissed the threat of nuclear 
attack, his statement was noteworthy because the need for prepara-
tions to cope with such an event had been voiced in the future 
tense. From a. Minister who previously had spoken of the 'duty 
to guard against potential dangers which come from the skies' 2 
this was a significant development and one which marked, at least 
at ministerial level, the beginning of a decline in the emphasis 
placed on the threat of nuclear attack. 
Civil Defence Planning_ Gl:,lide for Local Authorities 
The Minister's ekposition of policy during the passage of 
the C~vil Defence Bill was, however,· in marked contrast to the 
information given in a planning guide distributed to the local 
authorities by the Ministry in July 1963. The introduction to 
this publication which had been produced by the Regional Commis-
sioners stated: 
PLanning for civil defence must be based o·n the appreciation 
of the major threat which faces New Zealand. The major 
threat to any country must be global warfare. The direct 
or indirect threat to this country is very difficult to 
assess. It can be assumed, however, that a potential enemy 
is capable of delivering a nuclear attack anywhere in the 
world. 3 
The secondary threat was from: 
Natural causes (which) present a more co·ncrete pro!:>lem. 
New Zealand in its short history has already suffered from 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and has experienced floods, 
seismic sea-waves, fires, violent storms and epidemics. 4 
1N.Z.P.D., VoL 332, p. 2503, 7 November, 1961. 
2 see Chapter II, p. 31. 
3Ministry of Civil Defence, Civil Defence Pl<l!!!ling Guide for Local 
Authoriti~e. (Wellington, 19~ pp. 5-6. 
4 ' 
.!_bid.' p. 6. 
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In view of the pribrity envisaged in the preamble to the document 
it was not surprising that a section d~alt with the problem of 
nuclear attack, but no comparable section existed on natural 
disaster, although this was seen to ~e the more 'co~crete 
problem'. 
Policy and the 1958 Defence Review 
Within the Ministry discussions on policy continued infre-
quently, usually prompted by external considerations which 
required an interpretation of policy. 
In July 1964 the Director reported to the Regional Commis-
sioners that a new army directive indicated there would be :no 
nuclear warfare planning. As this was 'contrary to civil defence 
policy' and would 'present a complete misconception to army 
personnel', he stated that the matter would be raised with the 
rihief of the General Staff. 1 
At the same conference Bourke questioned the currency of the 
policy contained in the 1958 Defence Review. Peren pointed out 
tha:t he understood civil defence policy was to plan to cope with 
natural disasters, but with the organisation being capable of 
expansion to meet a nuclear attack. This, the Director, 
commented, was the broad policy stated by the two Ministers of 
Civil Defence. He then explained that the organisation needed in 
the case of both a nuclear attack or a natural disaster was 
similar, but in the former situation there were two special aspects 
to consider. Firstly, specialist training was required for 
monitoring and countering the effects of radiation. Secondly, 
1 H~O.C.R., July 1964. 
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the approach 'to rescue was different following a nuclear attack'. 
As to whether the 1958 Defence Review remained current, the 
Director said that each White Paper issued superseded its 
predecessor but each one had no standing unless legislation 
1 implemented its proposals. His reply was not entirely satis-
factory though the matter was not taken further. 
Discussion about the currency of Defence Reviews was largely 
unwarranted as the only complete statement of civil defence policy 
was contained in Civil Defence in New Zealand, but this document 
was not referred to. A.White Paper is a statement of Government 
intent but it is not mandatory fof the proposals to be implemented 
by legislation or other means, although criticism may be incurred 
for not doing so. The Labour Government, having published the 
1958 Defence Review, had honoured its intention by establishing 
the Ministry of Civil Defence. But as the original purpose of 
civil defence had been extended to cover natural disaster, the 
1958 Defence Review then remained current only in part. Although 
a further Defence Review had been published by the National 
Government in 1961 no mention was made of civil defence. 2 But 
the new Government had seen fit to continue the scheme introduced 
under the previous administratio~ by promoting civil defence 
legislation which incorporated the dual purpose of the organisa-
tion. Therefore, either the Civil Defence Act or Civil Defence 
in New Zealand provided the true basis of policy. 
A~ha:nge in po 1 icy 
1 Ib:!:_Q.. ---------------------·-----
2A,J.H.JL.., ReviefN" of Defence, A.19, 1961. 
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Early in 1964 the new Minister of Civil Defence, b.c. Seath, 1 
addressing the first meeting of the national civil defence 
committee (N.C.D.C.) 2 stated: 
I am not suggesting that planning against the consequences 
of nuclear disaster should be ignored, but first let us bend 
our energies to preparing against the known forms of natural 
disaster ... As to any special additional preparations that 
m.~y be necessary to meet the threat of nuclear attack those 
are matters which in my view might well be left to examina-
tion at a later stage of :your proceedings. 3 
The Minister's address marked the turning point in civil defence 
policy, and was the culmination of a gradual decline in the 
importance attached to the threat of nuclear attack. Realism 
had at last prevailed. 
Following the first meeting of the N.C.D.C. several planning 
sub-committees were established, some of which required in their 
terms of reference a definition of the purpose of civil defence. 4 
The task of drawing up terms of reference and producing a new 
Government civil defence plan to replace the out-dated Government 
5 Ac::tion .in a M~ jor Emergene,x was delegated by the N .C .D.C. to a 
national plans co-ordinating committee. 6 Members of the 
Tf. .L.A~~otz had been defeated ·at the 1963 General ;~ectio~~is 
portfolios were taken over in the new Government by D.C. Seath 
who had been Associate Minister of Finance in the previous 
administration. 
2For the composition and functions of the N.C.D.C. see Chapter Ill, 
p. 40. For the circumstances surrounding the committee's first 
m~eting see Chapter VI, pp. 100-103. 
3Reported in The Press, Christchurch, 18 February, 19q4. 4 . 
For the functions of the planning committees see Chapter VI, pp. 
103-108. 
5For details of this plan produced in 1954 see Chapter I, pp.17-18. 
6The national plans co-ordinating committee was composed of the 
folloT,.;~ing: The Director of Civil Defence, Representatives of the 
Counties and Municipal Associations, Dep:.1ty Director General of 
Health, representatives from the Industries and Commerce Dep.art-
merit, Ministry of Works, Post Office, Transport Department, 
N.Z.B.C., Police and armed services. 
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committee went further than the Minister's verbal terms of 
reference to the N.C.D.C. by deciding that New Zealand would not 
be subject to nuclear warfare. 1 The committee's decision was 
based o~ the view that 'a limited tactical use' of nuclear· 
weapons could probably occur 'without world-wide .disaster 
implications', but 'an all-out atomic attack could well mean 
destruction of the world'. The committee 'considered th.at no 
nation would be prepared to take the risk' and therefore civil 
defence in New Zealand would concentrate 0.:1 the threat of natural 
d . 2 ~saster. 
·Although taking a rather simplistic view of nuclear strategy 
and international affairs these deliberations by a non-specialist 
committee marked the end of a civil defence scheme primarily 
orientated to the threat of nuclear attack. 3 It was to be some 
time, however, before the finality of the committee's decision was 
fully appreciated, especially by the Regional Commissioners who 
had not been involved with the committee. ln fact, there was to 
be a temporary breakdow:n in communications within the Ministry, 
the consequences of which were made readily app.arent when, in July 
1The co~mittee~s d~li~erations appear to have first ~made 
public at the 1966 Municipal Association conference by P. Wakelin, 
Mayor of Carterton and the Association's representative on the 
national plans co-ordinating committee. See New Zealand Mu:nici-
p.al Association, froc~edin.gs of tq~Fifty-third Confer~, 1966, 
p. 70. . 
2 ne~ails of the committee 1 s discussion we.re made available to the 
writer by P. Wetkelin (Letter, 19 June, 1970). 
3
rt seems doubtful whether the committee's discussion could be 
termed 'a comprehensive study of the likelihood, objectives and 
other aspects of nuclear attack, particularly as they related to 
New Zealand'. Although not specifically referring to the commit-
tee, the Minister of Civil Defence has stated that the decision to 
change policy was primarily based on the committee's deliberations. 
(Letter to the writer, 28 October, 1970). 
70 
1964, the Regional Commissioners conferred with the chairman of 
the Publicity Planning Committee, one of the N.C.D.C. sub-
committees. 
The chairman; an officer from the Tourist and Publicity 
Department, stated that the committee was concerned with the 
'general education of the public to ensure they would understand 
civil defence and co-operate•. 1 But he noted: 
At present the organisation a:nd function of civil defence 
were nebulous in the public mind .•. The committee had 
wondered about the aims and 6bjects of civil defence, 
particularly those relating to nuclear attack. 2 
Bourke considered the nuclear threat was 'the only common theme 
which would prompt people throughout the country to join or 
3 
support civil defence'. Peren said 'people had become 
accustomed to earthquakes and felt they could be dealt with off 
the cuff 1 • 4 He was prepared 'to support and work for a 
nuclear orientated civil defence if cabinet directed it, but the 
organisation needed definite instructions' . 5 Peren also 
considered that the 1958 White Paper should either be 'revised or 
withdrawn', noting that there had been 'intimations from the 
Minister that natural disaster was the main concern•. 6 
The Regional Commissioners now seemed to be fighting a rear-
guard action to retain a nuclear orientated civil defence policy, 
but as they appeared largely unaware that a decision on future 
1 H.O.C.R., July, 1964. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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policy had already been taken, there was an element of futility 
in their discussion with the chairman of the publicity committee. 
In view of the apparent lack of consultation within the Ministry, 
the Regional Commissioners had been placed in the position of 
espousing a policy which, although they strongly believed in, 
had now been superseded. 
Any doubts as to the substance of the new policy were 
dispelled with the appearance in 1965 of the plan, Government 
Action in Maior Disaster (G.A.M.D.) which stated: 
Because the threat of nuclear attack is considered remote, 
priority has been given to the measures necessary to meet 
natural disaster. 1 
Future civil defence planning was to be based on the assumptions 
of: 
A disaster which does not cause damage or casualties in 
Wellington, but is on a scale which necessitates action by 
Government ; to 
An earthquake which devastates Wellington, and extends into 
Nelson and Marlborough in the Southern Civil Defence Region 
(South Island) and Wairarapa and Hawkes Bay in the Central 
Civil Defence Region (lower half of the North Island). 
Its effects would have lessened in Napier and Hastings, and 
there may have been some disturbances in western areas of 
the Central Region, possibly as far as Palmerston North. 
This situation would involve Government direction of the 
civil defence effort. 2 
The new planning assumptions detailed in G.A.M.D. which were to 
provide the terms of reference for the N.C.D.C. sub-committee were 
approved by the N.C.D.C. in June 1965 and shortly afterwards by 
the Minister. 
TMinistry of Civil Defence, Government Action in Maior Disaster 
(Wellington, 1966), p. 2. For the contents and circumstances 
surrounding the compilation of this plan, see Chapter VI, pp. 
103-108. 
2 Ibid. 
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The new developments did not meet with the approbation of all 
and prompted Bourke to write to the other Regional Commissioners 
in July, stating that: 
I feel that it is dangerous for the country to be so 
inadequately prepared to cope with radiation surveillance. 
Without this, any action to meet a national emergency, 
particularly in regard to the present negative attitude 
towards shelters, would result in grim chaos. 1 
His views, however, did not prevail. 
* * 
Since 1959 civil defence had been identified with the need 
to protect the country against a nuclear attack, yet, by 1964, 
New Zealand was no more prepared to cope with such an event than 
it had been when the Defence White Paper was issued in l958. 
Within this period progress with establishing local authority 
civil defence organisations was almost non-existent and detailed 
planning of central Government action in an emergency was not 
. 2 
begun until early in 1964. Moreover, the specialised requirements 
necessary to cope with an attack were never carried out. 
The ·need for radiation monitoring equipment was first 
discussed at a conference in March 1961 where Burrows suggested 
that monitoring facilities should be established in high schools. 
It was agreed that the Minister should be approached as the matter 
was national policy. 3 The question was raised again in July when 
the Regional Commissioners asked for recommendations to be made 
1H.O.C.R., July, 1965. 
2 For the reasons behind the delay in local and central Government 
civil defence planning see Chapter VI, 
3 H.O.C.R., March, 1961. 
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regarding the type, location and number of radiac instruments 
necessary to set up an adequate monitoring system throughout the 
country. 1 Although equipment was eventually purchased from 
Britain only small stocks were ever held and then only by the 
Regional Commissioners. 
The need for a warning system to operate throughout the 
country was discussed on many occasions between 1960 and 1964 but 
the technical difficulties involved, notwithstanding the fact that 
New Zealand had no means of detecting incoming missiles or air-
craft, effectively prevented a system from being developed. 
The question of air-raid shelters had been raised initially 
in Civil Defence in New Zealand, but the only time the topic was 
discussed occurred in 1962 when the Ministry was preparing a 
safety precautions handbook for issue to the general public. In 
one of the rare cases of direct ministerial intervention Gotz 
instructed that no reference should be made to the need for 
household shelters. 2 
Even the concept of 'target zones' was never fully developed. 
Civil Defence in New Zealand had stated that the delineation of 
four. 1 target zones 1 would automatically involve the creation of 
four regions. Yet, only three Regional Commissioners were ever 
appointed, a fact which indicated that the concept of 'target 
1
rbi.d., July, 1961. 
2 Ibid., May, 1962. The handbook was to state that: In some 
countries, people are being urged by their Government to construct 
and equip shelters capable of accommodating a family for periods 
of up to 14 days. Such a shelter policy has not at this stage 
been adopted in New Zealand, nor is it recommended. A degree of 
evacuation of potential target zones is considered to be a more 
practical measure - Ministry of Civil Defence, Householders' Hand-
book for Emergencies (Wellington, 1963), p. 21. 
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zones' was not as important as had originally been considered. 
Throughout the early 1960's it was evident that the Govern-
ment had neither the intention nor the ability to provide the 
country with protection against nuclear attack. While this was 
to be of no consequence after 1964, the failure to press the 
development of civil defence had been to ignore the other concern 
of the organisation - natural disaster. 
In view of this lack of progress discussion on policy within 
the period was to a large extent immaterial - for whether civil 
defence was to be concerned with nuclear attack, natural disaster, 
or both, was almost irrelevant - an organisation to implement 
policy existed only in skeleton form, the organisational infra-
structure had yet to be completed. 
The influence of time appeared to be the main contributing 
factor underlying the 1964 policy change. The degree of 
emotionalism which had surrounded civil defence and the threat of 
nuclea~ attack in the late 1950's and early 1960's had diminished 
to the point wher& a dispassionate view of the situation had 
revealed (what had always been obvious) that the chances of an 
attack on New Zealand were so remote as to be of no consequence. 
The decision to place priority on natural disaster, however, 
was not based on a reappraisal of the threat, but r~ther on the 
view that protection against nuclear attack was no longer 
warranted. Thus, the danger, of natural disaster - the most 
pressing reason for an effective civil defence scheme in New 
Zealand - received only de facto recognition. 
In view of the policy change, it was somewhat ironic wh,en the 
1966 Defence Review commented: 
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The civil defence organisation in New Zealand has reached a 
stage in its planning and development where it could provide 
a most valuable means of co-ordinating measures to deal with 
the consequences of nuclear attack or other major assault 
against New Zealand itself, unlikely though this may be. 1 
The Review did add, however, that: 
In present circumstances ... the usefulness of civil defence 
machinery in coping on a national or regional scale with the 
major peacetime crises of earthquake or other natural 
disasters is the aspect of its work on which it is sensible 
to concentrate most attention. 2 
Before turning to the organisational development of civil 
defence, the next chapter discusses the character of natural 
disaster in New Zealand. Hitherto a distinctly secondary 
consideration, the problem had now become the raison d 1 ~tre of 
civil defence. 
* * * 
1 A.J.H.R., Review of Defence, A.8, 1966, p. 9. 
2 Ib~. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NEW PRIORITY: NATURAL DISASTER 
Throughout its short history New Zealand's vulnerability to 
natural disaster, particularly earthquakes, had been made only 
too apparent. Yet there had been an almost consistent failure 
to recognise the danger and the need for a permanent emergency 
. t. 1 organ~sa ~on. The decision in 1964 to place civil defence 
priority on natural disaster was therefore a belated acknowledge-
ment of the obvious. It was natural disaster, not nuclear 
attack, which posed the real threat to the country. 
As 1964 marked a turning point in the development of civil 
defence this chapter forms something of an interlude and presents 
a general survey of the features of natural disaster in New 
Zealand. Although outside the immediate scope of civil defence, 
certain fields of local authority responsibility for public safety 
are also discussed. For not only have the local authorities a 
respons.ibility for civil defence but they are also in a position 
1The war period had been the notable exception, though it was the 
tear of attack rather than natural disaster which prompted the 
Government to introduce the E.P.S. Although the scheme was 
allowed to lapse at the end of the war the Government, prompted 
by the Wellington-Wairarapa earthquake of 1942, had realised the 
economic implications of natural disaster by establishing the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission in 1944. War damage had 
previously been covered by the War Damage Act, 1941. 
Under the Earthquake and War Damage Regulations all property 
insured against fire is deemed to be insured to the extent of the 
indemnity value against earthquake or war damage. Premiums at 
the rate of 5c (1969) for each $100 of insurance cover are 
collected by the insurance companies and paid into the Earthquake 
and War Damage Fund. At 31 March 1969 the fund stood at 
$109,499,876. In 1950 the scheme was extended to cover abnormal 
storms and floods, and more recently, landslips. Volcanic 
eruption is also covered. 
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to enforce preventative measures which could reduce the impact of 
a disaster, or at least prevent one from reaching maj9r propor-
tions. 
Earthquakes 
Earthquakes, which constitute the most potentially destructive 
natural hazard in New Zealand, occur because the country forms 
part of a geologically unstable belt extending around the circum-
ference of the Pacific Ocean. 1 The first recorded earthquake 
occurred in 1848, and subsequently sixteen have reached~ 
magnitude of Force 7 or more with progressively larger numbers of 
lesser magnitude. (See Fig. II.) In terms of loss of life and 
destruction, the most serious was that at Napier in 1931. 
Fortunately, many of the severe earthquakes have occurred in 
sparsely populated areas resulting in only minimal damage to life 
and property. 
Although New Zealand is regarded as a country of moderate 
earthqu~ke risk, a consensus does not exist amongst the earth 
sci~ntists as to the varying degrees of risk within the country. 
A number of methods havebeen developed for studying seismicity 
and seismic zoning. One is the use of earthquake records but, 
for accuracy, recordings are required over a long period of time. 
This, however, is not possible in New Zealand, and zoning from 
short term records can be both inaccurate and dangerous. In 
Australia and New Zealand the distribution of faults has often 
been used as a method for zoning; one which some earth scientists 
1Volcanic activity is an associated feature of this belt. Because 
of their location, however, New Zealand's active volcanoes consti-
stute only a localised threat in the sparsely populated central 
North Island. 
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Fig. rr 1 
• 
• 
• 
Large Shallow Earthquakes 
• • M~7, 1848-1961 
• 7>M~6, 1940-1961 
1. Adapted fron.F.F. Evison, 'Incidence of Large Shallow 
Earthquakes in New Zealand', R.R.S. 
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criticise. Eiby has said that: 
The absence of a fault, or of any other geological feature, 
does not establish that there have been no earthquakes; and 
the fact that only small shocks have been experienced in the 
past does not establish that this is the upper limit of 
their possible size. 1 
Clark et ~l have put forward a method of zoning based on tectonic 
activity: 
Assuming that the present day geological processes are the 
key to the past, the geologist infers that earthquakes will 
have accompanied most of the similar prehistoric deformation 
shown in the relatively recent geological record, and, 
conversely, that major earthquakes will have been rare where 
there is no measurable deformation. 2 
From their study of tectonic activity Clark et al have zoned New 
Zealand into four areas of earthquake risk (see Fig. III), but 
they note that: 'It must be stressed that it is not possible to 
forecast how soon or where the next destruction or damage will 
3 
occur in any zone'. 
Not all agree with Clark et al in their method of zoning. 
Evison points out that: 
In.the USSR, for example, evidence of geologically re~ent 
tectonic activity (folding, faulting, uplift, etc.) is 
regarded as relevant to seismic zoning. It is acknowledged, 
however, that the proper use of such evidence is in exte!)Qing 
boundaries of zones beyond what have been indicated by the 
occurrence of past earthquakes .•• such ancillary evidence 
has no application to New Zealand [because of the small size 
of the country]. 4 
1 G.A. Eiby, Earthquakes (London, Frederick Muller, 1967), p. 149. 
2R.H. Clark et al, 'Tectonic and Earthquake risk zoning 6 , Report 
of R~al Society of New Zealand ea£th~uake risk s~committee 
"'{"RRS (Wellington, Victoria University Department of Adult Educa-
tion, 196 7), p. 1 • 
3 Ibid. , p. 7. 
4 F.F. Evison, 'Incidence of large shallow earthquakes in New 
Zealand', RRS, p. 4. 
Fig, III l 
4 
Earthguake Risk Zones 
Zone 1: 
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Destruction is probable in several 
parts in any period of 100 years. 
Damage is expected in nunerous places 
in any period of tens of years. 
Zone 2: 
~ Destruction is probable in several 
~ parts of the zone in any period of a 
few hundred years. Danage is to be 
expected at numerous places in any 
period of 100 years •. 
Zone 3: 
Destruction is possible though not 
probable in several parts of the zone 
in any period of a few hundred years. 
Damage is to be expected in nunerous 
places in any period of 100 years. 
Zone 4: 
Destruction is possible though not 
probable in several parts of the zone 
in an.y period of a few thousand years. 
Damage is to be expected in several 
places in any period of a few hundred 
·years. 
1. Adapted from R.H. Clark, et. al., 'Tectonic and Earth-
quake Risk Zoning', R,R.S. 
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Accurate seismic zoning is necessary to ensure that the 
design and construction of buildings conforms to the known risk 
existing in any area. Zoning on the scale proposed by Clark 
et al_ has only a general application for building construction 
for as the movement of earthquake shock waves is greatly affected 
by the type of material through which they pass, macro-zoning 
. . 1 
must be supplemented by micro or s1te zon1ng. The micro-zoning 
of cities has been widely carried out overseas but not as yet in 
New Zealand. Fyfe et al suggest that: 
Major cities (in New Zealand) should be geologically mapped 
in detail and zoned in regard to expectable dama~e to the 
ground surface (which is likely to result in the) destruction 
of buildings, communications and water supply. 2 
Despite the lack of a consensus amongst the earth scientists 
as to the accuracy or feasibility of seismic zoning, and in the 
face of strong opposition from the Seismological Observatory, the 
New Zealand Standards Association 3 recently zoned the country for 
the purpose of compiling model building by-laws (see Fig. IV). 
In oppo·sing the Association's move, the Superintendent of the 
Seismological Observatory said that: 'New Zealand is a small 
country and should be decreed as one unit as far as earthquake 
risk is concerned 1 • 4 At a later date Eiby commented: 
-~------------
1For example, damage is more likely to occur to buildings on re-
claimed land, unconsolidated fill, etc. than on hard rock. 
2H.E. Fyfe et al, 'Site zoning for earthquake risk', RRS, p. 3. 
3The New Zealand Standards Association was established by legisla-
tion in 1965, replacing the Standards Institute which had been in 
existence since 1941. The function of the Association is to 
'promote standardisation in industry and commerce and to promul-
gate standards with the object of improving the quality of goods 
... industrial efficiency •.• and promoting public and industrial 
welfare, health and safety'. Department of Statistics, New 
Zealand Official Yearbook (Wellington, 1969), p. 1002. The model 
building by-laws are contained in New Zeala:qd Standard Specifica-
~ion (NZSS), 1900. 
4Report in The Pre~, Christchurch, 13 May, 1966. 
1. ·Adapted from 
1965, p. 25, and 
p •. 11. 
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Fig .. rv1 
Seismic Zones 
Zone A: 
Includes all regions known to have suf-
fered more than minor damage, all known 
epicentres of 'norma 1 1 earthquakes of 
magnitude greater than 6 and all known 
surface indications of earth distur-
bances likely to be of earthquake 
origin within say, the last 10,000 
years. 
Zone B: 
A buffer zone in which history indi-
cates that moderate damage may result 
from earthquakes of intermediate mag-
nitude within the lifetime of a build-
ing or from the distant effects of 
majorearthquakes in Zone A. 
Zone C: . 
Include~ those regions which have suf-
fered at the most trifling damage to 
the poorest class of non-earthquake 
resistant buildings and are tree of 
epicentres of other than minor mag-
nitude and of know reasonably· recent 
ground disturbance. 
Standards Association, NZSS 1900, Chapter 8, 
Commentary on Chapter 8 of NZSS 1900, 1965, 
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No part of New Zealand is far from a known earthquake origin, 
and until recently a uniform code of anti-seismic building 
laws was recommended for the whole country. In spite of 
strong representations from the seismologists, a new code 
has been introduced, which slightly increases the require-
ments in some areas, but reduces them in others that include 
two of our largest cities. There may be room for argument 
about the appropriate degree of strengthening needed to make 
a building earthquake resistant, but if the existing level 
was adequate, there is as little excuse for raising it in 
some centres as there is for lowering it in others. Insis-
tence that earthquakes are necessarily less frequent and less 
severe in areas that are without known active faulting can 
only be described as irresponsible. 1 
Although the Standards Association seismic zoning does not 
meet with the approval of many earth scientists, in the absence of 
an improved zoning, the Model, Building By-Laws fulfil a useful 
function by ensuring a certain standard of anti-seismic construe-
tion. However, it is not mandatory for the local authorities to 
adopt the by-laws, and some have exhibited a reluctance to do so. 2 
While new buildings must conform to local authority building 
regulations where they exist and are enforced, a major problem 
occurs in relation to those constructed before the first regula-
tions were introduced in 1939. A cursory inspection of the older 
buildings in urban areas would indicate that many could be 
potentially dangerous in a severe earthquake. The Christchurch 
City Council Engineer recently pointed out that of the 1000 
1G.H. Eiby, Earthquakes, p. 149. 
2 In 1967, of the 149 municipalities, 93 had adopted NZSS 1900, 19 
were considering them and 16 had not yet adopted them. In the 
last two groups some local authorities could be using the prede-
cessor of NZSS 1900, NZSS 95 - Information given by L. Sullivan, 
Secretary of the Municipal Association, (Interview, 23 April, 
1970). At 6 November, 1969, of the 108 Counties, 48 had adopted 
NZSS 1900, 22 proposed to adopt, 8 had not yet adopted, and 2 had 
refused (Cheviot County and Great Barrier Island County). 
Replies were awaited from the remaining 28 Counties - Information 
given by M.F. McDonnell, Assistant Secretary of the Counties 
Association (Interview, 23 April, 1970). 
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buildings in the central business district of the city 'only about 
fifty of these have been built since 1935 and have anti-earthquake 
features built in', and 'about the same number have been streng-
1 thened'. Although recent amendments to the Counties and 
MuniciQal Corporations' Acts have given the local authorities 
power to order the strengthening or demolition of buildings which 
are 'likely' to be dangerous during an earthquake, the economic 
2 implications will undoubtedly restrict the use of this power. 
The New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering which 
undertook a detailed survey of the Inangahua earthquake (24 May, 
1968) made a number of comments regarding the safety of old 
buildings, both within the disaster area and distant from it. 
At Nelson: 
Inspection of commercial buildings after the event revealed 
a surprising number of potentia~ seismic hazards .•• That 
many of these buildings did not suffer actual damage is 
fortuitous ••. Inspection has shown that there are a number 
of structures that should be partially demolished or 
strengthened ..• There does not appear to be the necessary 
authority to deal with potential seismic hazards. 3 
In Greymouth: 
1Report in the Christchurch Star, 22 June, 1970. In view of the 
concentration of people within a central business district, the 
need for safe buildings is obvious. For example, at any hour 
during a weekday in Christchurch there are approximately 69,000 
people within the central business district. 
2
•Both the Counties Amendment Act 1968 and the Municipal Corpora-
tions Amendment Act 1968 give county and borough councils clear 
authority to ensQre the removal or strengthening of buildings 
likely to be dangerous in a moderate earthquake. The new 
authority will apply only to councils on which it is conferred by 
Order in Council made on the request of the local authority ..• 
At 31 March 1969 four municipalities had applied for authority to 
exercise the new powers ..• ' - A.J.H.R., Report of the Department 
of Internal Affairs, H.22, 1969, pp. 16-17. 
3R.L. Saunders and G.A. Toynbee, 'Damage in the Nelson Area', 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 
rsNZSEE), Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1969, p. 124. 
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The great majority of the damage occurred to old buildings 
which had been designed with no thought for seismic 
resistance. In most cases their present condition was 
poor, compared to their original state. (Metal fixings 
had rusted, lime mortar had rotted out, cracks were present 
from previous earthquakes, etc.) The damage which occurred 
was in most cases obvious and inevitable ... Buildings 
designed to conform to the New Zealand Model Building By-
laws suffered only insignificant damage. 1 
Within the Inangahua township, damage to houses resulted from a 
number of contributing factors, notably, deferred maintenance, 
borer infestation, poor drainage and the numerous alterations and 
additions carried out 'without due regard to structural safe-
2 guards 1 • But on a more optimistic note it was pointed out that: 
The ordinary timber frame houses, as built in New Zealand, 
generally have a high level of earthquake resistance, 
especially if only of one storey and of a rectangular or 
well compartmented shape, and built on good ground. 3 
In a country which can expect at least one Force 8 earth-
quake4 and a number of lesser magnitude every century, the need 
to ensure a high standard of earthquake resistant construction is 
obvious for both economic and public safety reasons. 
Seismic Sea Waves (tsunamis) 5 
New Zealand's location within the Pacific Basin makes it 
vulnerable to coastal inundation by seismic sea waves. These are 
1P.D. Anderson, F.R. Smith, F. Quinn, 'Damage in the Greymouth 
Area 1 , BNZSEE, Vo 1. 2, No. 1, February 1969, p. 142. 
2H.W. Yeatman, 'Survey and approach to restoration of damaged 
buildings', BNZSEE, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1969, pp. 88-89. 
3B.H. Falconer, 'Initial appraisal of building damage in Inangahua', 
BNZSEE, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1969, p. 78. 
4The last Force 8 earthquake occurred in the Wellington-Wairarapa 
region in 1855, 115 years ago. By way of comparison, the recent 
Peruvian earthquake registered 7.7 on the Richter Scale. 
5Tsunami is the commonly accepted oceanographic term. 
86 
impulsively generated waves usually resulting from submarine 
earthquakes and have been known to travel up to speeds of five 
hundred miles per hour. The slope of the wave front is often 
imperceptible in deep water, but upon reaching shallow and 
particularly constricted water, wave height rapidly increases 
resulting in the inundation of low lying coastal areas. 
Throughout recorded history there are numerous examples of the 
destruction wrought by these waves within the Pacific Basin. 1 
In May 1960, a severe earthquake in Chile generated .a wave 
which travelled to a number of points around the Pacific rim, 
causing severe damage in Hawaii and Japan. In New Zealand 
considerable damage was done to shore installations at Napier and 
Lyttelton, and a number of coastal areas including the town of 
Whakatane were evacuated as a precaution. 
Not only does a danger exist from a wave generated at a 
distance from the country, but also from one originating in the 
area of the continental shelf. Because of the short distance, 
warning of the wave's approach may not be possible. The only 
recent example of a wave being generated in New Zealand waters 
occurred in 1947 following a magnitude IV2 earthquake thirty miles 
off the Gisborne coast. The wave was estimated to have reached 
between twenty and thirty feet in height, though fortunately, 
coastal damage was superficial and localised. 3 
1For a brief account of seismic sea wave destruction see W. Bas-
come, Waves and Beaches (New York, Doubleday, 1964), pp. 106-116. 
2Magnitude IV on the Modified Mercalli Scale. This scale measures 
the felt effect of earthquakes rather than magnitude as measured 
by the Richter Scale. The scale ranges from I - X. 
3Details of the damage done by this wave were taken from the files 
of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission. 
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In response to the tsunami problem in the Pacific, the 
United States Coast and Geodetic Survey has developed a warning 
system, to which this country belongs. 1 The system is centred 
on Hawaii where information is received about all Pacific earth-
quakes which might produce a tsunami. If there appears to be a 
danger, warnings are issued to member countries throughout the 
Pacific Basin. On receipt of a warning in Wellington, civil 
defence organisations and the police in coastal areas are notified 
by an elaborate telephone procedure. 
Flooding and Storms 
Although storms and floods frequently cause loss of life and 
destruction in this country, unlike earthquakes, warnings can 
usually be given. While they may not pose a major threat to life, 
their economic significance can rival that of a severe earthquake. 
The cyclonic storm which passed over most of New Zealand in April 
1968, exceptional in both intensity and the area affected, 
resulted in claims of $1,785,787 being made against the Earthquake 
an4 War Damage Commission. 2 By way of comparison the Inangahua 
earthquake which occurred six weeks later cost the Commission 
3 $2,430,000. 
Table I shows the distribution and frequency of storms and 
floods which have occurred over a period of twenty-six years, 
giving some indication of the vulnerability of the various areas 
of the country to these hazards. 
1New Zealand joined the system in 1962. 
2 A.J .H.R., Report of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission, 
B.11, 1969, p. 4. 
3 Ibid., p. 3. 
TABLE I 
STORMS AND FLOODS IN NEW ZEALAND (1944-1968) 1 
Region Floods Floods and 
Storms 
North Auckland 5 6 
Auckland 4 ~ \) 
South ,;\.uc k land 2 
•;,,;a ika to 8 L:. 
Coro,na nde l 1 1 
Bay of Plenty 7 12 
Haur~ki 2 1 
·;?'" ,.... 
'"'"1. n_:::, Country 4 2 
raranaki 3 3 
';~anganui 1 1 
Gisborne 1 3 
Haw!:ees Bay 2 3 
Taihape 2 
0.Ja irara pa 3 l 
l"la na"VJa tu 5 ') ,) 
>!ellington 4 7 
I'-'Iarlborough 4 6 
Nelson {.f i' 
Golden Bay 1 1 
';,Jes tla nd 3 " () 
Canterbury 6 lL:. 
Ut88,0 5 n 0 
Southland {. 9 
Total 
11 
10 
2 
12 
2 
19 
3 
6 
11 
2 
4 
5 
2 
4 
8 
ll 
10 
Jl 
2 
11 
20 
13 
13 
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~--------------------------------------------=------------1This table has been compiled from the records of the Earthquake 
and \-Jar Da~nage Com.:nission, 'wellinston,. The floods, and floods 
and storms, listed are those which have caused •extraordinary 
disaster damage' as defined under The Earth~~and Har Damage 
~"~.e? u lations, Amend :r:en t No. 2. 
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The Fire Service recognises that the maximum fire danger in 
New Zealand exists within port areas, large oil and petrol instal-
lations, and the highly concentrated commercial and business 
districts of the main urban centres; decreasing to a minimum in 
sparsely populated rural areas. 1 Fire brigades are distributed 
accordingly and an elaborate reinforcement system has been 
organised. 
Under normal circumstances the possibility of a conflagra-
tion reaching disaster proportions always exists, but the most 
potential disaster problem facing the Fire Service is the outbreak 
of widespread fire following an earthquake in an urban area. 
Both overseas and local experience has shown that this invariably 
occurs, the risk being particularly acute in this country because 
of the reliance placed on timber as a construction material. 2 
Fire Safety 
The question of fire safety has recently been studied in 
detail by a committee of enquiry set up in 1969 following a fire 
in a Wellington old people's home. ·Although the enquiry was 
concerned specifically with fire safety, protection and prevention 
in public acc.ommodation houses, institutions for handicapped 
people and Government buildings, the findings of the committee 
1New Zealand Statutes, The Fire Services Code of Practices 1965, 
pp. 2-3. The large tracts of coniferous forest in the central 
North Island pose a special fire problem, which is the responsi-
bility of the Forest Service. 
2The Napier earthquake (1931) was followed by widespread fire 
which added to the destruction and loss of life. The San 
Francisco earthquake (1906) was similar in this respect. 
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have an extended relevance as they particularly involve the local 
authorities• general responsibility for public safety. 
In regard to fire legislation, the committee found a typical 
administrative problem with fourteen statutes, amendments and 
regulations relating to fire safety. This situation led the 
committee to comment that: 
Even if the legislation on fire safety were "adequate", its 
"effectiveness" would tend to be diminished by dispersion. 
The law is so scattered throughout the Statute Book that 
only by good luck would most people be able to trace it to 
its 21 separate locations. 1 
The implementation of New Zealand Standard Specification, 
NZSS 1900, already mentioned in respect to earthquake resistant 
building construction, came in for criticism. The committee noted 
that Chapter 5 of NZSS 1900 (Fire Resisting Construction and Means 
Qf Egres§): 
goes a long way towards meeting the general demand for 
standardisation of the law on fire safety but falls short 
of the ultimate goal. For one thing, a number of local 
authorities have not adopted NZSS 1900 ••• The legislative 
standards on fire safety should be uniform throughout the 
country; consequently the model by-law onfire safety 
should be in force in every local authority area. 2 
Although the Municipal Corporations Act empowers the Minister of 
Internal Affairs 1 to require a council to make by-laws, or to 
revoke, alter, or exten~ any by-laws regarding fire safetyr, this 
3 pow~r has never been used. The Standards Association informed 
the committee that making the adoption of NZSS 1900 mandatory 
1Report of the Cornmt:ttee of Inquiry, Fire Protection and Means of 
E a e in Buildin s for Accommo ation of the Pub i or Inca a i-
tated Persons Wellington, 1970 , p. 34. 
2Report of the Committee of Inquiry, pp. 41-42. 3 . 
Ibid., p. 42. 
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'"would be nibbling away at the authority of local bodies"•. 1 
But, as the committee noted, 'as the legislature apprehends, com-
2 pulsion may at times be necessary'. 
was also pointed out that NZSS 1900: 
From further submissions it 
related mainly to new buildings and dealt with their 
construction to the exclusion of their equipment; and 
adoption was a burdensome legal process anyway. 3 
To remedy the situation, the committee advanced a number of 
recommendations including the demand for uniformity in fire safety 
standards, that fire safety provisions be included in only two 
statutes, and the replacement of the local authority optional 
model by-law (NZSS 1900) with mandatory regulations under both 
statutes. 
The committee also enquired into the •co-ordination that 
exists between licensing authorities, local authorities and fire 
authorities• 4 in respect to licensing and fire inspection, and 
found this to be inadequate. In this area, further problems were 
encountered with NZSS 1900, including difficulty of interpreta-
tion. The problem was 'compounded by the legion of officials 
throughout the country who have to give their own idea of what 
they mean 1 • 5 It was also noted that 'some local authorities have 
engineers, some have building inspectors as well or instead, some 
have neither•. 6 In respect to fire safety inspection it was again 
found that a multiplicity of poorly co-ordinated bodies were 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid . , p. 50 • 
5 Ibid., p. 53. 
6ll2...i..Q.. 
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responsible - a situation which led the committee to recommend the 
establishment of a national fire safety inspectorate administered 
by the Fire Services Council. 
Responsibility for the general situation revealed by the 
committee of enquiry rests with both local and central government. 
At a fundamental level, the unchecked growth in the number of 
ad hoc and territorial local authorities has led to a plethora, 
with the result that: 
"While it can be claimed that many local authorities, both 
urban and rural, appear to function successfully under the 
present system it is equally true that there are many others 
••• unable to support a satisfactory administration or 
economically perform the multifarious duties which modern 
conditions demand." 1 
Furthermore, the multiplicity of local authorities results in the 
inability to co-ordinate administrative responsibilities - in 
this particular context, fire safety. 
Successive Governments, however, have exhibited a marked 
reluctance to impose structural reform upon local government, or 
to impo·se mandatory regulations. This has been apparent with 
NZSS 1900, and a parallel situation has occurred tvith local 
authority civil defence planning. The Civil Defence Act placed 
only a moral responsibility on the local authorities, with the 
result that in 1968, six years after the Act's passage, some 30 
local authorities were still without civil defence plans. 2 This 
permissiveness on the part of central Government appears to be an 
acknowledgement of the status of local governmemt, but it would 
seem that in areas of public safety a moral responsibility is 
1A.J.H.R., Inquiry into the structure of local government, 1.18, 
1960' p. 13. 
2 For details see Chapter VI, p. 117 .. 
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insufficient. Yet, unless all local authorities are prepared to 
accept this type of responsibility, mandatory requirements or loss 
of functions appears inevitable. 
* * 
This chapter has attempted a brief and by no means exhaustive 
account of the character of natural disaster in New Zealand. 
Without doubt, earthquakes, because of their enormous destructive 
capacity and unpredictable occurrence, constitute the most serious 
threat. That is not, of course, to say anything new, the danger 
has been known since the earliest days of European settlement. 
Yet it is a measure of the country's concern that not until the 
mid-1960's was the need for a permanent emergency organisation to 
cope with the problem acknowledged. 
The questions of anti-seismic building construction and fire 
safety have been discussed in some detail as these are two areas 
where the local authorities are able to promote environmental 
. 1 
safety. Insistence on a high standard of fire safety may prevent 
or confine an outbreak of fire, while the enforcement of stringent 
building regulations may help to reduce the death toll in an 
earthquake. 
Combined with their responsibility for civil defence, the 
local authorities are therefore in an overall position to promote 
public safety, yet how seriously some take this responsibility is 
questionable. 
1The other major area is local catchment board responsibility for 
flood prevention. 
CHAPTER VI 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANISATION 
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In 1959 New Zealand had initiated the development of a civil 
defence organisation structured on three levels: national, 
regional and local. Officially, it was 'the United Kingdom 
model adapted to New Zealand conditions' . 1 But this was not 
entirely accurate. New Zealand had adopted the British model in 
1940, a model which in the latter context had remained substan-
tially unchanged throughout the post-war period. In 1959 this 
country in effect re-adopted the structure of its own wartime 
civil defence organi~ation. 2 
By the middle of 1960 the skeleton structure of the organi-
sation was complete. The Ministry was established, Regional 
Commissioners appointed, and the local authorities informed of 
their general responsibilities. 
Organisational development was to be based on the concept of 
utilising existing resources - the personnel and equipment of 
1Ministry of Civil Defence, Civil Defence in New Zealand, p. 5. 
2some months after the establishment of the Ministry of Civil 
Defence the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration publi-
shed the report of a study group which had considered the type of 
emergency organisation necessary to cope with both natural 
disaster and nuclear attack. See New Zealand Institute of Public 
Administration, 1 Organisation for Disaster 1 , N .Z. J. P .A., Vol. 22, 
No. 1, September 1959, pp. 51-54. 
The study group recommended a three-tier structure, and only the 
nature of the regional element differed from the Government's pro-
posals. It was suggested that regional areas should correspond 
to the 19 existing police districts. The report was inconclusive 
on the quest.ion of regional control, proposing that it rest with 
either the chief official of the largest town in each region or 
with the senior officer of police. With the benefit of hindsight, 
the regional approach adopted by the Government has proved 
successful, though the question of whether the police or the local 
authorities should retain control at the local level, an aspect 
which the report did not consider, is more debatable. For 
further discussion see Chapter VII, pp. 140-142. 
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Government departments, agencies and the local authorities during 
an emergency, rather than establishing an independent organisation 
with its own resources. By adopting this approach civil defence 
assumed a basically co-ordinating function and development at all 
levels of the organisation was directed towards this end. 
With the exception of the regional element, however, progress 
with organisational development was almost non-existent prior to 
1964, the result of the low priority afforded civil defence by the 
Government. Consequently, at no time during the early 1960's was 
the organisation in a position to cope with a serious emergency, 
whether in the form of a nuclear attack or a natural disaster. 
The Regional Headquarters 
As the Regional Commissioners were to assist the local 
authorities with establishing civil defence organisations, the 
development of the regional headquarters was given priority. At 
the first Ministry conference in June 1960 the functions of the 
Region~l Commissioners were defined. These were to be: (a) 
Representation of the Ministry within the regions; (b) Promotion 
of civil defence and assisting the local authorities in establis-
hing civil defence units: (c) Training; (d) The co-ordination 
of Government resources. 1 
The second function at this stage was the most important. 
The last function was poorly defined, and this was recognised. 
The mobilisation of Government resources in a disaster was still 
based on the procedure detailed in Government Action in a Major 
Emergency (1954). This plan did not make provision for regional 
H.O.C.R., June, 1960. 
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co-ordination, and not until 1966 was it superseded by a new one. 
However, the problem was to some extent overcome by incorporating 
the co-ordinating functions of the Regional Commissioners and 
their headquarters in the Civil Defence Act. 1 
Once the immediate functions of the Regional Commissioners 
had been defined, attention turned to the question of representa-
tio~ of Government departments on the regional headquarters. 
In most cases co-operation with civil defence was forthcoming; 
occasionally resistance to involvement occurred. 
The Health Department was the first to be involved with 
regional planning, but, following inconclusive discussions, the 
Director considered that the composition of the regional head-
quarters should be decided at ministerial leve1. 2 The Regional 
Commissioners therefore requested representation from the three 
armed services, the Police, the Ministry of Works, the Fire 
Service, the Post Office, and the Departments of Health and 
Industries and Commerce. 3 In July 1961, however, the Director 
informed the Regional Commissioners that a: decision on the compo-
' sition was to be their responsibility.~ Burrows took the 
opportunity to define the function of the regional headquarters 
which, he said, was: 
To plan the co-ordination of the Government effort within 
its region in the event of an emergency, the action of any 
-1--
See Chapter III, p. 41. 
2 
3 
The Health Department representative stated on more than one 
occasion that it was necessary for the Ministry of Civil Defence 
to provide a policy for the co-ordination of Government depart-
ments with civil defence. 
H • 0 • C • R • , May , 1 9 6 1 . 
4 Ibid., July, 1961. 
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department being subject always to any limitations imposed 
by its own higher authority. 1 
Following a letter from the Minister of Civil Defence to the 
chief firJ officers throughout the country asking for Fire 
Service participation on the regional headquarters, a representa ... 
tive of the Fire Service Council attended the July conference. 
He suggested that a regional fire officer with no operational 
control outside his own fire district should be appointed to the 
regional headquarters. But any system, he said, would require 
strict supervision as _it_ would be dealing with a large number of 
volunteer fire brigades who would 'resent outside contro1 1 • 2 
The Fire Service Council, he said, would set up a committee to 
study the problem. Nevertheless, negotiations with the Fire 
Service were to be protracted and a method of co-ordination 
between the Service and civil defence was not finally completed 
until 1967. 
A representative of the R.N.Z.A.F. also attended the July 
conference. He explained that under the present air-force 
standing orders· there would be little value in air-force repre-
sentation on· the regional headquarters, as all air traffic was 
under centralised control, 'and to be of value must stay that 
3 
way'. Undeterred, the Regional Commissioners felt that they 
must have air advisers on the regional headquarters. 
Regional representation was eventually completed during the 
drafting of the Civil Defence Bill when the decision was made to 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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create a national civil defence committee. Those on the three 
regional civil defence committees (R.C.D.C.) were to be nominated 
r 
1 by each Government department represented on the N.C.D.C., but 
with the added provision that there could be 'such other persons 
as the Director appoints to .•. the committee for the time being•. 2 
As the N.C.D.C. and R.C.D.C.'s were to be co-ordinating 
booies it was necessary for their composition to be relatively 
' 
uniform, though the added legislative provision gave the Regional 
Commissioners latitude in seconding further members. 3 
National Planning 
The composition of the regional headquarters was finalised 
with the passage of the Civil Defence Act in December 1962, but 
the more complex problem of defining the operational roles of those 
Government departments and agencies involved with civil defence 
had not been considered in any detail. 
In theory, the local authorities' demand for a co-ordinated 
central·Government commitment to civil defence had been met with 
the·passage of the Act. In practice, however, the Government was 
in no position to carry out its commitment. A comprehensive plan 
of Government action and a national headquarters to mobilise 
Government resources during an emergency did not exist. To fulfil 
1For the functions and composition of the N.C.D.C. see Chapter III, 
p. 40. 
2
civil Defence Act, 1962, s20~ subss2. 
3For example, the regional civil defence committee Southern Region, 
has in addition to the district officers of those departments 
listed on the N.C.D.C., the following: The Chief Fire Officer of 
the Christ:.church Metropolitan Fire Board, the District Officer of 
the Department of Internal Affairs, a nominee of the petroleum 
industry, and three military representatives - A.O.C. R.N.Z.A.F. 
Wigram, the Commander of the Southern Military District and the 
Resident Naval Officer. 
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these requirements and to define the operational roles of those 
departments involved with civil defence required the attention of 
_the N.C.D.C., but the committee did not meet for the first time 
until early in 1964. 
National planning was also handicapped by the lack of 
I 
.,, 
administrative capacity within the Ministry. The absence of a 
full-time directorate, indicative of the Ministry's low status, 
placed a heavy administrative burden upon the Regional Commissio-
ners with the result that delays in decision-making were 
inevitable. It was for this reason that the composition of the 
regional headquarters had taken more than eighteen months to 
finalise. 
The most urgent requirement confronting the Ministry was the 
need to replace Government Action in a Maior Emergency (1954) 
which, although obsolete, was still in force. A major disaster 
involving central Government direction of the civil defence effort 
required a new plan. 
At a conference in July 1963 Bourke pointed out that there 
were dangers in the continued existence of G.A.M.E. as it was the 
only written directive available to Government officers. In 
reply, the Director said that 'the terms and requirements of civil 
defence [.as they affected Government departments] would have to be 
est'ablished by the N.C.D.c.• 1 The need for a meeting of the 
N.C.D.C. was stated bluntly in December 1963 when a Health Depart-
ment representative said that his department would not become 
involved with civil defence until the N.C.D.C. had met. The 
1 H.O.C.R., July, 1963. 
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hospitals, he stated, would not stockpile supplies for civil 
defence purposes 'until a policy had been decided, approved, and 
1 
the money set aside for the purpose'. 
Despite the urgent need for a meeting of the N.C.D.C., at no 
time during 1963 did the Regional Commissioners directly request 
.\ 
o·ne. When the committee did meet in February 1964, it was 
directly attributable to an enquiry made into civil defence 
administration by the Ombudsman. 
The Ombudsman's enquiry 
The Ombudsman's enquiry into civil defence occurred when: 
Several citizens expressed misgivings [to himJ .•• about the 
administration of the Civil Defence Act, and [be] noticed 
various press criticisms which had been appearing from time 
to time. 2 
Having considered the complaint was within his jurisdiction, the 
Ombudsma·n wrote to the Director of Civil Defence in September 1963: 
Advising him of complaints that the administration was being 
less active than it should be in pressing for the prepara-
tion and approval of national civil defence plans and of 
local civil defence plans; and that there was too much 
secrecy surrounding civil defence so that the public as a 
whole were unaware of what their immediate responsibilities 
were. 3 
The Ombudsman noted that both the Director and Deputy Director had 
'other important responsibilities' and were not able to devote a 
great deal of time to 'organising civil defence on a national 
levet•. 4 The Internal Affairs Department responsibility for 
organising the itineraries of distinguished visitors to the 
1 Ibid., December, 1963. 
2 A.J.H.R., Report of the Ombudsman, A.6, 1964, p. 35. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
country was considered by the Ombudsman to be 0 an additional 
inhibiting factor' . 1 
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Following the initial correspondence, the Ombudsman inter-
viewed the Director who expressed some doubts over the Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction 1 but conceded the validity of /Jlis] view that a 
II • 1 d f . 1 d • • I 2 
"matter of administration must ~nc u e a a~ ure to a m~n~ster • 
The Director explained that the N.C.D.C. had not met because: 
~ 
In his judgement it was desirable that the local civil 
defence schemes should first be advanced to a stage where 
there was an organisation in existence. 3 
The Ombudsman also enquired about 'directives to Government 
departments'. To this the Director replied that he had 
1 personally written to every permanent head requesting fullest 
assistance to Regional Commissioners in regional and local 
schemes 1 • 4 He added that: 
Civil defence could proceed only as far as and as fast as 
the availability of staff and finance permitted, and in the 
ultimate must depend wholly on the interest which the public 
itself takes in it at the local leve1. 5 
Although the Director had decide& to call a meeting of the 
N .C .• D .C. in January 1964, 'the Ombudsman, having seen further press 
criticism which he felt had validity: 
Considered that the answers previously given to [his] 
questions had become progressively less valid as time went 
on and that by now sections 10-13 of the Civil Defence Act 
should be put into active administration. 6 · 
Although the Ombudsman 'realised the difficulty of a reluctant 
public' he pointed out that the: 
102 
Government and Parliament had been sufficiently aware of 
the needs of the situation to pass the comprehensive Act, 
and ... felt that it was indeed the duty of the responsible 
Department to administer the Act effectively. If adequate 
staff and funds were not available then it was the duty of 
the Director to make the appropriate representations to his 
Minister. 1 ·r 
The Ombudsman's enquiry was a severe indictment of civil 
defence administration and exposed the Ministry's failure to 
undertake the obligations imposed upon it by the Civil Defence Act. 
In particular, the Director's claim that a meeting of the N.C.D.C. 
was necessary only when 'there was an organisation in existence' 
was to argue in a vicious circle, for an adequate emergency 
organisation could not be developed without establishing a co-
ordi:nated system of Government support for the local authorities 
and this required the urgent attention of the N.C.D.C. 
Parliament did not find time to debate the enquiry when the 
Ombudsman's report was tabled in 1964 and the subject was raised 
only briefly when A.M. Findlay (Labour, Waitakere) said: 'The 
report presented a view of the Ombudsman's activities which went 
rather further than was contemplated in the Act and began to 
invade the functi9n of Parliament itself 1 • 2 More to the point, 
the Ombudsman had succeeded where Parliament had failed. The 
enquiry, however, spurred civil defence·development particularly 
at the national level though it did little to improve the already 
poor image of civil defence in the country. 
l I bid. 
2-
N.Z.P.D., Vol. 339, p. 1055, 4 August, 1964. 
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'Government Action in Maior Disaster' 
The N.C.D.C. convened for the first time on 17 February 1964, 
fifteen months after the passage of the Civil Defence Act, and it 
was to this meeting that the newly appointed Minister of Civil 
Defence, D.C. Seath, elaborated the 'new' natural disaster 
. . f h . . 1 prLorLty o t e organLsatLon. 
In its administrative cap?city, the N.C.D.C. was to be 
assisted by planning committees which would consider special civil 
defence problems, including the operational responsibilities of 
the various Government departments, and the provision of 'guide-
lines' on particular aspects of local authority planning. 
The first meeting of the N.C.D.C. decided the number of 
planning committees required, and sent a report to the Minister 
asking him to seek Cabinet approval for the functions of the ten 
2 departments represented on the N.C.D.C. The committee also 
established a national plans co-ordinating committee, responsible 
for integrating the work of the individual planning committees 
into a national scheme, and producing a new plan detailing Govern-
ment direction of the civil defence effort in a major disaster. 3 
The need to replace Government Action in a Maior Emergency 
j 
(1954) had first been discussed in July 1963. In October of the 
same year, the Regional Commissioners were informed that a new 
plan had been submitted to the Director for his consideration. 4 
In December, they were further informed that the plan still 
1For details see Chapter IV, p. 68. 
2A total of 10 planning committees was established. 
3For the composition of the national plans co-ordinating committee 
see Chapter IV, p. 68 footnote 6. 
4 . 
H.O.C.R., October, 1963. 
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required the Director's decision, and that important issues were 
involved, ,including constitutional matters which would require 
l: 
Cabinet approval. Bourke, who was to be the most vocal critic 
of the plan, said that he wanted···' it to detail Government action 
in a wartime situation, provide alternative sites for the Govern-
ment, and explain how Government departments would delegate their 
1 powers. 
Drafting the plan, it appears, was begun again following the 
first meeting of the national plans co-ordinating committee, and 
a 'first draft' of Government Action in Maior Disaster (G.A.M.D.) 
did not appear until April 1965. 
The order of reference for G.A.M.D. was planning 'Government 
Action in National Emergency and Major Disaster•, 2 but as the 
national plans co-ordinating committee had previously decided that 
a nuclear attack on New Zealand was no longer a possibility, only 
the latter aspect of the terms of reference was dealt with. 3 
G.A.M.D. was based on the assumption of a 'major disaster' 
which required Government direction of civil defence operations. 4 
For. reasons of morale the plan stated that the Government would 
remain in Wellington, though provision was made for its removal 
to a field location if necessary. Overall responsibility for 
civil defence would rest with a small Cabinet sub-committee, while 
an operational group would direct the civil defence effort. 5 
1 Ibid. , December, 1963. 
2Ministry of Civil Defence, Government Action in Major Disaster 
(Wellington, 1966), p. 2. 
3For details see Chapter IV, pp. 68-69. 
4For the definition of a vmajor disaster' see Chapter IV, p. 71. 
5The operational group was a contracted version of the N.C.D.C. 
(See Fig. V.) 
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1 Below the national headquarters would be the existing structure 
of the regional headquarters and the local authorities. (See 
Fig. V.) 
The second part of the plan dealt with the functions of the 
regipnal headquarters and the local authorities, functions which 
were already known. An appendix prescribed the responsibilities 
of those Government departments and agencies involved with civil 
defence. 2 
Following the appearance o~rthe first draft of G.A.M.D. in 
April 1965, Bourke commented: 
I think the paper is too long ••. It seems to me that while 
the concept of the Government field committee has been at 
last laid low,3 this report has not yet clearly established 
the principle that civil defence operations to cope with a 
major disaster ••• cannot be centrally directed. Success 
in dealing with the life saving phase of any operation must 
depend upon the initiative of those at the scene and this 
requires a clear and widespread delegation of authority from 
central Government to local governme:nt, and from the head-
quarters of government departments to branches •.. The 
general impression which the paper leaves me with is that 
the concept of G.A.M.E. is still very much in the foreground 
••• I do not believe there is anything to be gained by 
attempts to set up temporary Government headquarters •.. 
outside Wellington. If ••. a disaster should overwhelm 
Wellingto·n ••• the only sensible procedure would be to re-
establish government .•• at Auckland. 4 
As a plan, G.A~M.D. was over-centralised and there appeared 
to be some co:nflict between the plan and the assumptions on which 
it was based. A major disaster requiring central Government 
1National headquarters would be located in the basement of Broad-
casting House, Wellington, a.nd later transferred to the 'beehive' 
extension of Parliament buildings when completed. 
2These had bee:n approved by Cabinet in March 1964. 
3G.A.M.E. (1954) made provision for a Governme:nt field committee. 
See Chapter I, Pe 18~ 
4Regional Commissioner, Northern Region, to the Director of Civil 
Defence and other Regional Commissioners, Letter, 6 May, 1965. 
Figure V: GOVERNMENT ACTION IN A MAJOR DISASTER - COMMAND STRUCTURE 
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direction was assumed to be one affecting the central area of New 
Zealand. It would seem, however, that a disaster of such 
· magnitude could seriously affect Wellington and in all probability 
make Government direction of civil defence difficult, if not 
I 
impossible. 
The question of regional government, in the event of Welling-
ton being destroyed, had been considered before, but had never 
proceeded beyond the discussion stage. Yet, one of the reasons 
for basing Central Region headquarters on Palmerston North in 1960 
was that Wellington had at that time been defined as a 'target 
zone 1 • 
1 Although circumstances had now changed, the rationale 
was still applicable. If Wellington were incapacitated by a 
natural disaster, civil defence operations could be directed from 
Palmerston North with support from the other regions. 
Bourke continued his criticism of G.A.M.D. in March 1966 when 
he expressed to the other Regional Commissioners the view that the 
plan placed too much emphasis on Wellington and failed to give 
sufficien;.t details of how the various Government departments were 
/ . 
to support civil defence. He reiterated the contention that the 
national headquarters should be transferred to Auckland in the 
event of Wellington being destroyed. Herrick, 2 however, 
considered that national control should be at Palmerston North. 
Burrows felt the question of regional government should be dealt 
with in a separate section of G .A .M.D. Notwithstanding the 
criticism of the plan, the Director considered that it fulfilled 
1see Chapter IV, p. 60. 
2 Peren had retired as Regional Commissioner for the Central Region 
at the end of 1964. He was replaced by Captain T.D. Herrick. 
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an urgent need and should be regarded 'as a directive rather than 
1 
a hard and fast plan'. 
National Plans 
During the course of 1965 the results of the work done by the 
national planning committees began to appear, and by 1967 a total 
of ten plans had been produced, most of which provided basic civil 
defence information for the local authorities. 2 
1 . 
H.O.C .R., March, 1966. 
2Four of the plans, Traffic Control, Supply, Evacuation, and 
Welfare, provided information essentially for the local authori-
ties. The Traffic Control Plan listed the traffic control 
districts throughout the country. The Evacuation and its 
complementary Welfare Plan described methods for dealing with 
large numbers of homeless people. The Supply Plan listed the 
quantities of foodstuffs, clothing, etc. available at commercial 
organisations throughout the country. The Medical Plan explained 
the co-ordination between the Health Department and civil defence, 
and also described the procedure for dealing with casualties and 
maintaining public health. The Law and Order. Plan described the 
role of the Police during a disaster. This was to be the main-
tenance of order and the identification and disposal of the dead. 
A Tran.sport Plan and two Communications Plans rather more approx:i.-
ma.ted the term 'plan 1 • The former described the alternative 
transport resources which could be drawn upon during a disaster. 
The latter explained the alternative methods of communication 
which could be utilised throughout the country, and the communi-
cations to be used at the national and regional civil defence 
· headquarters. 
The Fire Fighting Services Plan was the last of the national plans 
to be produced. Negotiations between civil defence and the Fire 
Service had been proceeding intermittently since 1961. They had 
been protracted, not only because of their infrequency but the 
reluctance on the part of the Fire Service to being brought into 
the civil defence line of control. Eventually a compromise was 
reached: 
Fire Fighting Forces will be under their own separate and 
autonQmous command but will work in alliance with other Civil 
Defence operational groups and will conform to policy decisions 
and directions of the Civil Defence organisation - Ministry of 
Civil Defence, Fire Fighting Services Plan (Wellington, 1967), 
p. 1. 
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* * 
A combination of factors had stimulated the more rapid deve-
lopment of civil defence after 1964. The Ombudsman's enquiry, 
though embarrassing, provided the initial impetus. The appoint-
ment of a new and more capable Minister of Civil Defence was also 
a contributing factor and, following a recommendation from the 
Regional Commissioners, a permanent full-time Director was 
appointed at the end of 1964, providing a much needed increase in 
administrative capacity at the national level. 
Although the basic structure of civil defence was a,wartime 
adaptation it provided a rational system for dealing with natural 
disaster. Overseas experience with such events indicates that 
'the major problems which confront a government in a disaster 
situation are those of co-ordination' . 1 Ensuring effective co-
ordination had1 been, for a number of reasons, a dominant conside-
ration in the development of New Zealand civil defence. Firstly, 
the organisation ·-had been developed on a three-tier structure, 
nationa~, regional and local - a disjunct structure which required 
co-?rdination between the components. Secondly, the structure 
was constitutionally dichotomous as it incorporated both central 
and local government. The relationship between the two branches 
of Government required co-ordination rather than hierarchical 
direction. 2 Thirdly, and more importantly, civil defence was not 
1J.M. Power and R.L. Wettenhall, 'Bureaucracy and Disaster- II', 
Public Administration: The Journal of the Australian Regional 
Groups of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, Vol. 
XXIX, No. 2, June 1970, p. 181. This article is a study of the 
response to the 1967 Tasmanian bushfires. 
2Where a local authority declares a state of local civil defence 
emergency,' the decision to call upon regional assistance is that 
of the local authority. Where a state of national civil defence 
emergency is declared, the local authorities would automatically 
be directed from above. 
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intended to be an exclusive disaster organisation but a co-
ordinating body. 
Dey_elQQ.ments at the local_authority level 
From the outset the local authorities had been generally 
sympathetic to the need for civil defence though they had shown 
no obvious enthusiasm and were particularly critical of proposed 
methods for financing the scheme. 1 
Although the Ministry had considered that the local authori-
ties had an obligation to establish civil defence organisations, 
initially there had been a marked reluctance to exert pressure. 
Early in 1961, the Minister had informed the Regional Commissioners 
that: 
He did not want local authorities to be coerced into 
organising local civil defence schemes and thought the best 
approach was through the peaceful penetration of the Regional 
Commissioners which seemed to be having good results. 2 
During the passage of the Civil Defence Bill, a firmer line 
had.been taken. The Local Bills committee had included coercive 
provisions in the legislation, and the Minister had stated that 
'local authorities must have their plans prepared and approved 
within a year of the Act's passage' . 3 The Minister's mandatory 
'mu~t', however, contrasted with the permissive 'shall' of the Act. 
The Act was, nevertheless, a visible sign of progress though 
it did not provide the local authorities with details of how local 
1
see Chapter II, pp. 26 ff. 
2 H.O.C.R., May, 1961. 
3 . N~Z.P.D., Vol. 332, p. 2502, 7 November, 1962. 
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organisations were to be established. 1 This demand was eventually 
met with the distribution of the Civil Defence Planning Guide fQl;'. 
Local Authorities, in July 1963 and supplemented with the various 
national plans which appeared after 1965. 
With the provision of the 'planning guide' and the passing of 
the Civil Defence Act the Minister considered that a sufficient 
'lead' had been given and he warned the Municipal Association in 
1963 that if the local authorities showed any reluctance in under-
taking their responsibilities: 
He would not like to be placed in the position of having to 
recommend to the Government the imposition of penal provisions 
on local authorities because of their failure to undertake 
this responsibility. 2 
}' 
The President of .the Municipal Association saw the situation in a 
different light: 
With the passing of the C~vil Defence Act in December, 1962, 
an additional burden, both financial and administrative was 
placed on our members. 3 
During the previous four years numerous remits had been passed 
by the annual conferences of both local government associations, 
requesting Government financial assistance for civil defence. 
Some were general requests, for example: 'that the Government be 
asked to provide financial assistance towards the establishment of 
civil defence organisations•. 4 Others were more specific, for 
1The Civil Defence Act laid down only the powers and general res-
ponsibilities of the local authorities. See Chapter III, 
pp. 42-43. 
2New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Fiftieth 
Conference, 1963, p. 14. 
3New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Fifty-first 
Conference, 1964, p~ 21. 
4 New Zealand Counties Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-
seventh Conference, 1962, p. 99. 
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example: 'that the Government be ~rged to face up to its respon-
sibilities to meet out of pocket expenses for those people who by 
reason of involvement in civil defence organisations face loss of 
wages in their normal work 1 • 1 On all occasions the Government 
rejected the remits, and the impasse led the President of the 
Municipal Association to declare in 1965 that: 
Government has made it abundantly clear that it regards the 
organisation of c~vil defence as a local body responsibility 
and so the executive has come to the conclusion that there 
is no point in further pressing this matter [of financial 
assistance}. 2 
If external pressure were not successful, eventually, internal 
pressure was. In March 1964, the Regional Commissioners informed 
the Minister that the Government 'should consider giving "more" 
,f~ 
assistance to the local authorities now that local authority plans 
3 had been approved'. The Minister said he would consider putting 
a case before Cabinet. But not until over two years later, in 
October 1966, did Cabinet approve subsidies on certain items of 
civil defence expenditure for those local authorities with civil 
defence plans. 4 At a later date it was revealed that the 
Treasury had opposed the subsidies, and the Director admitted they 
were 'the best they could get'; a claim to have them made retro-
spect~ve had been refused. 5 
1New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Fifty-first 
Conference, 1964, p. 104. 
2 New Zealand Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Fifty-
second Conference, 1965, p. 21. 
3 H.O.C.R., March, 1964. 
4
subsidies were on a $ for $ basis. At 31 March 1968 approval 
had been given for a total of $21,175 in subsidies - A.J.H.R. 
. ' Report of the Department of .Internal Affairs, H.22, 1968, p. 19. 
5 H.O.C.R., October, 1966. 
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The subsidies went some way to satisfying local authority 
dem-tnds, though in 1967 and again in 1968 a number of remits were 
passed at the local government conferences requesting extension 
of the subsidies to cover the payment of permanent local authority 
civil defence officers. The requests were promptly refused on 
economic grounds. But following the disasters which struck the 
country early in 1968, the question of extending financial assis-
tance was hurriedly reappraised. 
An example of a local civil defence organisation 
The Christchurch Combined District civil defence organisation 
incorporates the six territorial local authorities in the area and 
was one of the first South Island organisations with an approved 
1 
civil defence plan. 
In the event of an emergency, overall responsibility is 
vested in a committee of the six local authority mayors, while 
operational control is exercised by a group controller through a 
central-headquarters manned by the heads of the various civil 
defence sections and liaison officers from the emergency utilities. 
(See Fig. VI.) 
For operational purposes the city is subdivided into ten 
areas, each with a headquarters. The areas in turn are subdivided 
into a total of 74 sectors, each of which is the responsibility of 
a warden. The sector posts, based on state primary schools, are 
intended to provide the basic level of contact between c~vil 
defence and the public and act as focal points for rescue and 
1 Although the Civil Defence Act provides for the triennial review 
of plans by the Regional Commissioners, this, of course, cannot 
guarantee their effectiveness. 
Figure VI: CHRISTCHURCH COMBINED DISTRICT CIVIL DEFENCE ORGANISATION 
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relief operations. 1 
The rationale underlying the system is that in the event of 
a disaster the resources of the normal emergency utilities would 
be overwhelmed and, therefore, the resources of the whole 
community must be brought to bear. 
As well as having the resources of the public utilities and 
the civil defence organisation itself, the controller is empowered 
also to requisition pr~vate resources but, should the organisation 
be unable to cope ~r require specialised assistance, support from 
the Regional Commissioner can be called upon. 
In theory the system is sound. In practice, however, the 
ability of civil defence to cope effectively with a disaster is 
questionable. Since the organisation's inception priority has 
been given to the establishment of a warden system within the 
suburban areas. But this has' been to ignore the special problem 
of the central business district where the high population concen-
tration, particularly during working hours, and the preponderance 
of old buildings would, in the event of a severe earthquake, 
inevitably result in a high casualty rate. 
Even within the suburban areas, the credibility for civil 
defence is doubtful. Under present instructions, the pub lie, in 
the event of an emergency, are asked to contact their nearest 
war~en post if they require help or can offer assistance. The 
existing distribution of warden posts, however, places most of the 
population at some distance from them; a fact which must 
inevitably 
1u · 1· · t~ ~s~ng 
policy. 
reduce their utility as focal points for rescue and 
·---------------------------------------------------------
state primary schools as sector posts is national 
116 
relief operations. In order to provide effective coverage it 
would appear necessary to extend the warden system down to the 
block, if not individual street level. Ideally, every street 
could contain a nucleus of people capable of forming an emergency 
team in the event of a disaster. 
With the existing system, however, there exists a fundamental 
problem, and one which is not confined to Christchurch. This is 
the lack of public awareness of the function of civil defence. 
The level of public awareness 
The only purpose of civil defence is to provide help in time 
of crisis, yet, since its inception little attempt has been made 
at both the national and local levels to publicise civil defence; 
with the result that the public appear largely unaware of its 
function. 
In Christchurch, for example, a random sample of 162 people 
in the St. Albans electoral district found that 70 percent of the 
respondents did not know the location of their nearest warden 
1 post. A more comprehensive survey carried out in the South 
Island town of Blenheim (population 12,000), though covering fewer 
respondents, found that 80 percent were unaware of the location of 
their nearest warden post. 2 
In Blenheim, public knowledge of the local civil defence 
organisation was found to be very limited. Fifty-four percent 
of the sample thought the police were responsible for civil defence, 
while only 25 percent knew that it was a local authority responsi-
1For full details see Appendix A. 
2 In Christchurch, sector posts are marked with signs; in Blenheim 
they are not. 
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bility. In the event of a disaster 27 percent sa1.d they would 
turn to tne police for nelp while 24 percent sa1.d they would 
crintact their sector warden. Yet, ot the 24 percent, only 30 
percent of tnat number 1.n fact knew the location of their sector 
warden. 1 
It the lack of public recogn1.tion for the role of civil 
defence apparent in Blenheim and Cnristchurch applies in other 
centres, it is doubtful whether any local organisation would at 
present be able to achieve the level of social control necessary 
for it to cope effectively with a major disaster in an urban area. 
Progress with Local authority plann1.ng 
Although the Civil Defence Act only stipulated that local 
authorities 'shall' plan for civil defence, once the necessary 
planning details nad been provided, most showed a readiness to 
undertake their responsibilLties. By 1964 80 civ·il defence 
org~nisations were in existence incorporating 223 local authori-
ties.2 Over the next three years a steady increase occurred, 
tho!-Jgh by 1968 some 30 loca 1 authorities were still without plans. 
The Ministry, however, was in a difficult position to impose 
mandatory provisions on the recalcitrant local authorities. Not 
only was the Ministry conditioned by its own cautious approach, 
but. any action would almost inevitably be regarded as interference 
1For full details see Appendix B, Questions I, II, III, IV. 
2New Zealand local authorities have consistently shown a marked 
reluctance to amalgamate despite frequent reform attempts by 
central Government. Surprisingly, the provision in the Civil 
Defence Act permitting local authorities to combine for civil 
det ence purposes has met with considerable success. At 31 March 
1968, 25 organ:t.sa tions existed in the Northern Reg1.on incorpora t-
ing 72 local authorities; 51 organisations existed in the 
C~ntral ~egion.incorporating 75 local authorities; 45 organisa-
tl.ons ~x1.sted 1.n the Southern Region incorporating 94 local 
author1.t1.es. 
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in local authority affairs, particularly as it had been stressed 
that local civil defence was their responsibility - an argument 
which had consistently been used to justify the rejection of 
requests for financial assistance. Ironically, the emergencies 
which occurred early in 1968 and were to test c~vil defence on a 
major scale for the first time, also provided the Government with 
the political opportunity to impose mandatory civil defence 
requirements on the local authorities. 
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CHAPTER VII 
1968: CIVIL DEFENCE IN ACTION 
The April Storm 
From 9 to 15 April 1968 a cyclonic storm which produced the 
most severe weather conditions ever recorded in New Zealand, 
passed across the North and South Islands causing widespread 
damage to property and communications. The damage on land, 
however, was overshadowed by the loss of 51 lives when the inter-
island ferry 'Wahine' sank at the entrance to Wellington harbour 
at the height of the storm. 1 
Storm warnings had been issued by the meteorological service 
as early as 6 April and the national headquarters of civil defence 
was notified before the storm reached the northern part of the 
2 
country. 
At first the storm followed a southerly track along the east 
coast of the North Island, but du~ing the night of 9 April it 
intensified, changed track, and arrived unexpectedly over the 
Wellington area in the early morning of 10 April. 
In Wellington, winds gusting to 146 knots were recorded, and 
in the southern and exposed suburbs of the city numerous houses 
were severely damaged. The storm caught local civil defence 
organisations unprepared, and only in the borough of Upper Hutt, 
twenty miles north of Wellington, was a state of local disaster 
declared. The Mayor of Wellington decided against making a 
1 . 
For details of this disaster see A.J.H.R., T.E.V. Wahine, Ship-
ping Casualty, 10 April 1968, Report of Court and Annex thereto, 
H.51, 1969. 
2 It appears that the only warning issued by the national head-
quarters was to catchment authorities in the Auckland area. 
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declaration as it would have required the evacuation of places of 
work, bringing people out onto the windswept and debris-strewn 
streets. 
Following its southerly track, the storm reached Christchurch 
during the night of 10-11 April. The major threat facing the 
city was the heavy rain associated with the storm coinciding with 
a high tide, and flooding the low-lying coastal suburbs of New 
Brighton and Sumner. Fortunately, major flooding did not occur, 
though some exposed hillside houses were damaged by wind and 
ground subsidence. At all times during the night the police, 
assisted by army units which they had called in, remained in 
charge and a declaration of disaster was not made. 
The Leader of the Opposition, N.E. Kirk, who was in Christ-
church at the tim~ of the storm, criticised the failure to 
activate the civil defence organisation. Although later informed 
of the overall situation, Kirk claimed on the following day that 
'civil defence needs an urgent re-examination and a pretty sharp 
shakeup if last night's sorry episode is not to be repeated', and 
called for the resignation of the Minister of Civil Defence. 1 
The storm continu.ed its southerly track after passing over 
Christchurch, and though declining in intensity, continued to bring 
heavy rainfall.' In Southland, the Mataura River reached its 
highest level in 55 years and a declaration of disaster was made 
in the Gore-Mataura area where the evacuation of threatened houses 
took place. In the township of Wyndham, a declaration was not 
made but 700 people were evacuated by a joint effort of civil 
1Reported in The Press, Christchurch, 13 April, 1968. 
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defence and the police. 1 
The April storm provoked a renewed, though critical interest 
in the state of civil defence an interest which had been almost 
non-existent during the preceding years. The most vocal critic 
was the Leader of the Opposition who, following a meeting of the 
Labou~ party caucus, said that 'civil defence should rid itself of 
its pseudo-military background', and added that the police should 
be in control during an emergency. 2 The Mayor of Hamilton echoed 
Kirk's remarks, saying 1 1 firmly believe that the police are still 
the b~st-trained and the best able to direct and take command in 
emergencies such as we have just had' . 3 
The Prime Minister considered it necessary to take responsi-
bility for the criticism, admitting 1 it was apparent that in some 
places the civil defen~e organisations were not adequate to meet 
situations such as the gales of the past few days' . 4 At a later 
date the Minister of Civil Defence agreed 'that the civil defence 
system had failed because there had not been a lead from the 
capital which could have been followed through on a national 
. 5 
basis'. This was apparently a reference to the Ministry's 
failure to provide warnings to civil defence organisations in 
1 The township of Wyndham forms part of the Southland County which 
is administered from Invercargill. At the time of the flooding, 
County officials able to declare a state of disaster were out of 
the area and the civil defence warden in Wyndham was reluctant to 
do so. The Superintendent of the lnvercargill Police district 
proceeded to Wyndham and with the civil defence warden decided to 
evacuate the area, but without declaring an emergency. 
2Reported in The Press, Christchurch, 22 April, 1968. 
3 Ibid., 18 April, 1968. 
4 Ibid., 17 April, 1968. 
5 Ibid., 19 April, 1968. 
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areas likely to be affected by the storm. 
Because of the demand for a review of civil defence activities 
during the storm, a conference of Ministry personnel was promptly 
held, and a number of recommendations for improving the effective-
f h . . d 1 ness o t e organ~sat~on were rna e. These were: (a) Better 
administrative arrangements to ensure that any warning of an 
impending disaster was passed immediately to the Ministry of Civil 
Defence. (b) Any warning so received was to be passed immediately 
to the Regional Commissioners and the local authorities who would 
be advised to alert key members in their civil defence organisa-
tions.2 (c) Ea~ly activation of national and regional head-
quarters. (d) The local authorities be recommended to declare a 
state of disaster if there was an imminent threat of one. 
(e) Better arrangements to keep the public informed. It was also 
announced that the Government would consider extending its subsidy 
scheme to encourage more local authorities to employ paid civil 
defence officers. 3 Changes to the wording of the Civil Defence 
~ct were also proposed in an attempt to overcome the evident local 
authority reluctance to issue declarations of emergency. 
The Inangahua earthquake was to interrupt the implementation 
of the legislative reforms though during the intervening period 
discussions as to the adequacy of the Civil Defence Act were held 
1Details of the recommendations taken from The Press, Christchurch, 
19 April, 1968. 
2The New Zealand Meteorological Service now advises the Ministry of 
Civil Defence of unusually severe weather conditions which may 
have a reasonably high possibility of creating an emergency. At' 
his discretion the Director of Civil Defence alerts the Regional 
Commissioners who are then responsible for notifying the local 
authorities. 
3The scheme was introduced on 1 April 1969. The salaries of full-
time local authority civil defence officers are subsidised by the 
Government on a $ for $ basis. 
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between the Regional Commissioners and the local authorities. 
Although civil defence operations during the Inangahua earth-
quake were to prove successful, this disaster added further 
impetus to the need for legislative reforms, and shortly after the 
termination of the emergency the Regional Commissioners conferred 
with the Director and Secretary of Civil Defence. 
It was generally agreed that the reluctance of the local 
authorities to declare emergencies during the April storm had 
resulted from 'a lack of knowledge of the Act, and/or a lack of 
confidence in the local civil defence plan•. 1 From a meeting 
with civil defence controllers in his region, Herrick concluded 
that many had not _read the Act. 
Following a proposal from Burrows the conference decided that 
the word 'disaster' should be replaced in the Act by 'emergency' 
as the latter term was less emotive and might, for psychological 
reasons, make it easier for a local authority to make a declara-
tion. Although under existing legislation a civil defence orga-
nisation could be activated without a declaration, members would 
not be protected against liability or for compensation. This 
problem, it was felt, could be overcome by extending existing 
provisions in the Act. 
The other major amendment to the legislation arose from the 
dem·and to make local authority civil defence planning mandatory. 
At 31 March 1968 some 30 local authorities, all but one in the 
North Island, were still without civil defence plans. With the 
renewed concern for civil defence it appeared an opportune time 
to force the recalcitrant local authorities into accepting their 
1 H.O.C.R., June, 1968. 
. b' 1' . 1 respons~ ~ ~t~es. 
2 The lnangahua Earthquake 
124 
3 At 5.24 a.m. on 24 May 1968 a severe earthquake occurred on 
the West Coast of the South Island, its epicenter located a few 
4 
miles north of the small township of lnangahua. Widespread 
deformation of the landscape took place and severe damage occurred 
to buildings, roads, railways and telegraphic communication within 
the area. Fortunately, only two deaths occurred when a landslip 
demolished a farm house. 
At the time of the earthquake two civil defence organisations 
existed within the area: the Buller Combined District centred on 
Westport and the lnangahua County organisation centred on Reefton. 
Both organisations, however, were in a moribund state. Although 
Inangahua possessed a civil de~ence plan the organisation was in 
the process of being reconstructed as a number of personnel had 
1The method for achieving this was clumsy. The Civil Defence 
Amendment Act, 1968, stipulated that all local authorities were 
to have plans completed and approved by 31 December 1969. Where 
this provision was not complied with the appropriate Regional 
Commissioner would then prepare a plan for the recalcitrant local 
authority, the cost of doing so being recoverable from the local 
authority. It is difficult to see how such action would result 
in the local authority having an effective civil defence organi-
sation. See C~vil Defence Act, 1962, s28A. 
2This account is based on the following sources: Ministry of Civil 
Defence, Report of the lnangahua Earthquake, New Zealand. May 1968 
(Wellington, 1970); Bulletin of the New Zealand Societv for 
Earthquake Engineering, Vol., 2, No. 1, February 1969; discussions 
with Brigadier J.T. Burrows, Regional Commissioner, Southern 
Region, Christchurch, and Mr. G. Evans, Department of Civil Engi-
neering, Canterbury University. 
3The earthquake registered 7.0 on the Richter Scale and a maximum 
intensity of X on the Modified Mercalli Scale. The epicenter 
·was located 25 miles from that of the 1929 Murchison earthquake 
which had registered 7.6 on the Richter Scale. 
4
rnangahua (pop. 202) is a small railway junction and the site of 
a Ministry of Works depot, a timber mill, and an Electricity 
Department substation. 
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left the district. The Buller plan was only in the drafting 
stages, though some personnel had been appointed to the organisa-
tion. 
Rescue Phase 
The Inangahua township was completely isolated by the earth-
quake, with the first news of the disaster coming from the 
N.Z.B.C. at 6.30 a.m. after widespread earth tremors had been felt 
throughout the North and South Islands, though the actual location 
of .the earthquake was at that time unknown. The first.contact 
from Inangahua with the outside world was made over an Electricity 
Department mobile radio to Waimangaroa. 1 Contact was later 
established with Gisborne over a Ministry of Works (M.O.W.) radio; 
the message being relayed to the M.O.W. in Westport. 
The Electricity Department in Nelson, realising something was 
amiss at the Inangahua substation, despatched engineers by heli-
copter who arrived at the township at 9.50 a.m. After picking up 
an injured woman, the helicopter continued to Reefton where it 
uplifted a County official and proceeded to reconnoitre the 
disaster area. 
At Reefton, 25 miles from Inangahua, considerable damage was 
sustained and civil defence operations began almost immediately 
after the earthquake occurred. Under the control of the County 
foreman, groups of men proceeded to work around the town 
demolishing unsafe chimneys and covering damaged roofs. 
As the County chairman, who was also the civil defence 
controller, could not be contacted at his home sixteen miles away, 
1Waimangaroa - a small township north of Westport. 
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the town clerk assumed his duties and until late in the morning 
the police station acted as the centre for civil defence opera-
tions. 
Because of telephone and power failures, contact could not be 
established with the outside world, though the local traffic 
officer ascertained that the road to Christchurch was open 
although those to Inangahua and Greymouth were found to be closed. 
By radio he was able to make contact with the Traffic Department 
in Greymouth. 
At 8.30 a.m. the Inangahua County chairman arrived at 
Reefton, having travelled by 'foot, bicycle, landrover and Post 
Office van•. 1 At this time a M.O.W. radio in Reefton picked up 
reports of casualties in Inangahua and it was later decided to 
send rescue parties to the township. Two parties made their way 
independently; a police group 'from Greymouth which was the first 
to arrive, and a civil defence party from Reefton. As a gradual 
picture of the situation developed the County chairman decided to 
declare a state of local major disaster at 11 a.m., and shortly 
afterwards, contact via the Railways telephone system was made 
with the Regional Commissioner, Southern Region, in Christchurch. 
Following the declaration, a civil defence headquarters was 
established in a disused Forestry school and registration and 
welfare facilities were set up i:n the nearby school hostel. 
However, as eight of the twelve :members of the organisation were 
unavailable, new members had to be recruited to take charge of the 
various sections of civil defence operations. 
1Ministry of Civil Defence, Report on the Ina:ngahua Earthquake, 
p. 17. 
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Following the arrival of the rescue parties at lnangahua, an 
j 
inspection of the area revealed that most houses were uninhabi-
table, and that the state of the water and sewerage systems posed 
a threat to health. Also, there was a danger of flooding in the 
area as the Buller River had been dammed by a landslip during the 
earthquake. A decision was therefore made to evacuate the town-
ship. Two private helicopters, at that time in the area, began 
the evacuation, but as there was an urgent demand for further 
capacity, a request for assistance was passed to the Regional 
Commissioner. Two additional private helicopters were made 
available and late in the afternoon two large air-force machines 
arrived on the scene. To fully utilise air capacity, evacuees 
were flown out to a point some miles from Reefton, then transported 
to the town by road. Once in Reefton they were taken to the 
Forestry school where welfare services were provided and billets 
arranged. By the time the evacuation was completed a total of 
301 people had been brought out of Inangahua, 169 by helicopter. 
Relief Phase 
Although many of the key personnel in the Inangahua civil 
defence organisation were unavailable at the time of the earth-
quake, local goodwill prevailed and the necessary staff were 
rapidly recruited. The structure of the organisation established 
in Reefton is shown in Figure VII. 
Law and Order 
This section of civil defence operations was controlled by a 
police sergeant brought in from Greymouth to replace the local 
Fig,ure VII 
INANGAHUA CIVIL DEFENCE ORGANISATION 
HEADQUARTERS (26 MAY 1968) 
Controller 
I 
Deputy Controller 
Liaison:----------1---Press and Information 
M.O. W. 
Air Force 
Army 
Law~ and 
order 
Com~uni­
ca tions 
Officer 
Transport E;ngi1neer-
ing and 
Works 
Sup1ply 
. Housing Welfare 
Relief 
Catering Clothing 
Source: Ministry of Civ·il Defence, Report on the 
Inang,ahua Earthquake, p.31. 
128 
129 
officer who had taken charge of civil defence communications. 
Further police reinforcements later arrived from Christchurch and 
were given the task of organising the safe custody of valuables, 
and the removal and storage of furniture and personal effects 
from the I:nangahua township. They also maintained road blocks 
to pr~vent the numerous sightseers entering the disaster area. 
Communications 
There was no planned communications system for civil defence 
in the Inangahua County at the time of the earthquake, and 
throughout the first day of the disaster a multitude of systems 
was used, including those of the M.O.W., Forestry Service, Police, 
Transport Department and the Amateur Radio Emergency Corps. 
Early on the day following the earthquake, army and air-force 
communication units arrived in the area and, with the police 
system, provided the basis of civil defence communications 
throughout the emergency period. 
Welfare· 
The welfare section was the responsibility of a woman con-
troller who, prior to the earthquake, had organised potential 
billets in Reefton. When evacuees arrived from Inangahua they 
were received at the Forestry school, registered, then billeted 
in private homes within Reefton. On the first night of the 
disaster, accommodation was found for some 250 people. As it was 
to be some time before houses in Inangahua were again habitable, 
a number of vacant houses in Reefton were taken over to provide 
long-term accommodation for the evacuees. The distribution of 
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food and clothing continued until the middle of July and temporary 
housing was maintained until November 1968. 
Supply 
This section of civil defence activity was headed by a local 
grocer until 27 May when the section was subdivided into ma;terials 
and food. Most food supplies were obtained locally, though some 
commercial organisations provided generous gifts at a later stage. 
Medical 
As the disaster caused very few casualties the medical 
problem was not great, though at a later date an army medical unit 
was brought into the area because of the large number of work 
parties operating. 
Transport 
When the earthquake occurred, the designated civil defence 
transport officer was unable to undertake his duties because of 
an employment commitment to the Railways. An employee of the 
For!3st Service took his place and put his department's vehicles 
at the disposal of civil defence. Until road access with 
lnangahua was re-established, transportation was heavily dependent 
on the private and air-force helicopters. Because of the general 
state of the roads within the area the army provided a number of 
heavy vehicles. 
Recovery (Restoration) Phase 
Before rescue and relief operations were underway, restora-
tion work was being carried out. Early on the morning of the 
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disaster work parties began making temporary repairs to buildings 
in Reefton. The M.O.W. rapidly re-opened the Reefton-Greymouth 
road to general traffic and the Reefton-Rotokohu road to heavy 
traffic, though this work was undertaken independently of civil 
defence. 
In the early afternoon of the 24th the Inangahua County 
consulting engineer arrived in Reefton and proceeded to establish 
liaison between the M.O.W., Railways, and other Government depart-
ments concerned with restoration. Co-ordinated repair work did 
not begin until two days later when a meeting of affected parties 
decided to give the restoration of Inangahua's water supply 
highest priority. 
Inspection of suspect buildings in the area was carried out 
by members of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission. The 
Reefton Post Office was found to be in very poor condition and 
Post Office officials decided to have it demolished. There was, 
however, a conflict of interest, and the civil defence controller 
refused permission to demolish the building as he considered that 
it would jeopardise part of the communications system. 
The Buller Combined Civil Defence District 
Following the earthquake a survey of damage in Westport was 
carried out by the police and civil defence personnel. Widespread 
but superficial damage had occurred to houses though some 
commercial buildings had been severely damaged. Disruption of 
the water and gas systems had taken place and the town was 
' 
isolated by slips blocking access roads. 
At 2 p.m. in the afternoon, the Mayor of Westport and the 
civil defence controller decided to declare a state of local 
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disaster, and a civil defence headquarter~ was established in the 
Council Chambers. The problem in the area was, however, far less 
acute than in Inangahua and Reefton, and civil defence operations 
were primarily concerned with restoration measures which included 
repairs to buildings and the water and gas mains. 
Regional Co-ordination 
Not until 11.30 a.m. on the morning of the 24th was contact 
established between Reefton and the regional headquarters in 
Christchurch. Following the decision to evacuate Inangahua, 
the Regional Commissioner was requested to provide additional 
helicopters. Contact was made with the Nelson town clerk who 
organised the mobilisation of the two private helicopters. The 
A.O.C. Wigram was also contacted and was able to provide the two 
large machines which, at the time, were fortunately flying over 
the Sou.th Island. 1 An aircraft was also provided to fly M.O.W. 
engineers over the Buller River dam. Army units were similarly 
provided. 
Numerous requests for material assistance came from both 
Reefton and Westport. In the latter case the demand was for 
food, water piping and power cable. The Department of Industries 
and Commerce representative on the regional civil defence commit-
tee was requested to provide 5000 lb. of milk products, which were 
1The helicopters were at the time returning to Auckland after 
having taken the Duke of Edinburgh to visit the Manapouri power 
scheme. Partly in response to a request from Burrows, the air 
force has now stationed helicopters permanently at Wigram. 
Previously, all air force helicopters were stationed at Auckland. 
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later transported to Westport by the air force. Similarly, the 
M.O.W. provided 3000 feet of polythene pipe, fittings and two 
plumbers. Tarpaulins to cover damaged houses were supplied by 
the Railways. 
National Co-ordination 
,: The :national headquarters received first hews of the earth-
quake from the Electricity Department at 9.15 on the morning of 
the 24th. A decision was made to activate the communications 
centre and liaison officers from the air force, N.Z.B.C.,, and 
Tourist and Publicity Department joined the Director of C~vil 
Defence. The major request for assistance passed to the national 
headquarters was for a water chlorination plant required in 
Westport. The request was passed to the M.O.W. who informed the 
Director that the air force had a mobile plant at Ohakea, and 
ope~ators and supplies for the plant in Wellington. An air force 
transport, the only one available, was then despatched from 
Auckland to Westport via Ohakea and Wellington • 
. ·The national headquarters also organised transport for a 
. . . 1 t h d' 1 m1n1ster1a party o go to t e 1saster area. Having surveyed 
the ~cene on arrival, the party conferred at Reefton with repre-
\ 
'' 
se:ntatives of the M.O.W., Earthquake and War Damage Commission, 
a'nd the civil defence controller to decide upon a method for 
repairing and rebuilding damaged houses. On their return to 
Wellington on 27 May, the Ministers reported to Cabinet where it 
was decided to establish an interdepartmental committee 'to ensure 
that the fastest and most efficient use is made of all available 
1The Ministers of Education and Civil Defence. 
1 
resources to get the West Coast back to normal'. 
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The committee was convened, then reconstituted into subcom-
mittees - a Welfare committee presided over by the Chairman of the 
Social Security Commission and a Reconstruction committee chaired 
by the Commissioner of Works. The former committee was primarily 
concerned with providing social security payments for victims of 
the earthquake, and to facilitate this a temporary office was 
opened in Reefton on 28 May. 
The Reconstruction committee was concerned with general 
restoration work and remained in contact with two committees 
established at Greymouth and Reefton. The function of these 
committees was 'collating the repair and reconstruction needs of 
the various areas and assessing and fixing priorities for 
additional assistance where local resources appeared insuffi-
cient 1 • 2 
An appraisal 
Civil defence operations within the Inangahua area were 
eff~ctively carried out though, had the earthquake caused a large 
number of casualties, the situation could have been very different. 
The cost of the disaster is shown in Table II. 
The earthquake illustrated the importance of the co-ordinating 
machinery for mobilising resources at both the national and 
1Ministry of Civil Defence, Report on the Inangahua Earthquake, 
p. 78. 
2 Ibid., p. 78. After the. state of local major disaster was ter-
minated on 30 May the M.O.W. assumed overall responsibility for 
reconstruction and a committee comprising representatives of the 
M.O.W. and the Inangahua County Council was formed to control 
continuing civil defence operations in the area. 
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TABLE II 
COST OF THE INANGAHUA EARTHQUAKE 1 
The approximate expenditure incurred by Government Depart-
ments as a result of the earthquake was: 
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT 
Repairs to schools 
ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT 
Repairs to towers, switchgear and buildings 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT 
Civil defence costs 
MINISTRY OF WORKS 
Repairs to main highways, roads, bridges, 
buildings and miscellaneous services 
NEW ZEALAND RAILWAYS 
Restoration of rail, buildings and bridges 
POST OFFICE 
Restoration of telecommunications and buildings 
SOCIAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT 
Payments to evacuees and for billeting 
STATE ADVANCES CORPORATION 
Repairs to houses 
Miscellaneous 
Miscellaneous payments by eight departments 
TOTAL: 
Payments made by the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission 
GRAND TOTAL: 
$ 
121,000 
77,332 
43' 170 
835,803 
474,516 
144,000 
6,587 
53,300 
13,000 
$ 1,768,708 
2,430,000 
$ 4,198,708 
1 Table II adapted with minor modifications from Ministry of Civil 
Defence, ~rt .2!.1 the Inang9_hua Earthquake, p. 80. 
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regional levels of the civil defence organisation, and the 
Ministry was very willing to study the experience gained during 
the emergency and propose improvements to the system. As very 
little time had elapsed since the April storm many of the recom-
mendations were necessarily similar. 
At the national level, the most apparent defect was the delay 
in receiving news of the earthquake which had consequently delayed 
the activation of the communications centre. Fortunately, this 
,did not matter greatly as national assistance was not immediately 
. d 1 requJ.re . One of the reasons for the delay was the inability of 
those at lnangahua township to communicate with the outside world 
until the network stations of the M.O.W. and Forestry Service in 
other parts of the country went on the air at their normal trans-
. . . 2 
ml.ssl.on tJ.mes. 
The establishment of the interdepartmental committees 
concerned with reconstruction and welfare following th~ return of 
the ministerial party from the West Coast was an acknowledgement 
of the ·importance of these phases of civil defence operations, and 
the committees could well become permanent bodies capable of being 
activated in any future disaster. 
At the local level the most obvious deficiency with the 
Inangahua organisation was the unavailability df key personnel 
when the disaster took place. Fortunately, local goodwill and 
expediency prevailed and an effective organisation was rapidly 
1This situation would suggest the development of a warning system 
between the seismological observatory and civil defence national 
headquarters. 
2The Ministry has suggested the immediate activation of these net-
works in the event of a severe earthquake - Ministry of Civil 
Defence, Report on the lnangahua Earthquake, p. 81. 
137 
established. Nevertheless, the problem indicated faulty planning 
and pointed to the fact that possession of a paper plan may bear 
little relation to the state of local authority preparedness. 
The other notable deficiency was the failure to make early 
declarations of disaster. The Inangahua declaration was not 
issued until 11 a.m., and that in Westport not until 2 p.m. on the 
day of the earthquake. 
Parliamentary reaction and the Civil Defence Amendment Bill 
Once the Civil Defence Act had been placed on the Statute 
Book at the end of 1962, Parliament lost interest in the subject. 1 
The one major opportunity to question the Government's administra-
tion of civil defence - the tabling of the Ombudsman's Report in 
1964 - was not taken and the introduction of amendments to the 
Civil Defence Act in 1965 and 1967 met with a similar lack of 
2 
concern. 
For a period of six years Parliament had consistently shown 
almost complete indifference to the state of civil defence prepa-
rations within the country. Nevertheless, the April storm and 
the Inangahua earthquake inevitably provoked reaction and recrimi-
1As a measure of this lack of interest, references to civil defence 
in N.Z.P.D. from 1963-67 inclusive totalled thirty-two, slightly 
more than six per year. The bulk of these were statements from 
the Minister of Civil Defence, usually relating to the progress 
of local authority civil defence planning. 
2 The 1965 amendments related to: provision for a Director~ Deputy 
Director and Secretary of Civil Defence (Sections 4, 5, 6J; 
obligation upon a local authority to ensure its civil defence plan 
could be implemented (33A); provision for the reviewin~ of plans 
(34A); provision for the establishment of sub-regions (37); 
changes to provisions relating to pensions (45); amendments to 
requisitioning powers (48). The 1967 amendments related to 
changes of wording resulting from the creation of a Ministry of 
Transport (53A, 53B). Both sets of amendments were passed 
without debate. 
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nation. 
When Parliament resumed late in June, however, the disasters 
had lost much of their topicality and, in fact, a major debate on 
civil defence did not take place until October when the Civil 
Defence Amendment Bill was introduced. The Minister, D.C. Seath, 
informed the House that the Bill aimed: 
basically at ensuring that action is taken promptly in an 
emergency or threatened emergency; that all local authorities. 
have plans for an emergency; and that those serving in the 
various civil defence organisations are adequately protected 
against injury and loss during civil defence work and 
training. 1 
He then elaborated the provisions in detail, noting that the new 
term 'civil defence emergency' 'gives a more readily understandable 
meaning to the circumstances in which the civil defence organisa-
tion may be called into operation' . 2 
H.J.L. May (Labour, Porirua) opened the debate for the Oppo-
sition and immediately questioned the term 'defence': 
I am not speaking in a derogatory sense about ex-army or 
air force officers who have become administrators of civil 
defence groups, but the fact that the word 'defence' is used 
has, I believe, put some people off .•. some thought should 
be given to the use of the word 'defence' because it does 
conjure up in some people's minds a semi-military organisa-
tion.3 
May was in agreement with the mandatory planning requirement, 
though noting in rather military jargon that 'It is very little 
use having an organised scheme on paper if there are no troops to 
carry it into action' •4 A.J. Faulkner (Labour, Roskill) also 
1 N.Z.P.D., Vol. 357, pp. 2061-2, 3 October, 1968. 
2 Ibid.' p. 2062. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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called for the name of the organisation to be changed, but the 
Minister was unmoved. He considered that overseas use of the 
term justified its retention in New Zealand and added that 'it 
has been made perfectly clear that civil defence has no military 
• I 1 
co.nnotat1.ons . 
The Civil Defence Amendment Bill was then referred to the 
Local Bills Committee and returned to the House unaltered on 17 
December 1968. J.A. Walding (Labour, Palmerston North) opened 
the debate for the Opposition with considerable vigour, claiming 
that 'civil defence in this country is just a farce and a joke, 
2 
and in most communities it is just a hopeless mess'. He then 
proceeded to quote a series of press criticisms of civil defence 
and claimed that: 
I believe a great mistake was made when the Government 
charged the local authorities with the responsibility of 
organising civil defence emergency organisations and gave 
them no clear objectives to strive for. 3 
Despite his criticism of local authority control, Walding did not 
put forward proposals for a new system, but went on to criticise 
the level of Government financial assistance to the local authori-
ties. 
H.J.L. May then informed the House that: 
The fire service should be the number one organisation 
because it is operating in most areas. The Police Depart-
ment is the second organisation that must come into any 
operation ... I say we must have a change of emphasis in 
the whole structure of civil defence. 4 
I Ibid . , p. 20 64 . 
2 Ibid., Vol. 359, p. 39L~3, 17 December, 1968. 
3 Ibid., p. 3944. 
4 Ibid. 9 p. 3948. At a later date May claimed that the Police 
should have control in an emergency (Interview: Wellington, 2 
September, 1969). 
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May's comments conflicted with those of the Leader of the Opposi-
tion who had stated after the April storm that the police should 
b . t 1 1 e 1n con ro . 
The debate then degenerated into a memory contest following 
an accusation from H.R. Lapwood (National, Rotorua) that the last 
Labour Government had not passed any civil defence legislation. 
Although the overall debate was not of a high standard, 
civil defence operations during 1968 had generated more Parlia-
mentary interest in the subject than had been evident at any time 
during the preceding five years. 
While Opposition criticism did not generate a re-appraisal 
of the basis on which civil defence was organised, it did place 
the Ministry somewhat on the defensive. The Annual Report of the 
Department of Internal Affairs in 1969 gave considerable space to 
a justification of the existing organisational arrangements: 
Any doubts there may have been about the wisdom of placing 
the primary responsibility for civil defence in the hands of 
the territorial local authorities must surely have been 
dispelled by the experiences of last year. Advocates of 
placing responsibility solely in the hands of the Police or 
armed services overlook the tremendous potential available 
in the local community itself. They also forget that 
centrally employed professional forces, such as the Police 
or armed services, are often very thinly represented, or in 
the case of the armed services not represented at all, in 
many parts of the country. Without reinforcements - which 
takes time - they cannot hope to handle a situation which 
has assumed proportions beyond the immediate personnel 
available. Such forces, of course, have their own well 
defined and accepted role in civil defence, and this is 
spelt out in all national, regional and local plans. 2 
For reasons of their geographical distribution, the armed 
1May's claim for the fire service appeared to be the result of his 
long association with the organisation. 
2A.J .H.R., Report of the Department of Internal Affairs, H.22, 
1969, p. 5. 
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services must necessarily play a supporting rather than control-
lLng role in civil defence, but the position of the Police is 
not as clear. 1 Tne Police claim that they should control civil 
defence operations because of their command ability and their 
identification by the public2 as an emergency organisation. 3 
At the present time the police role in civil defence is the 
maintenance of law and order during a disaster, and the identifi-
cation and removal of the dead. In a major disaster, and 
particularly one affecting a city, existing police resources 
may well be placed under severe strain .. 4 To remov·e members of 
the police to controlling positions within a civil defence organ-
isation may result in the withdrawal of personnel urgently required 
in their professional capacity. In a small community the demand 
for the police in their professional ro.le may well exceed the 
demand for their organisational .and co-ordinating ability, and 
in this field they do not have a monopoly of skills. 5 
From the previous discussion of the Inangahua earthquake it 
was shown that civil defence operations passed through three, 
1Al~o military resources may not be available because of overseas 
commitments. 
2This ~as certainly evident in Blenheim, see Chapter VI, pp.ll6-117. 
3Tnese views nave been ascertained in general conv·ersa tion wi tn 
members of the police. 
4 The provision in the Civil Defence Act for the creation of 
volunteer civ·il defence police was an acknowledgement of this 
fact. Civil defence police, of which there is an establishment 
of 3,500~ may only be used during a state of national emergency 
or civil defence emergency. 
5 In many rural communities only a single police officer is usually 
present. Tnis was the case at Reefton. Here the officer was 
seconded to the civ·il defence organisation as the communications 
controller, though it was, howev·er, possible to replace him with 
an officer brought in from Greymouth. 
though not mutually exclusive, phases - Rescue - Relief -
Recovery (Restoration). The rescue phase was the evacuation 
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of the Inangahua township. The relief phase began when the 
ev·acuees arrived in Reefton - and in some cases continued long 
after the emergency was lifted. The recov·ery phase began almost 
immediately after the earthquake occurred and also continued 
beyond the immediate emergency period. The services of the 
police were most in demand during the rescue phase, and during 
the early period of the relief phase, but then declining during 
the recovery period., While there may be some merit in suggest-
ing police control of the rescue phase, this must be weighed 
against the possibility of complicating the established lines 
of authority now existing throughout all the phases of civil 
defence operations.. To suggest, however, that the police should 
control all operational phases would appear to result from a 
failure to appreciate the ac~ual function of civil defence. 
* 
CHAPTER VIII 
EVALUATION 
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The months of April and May 1968 stand as something of a 
landmark in the development of civil defence. Within this short 
period' the organisation was twice put to the test and its 
st~engths and weaknesses clearly exposedo The April storm 
caught both the country and the civil defence organisation by 
surprise and in the recriminatory atmosphere which followed 
critical attention focussed on the organisation to an unpreceden-
ted extent. 
Criticism of the national headquarters' failure to give 
storm warnings was warranted, although much of the other criticism 
r..vas misplaced. In its aftermath the effects of the storm on land 
were exaggerated, particularly py the Leader of the Opposition 
who attempted to make political capital out of the apparent 
failure of civil defence. Some local authorities could have 
shown greater presence of mind by declaring emergencies as 
precautionary measures but these argume~ts ignored the fact that 
in no part of the country affected by the storm had the normal 
emergency utili ties been in danger of being ov·erwhe lmed. 
Nev·ertheless, the adv·erse criticism did little to ~nhance 
the credibility of civil defence as an emergency organisation, 
although for the first time the connection with natural disaster 
was explicitly established in the public mind - a connection which 
was to be reinforced only six weeks later with the Inangahua earth-
quake .. 
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If the April storm pointed to weaknesses in the organisation 
the response to the earthquake was the success story of 1968 and 
did much to restore the organisation•s tarnished image, for it 
demonstrated its effectiveness as a method for the mobilisation 
and co-ordination of Government and local authority resourceso 
Even so, it must be remembered that the earthquake affected only 
a small rural population and produced an evacuation rather than 
a casualty problem. Furthermore, if the necessity for an 
imlnediate response b·afore external assistance became av·ailable 
·.emphasised the wisdom of hav·ing placed the ultimate responsibility 
for community safety with the local authorities, the moribund 
state of the Inangahua County organisation illustrated the problem 
of maintaining a local organisation in a state of readiness for 
an indefinite period of timee 
The nature of the response.also established the necessity 
for extending civil defence operations beyond the immediate tasks 
of rescue and relief to the longer term requirements of restora-
tion. The creation of two Gov·ernment interdepartmental 
committees to supervise welfare and reconstruction was an acknow-
ledgement of this role. 
The success of civil defence operations at Inangahua was 
widely recognised by the press, and provided salutary evidence of 
the organisation 1 s increased credibility. In November 1968, the 
Christchurch Star, previously one of the most ardent critics, 
commented that: 
The violent storms in Christchurch and Southland earlier this 
year and the disastrous earthquake at Inangahua which 
followed them have shown the need for an efficient civil 
defence organisation e0~ For some time after it was 
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established, the civil defence organisation was not 
appreciated because too many people believ·ed that its only 
purpose was to swing into action in a time of war and they 
saw little prospect of thiso It is now quite obvious that 
civil defence is an essential peacetime organisation well 
gear~d to function in any emergencyo 1 
But, with the events of 1968 now receding into memory there 
is a danger - all too apparent in the past - that concern for 
natural disaster and civil defence will once again decline to a 
lev·el of complacency and indifferenceo 
* 
The development of civil defence in this country since the 
1930's has been characterised by long periods of apathy punctuated 
with sudden bursts of activity and interesta This has, for the 
most part reflected the country's traditional preoccupation with 
the threat of enemy attack, and conversely its failure to 
appreciate the persistent danger of natural disaster. 
The MUrchison and Napier earthquakes in the early years of 
thi$ century dramatically illustrated the acute danger of natural 
disaster, yet the first response to the problem in the form of the 
1932 Public Safety Conservation Act was of very limited scopeo 
It was, in fact, an indication of the degree of concern felt at 
1
that tim,9, that the Government included natural disaster provi-
sions in essentially anti-riot legislation. The Act failed to 
prov·ide for the establishment of a permanent emergency organisa-
tion or for any comprehensive central and local government 
planning to deal with future disasters, and it appeared that the 
1
christchurch Star, 12 November, 1968® 
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Government was generally indifferent to a repetition of the Napier 
experience., 
Not until the late 1930's was a comprehensive civil defence 
scheme established and then it was in response to the growing 
threat of waro The Emergency Precautions Scheme was designed to 
cope with both hostile attack and natural disaster and it proved 
its value in the latter capacity during the Wellingt.on-Wairarapa 
earthquake of 1942.. But, despite this lesson, the scheme was 
abandoned at the end of the war, although by passing the Earth-
g_ua~-~nd War Damage Act in 1944 the Government had shown itself 
to be well aware of the economic significance of natural disaster. 
Its failure, therefore, to maintain a permanent emergency organi-
sation amounted to almost callous indifference., 
After the war emergency planning fell into abeyance for eight 
years and the introduction of the Local Authorities Emergency 
Powers Bill in 1953 provided a poor substitute for the wartime 
scheme .. 
Ostensibly the Bill was introduced primarily in response to 
the threat of natural disaster, though evidence suggests that the 
fear of attack was still the dominant concern. Nevertheless, the 
Act was singularly inadequate bo deal with the problems with which 
/it was designed to cope.. Although the Gov·ernment undertook its 
own emergency planning in 1954, the absence of permanent local 
authority emergency organisations precluded an effectively co-
ordinated local ·and centt·al Government disaster response .. 
While there appeared to be an element of uncertainty in the 
underlying reasons for introducing the 1953 legislation this was 
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certainly not the case with the establishment of the Ministry of 
Civ·il Defence in April 1959., Through the medium of the 1958 
Defence Review the Labour Government had expressed the belief that 
developments in military technol-ogy threatened the safety of New 
Zealand. 
With the passage of time, the Defence Review may now be 
regarded as an over-reaction to an undefined threat, although it 
is not difficult to see why New Zealand did react in such a 
mannere The technological developments took place against a 
backdrop of the cold war and many countries were showing a renewed 
interest in civil defence. In view of New Zealand's traditional 
willingness to follow the example of others, similar interest was, 
therefore, not unexpected.. Furthermore, Sov·iet rocket testing in 
the Pacific had demonstrated that New Zealand's geographical 
isolation did not guarantee invulnerability to missile attack 
should some nation (which at that time could only be the Sov·iet 
Union) regard the country as a potential target in a future war. 
While the threat of aggression was purely hypothetical, the 
Labour Government nevertheless heliev·ed that a threat existed, 
and consequently embarked upon a civil defence programme. 
Although the proposed scheme was also intended to cope with 
1natural disaster, this appeared as little more than an afterthought 
- a status the threat was to retain throughout the early 1960 1 s. 
Nevertheless, the renewed interest in civil defence did have the 
effact of placing an emergency scheme on a permanent basis for 
the first time. 
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With the creation of the Ministry of Civil Defence in 1959, 
New Zealand in effect readopted the structure of its own wartime, 
and distinctly British, system of civil defence. But while the 
new scheme bore a close structural resemblance to wartime 
practice, it differed in terms of organisational principles. 
Although it was initially envisaged that the local authorities 
would establish civil defence corps on para-military lines, this 
approach did not eventuate. Instead, civil defence was designed 
to provide the means for mobilising and co-ordinating existing 
central and local government resources, and only at the local 
level was a large personnel establishment required for a warden 
system .. 
Intention, however, was not matched with action, and it was 
ev·ident that the Government considered the development of civil 
defence a low priority commi tmen.t. This was reflected in the 
meagre personnel and material resources placed at the disposal of 
the Ministry of Civil Defence which, in turn, showed a marked 
reluctance to undertake the national planning obligations imposed 
upon it by the Civil Defence Act0 
In v·iew of the Gov·ernment's attitude it was, therefore, not 
surprising that the local authorities expressed little enthusiasm 
for civil defence. They viewed the 'threat' of nuclear attack 
with scepticism and were reluctant to undertake a responsibility 
which not only added to their financial and administrative burden, 
but was one which the Government itself did not appear to take 
seriously. 
The lack of visible organisational development did little to 
instil public confidence in civil defence and, in fact, in a 
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number of ways the organisation seemed intent upon alienating 
what public support existed. The aura of secrecy surrounding 
civil defence in its early years was certainly not designed to 
generate public awareness of the organisation's function, and the 
Hinister 1 s unfortunate remarks about the press during the passage 
of the Civil Defence Act in 1962 guaranteed an unsympathetic 
hearing from that quarter. 
But probably the mal.n reason why civil defence failed to 
generate public interest stem::ned from the prominence given to the 
'threat' of nuclear attack. Such a threat seemed non-existent. 
There was no atmosphere of impending crisis and, in the absence 
of any visible evidence of civil defence preparations, no real 
reason for the public to take it all seriously@ 
The limited organisational development during tne early 
1960's was, in fact, a clear indication that the Government was 
prepared to pay little more than lip service to the threat of 
attack; it had neither the intention nor tne capability of 
protecting the country against such an event~ But the lack of 
progress with civil defence was, at the same time, to ignore the 
~other 1 role o:t tne organisation - that of coping with natural 
disaster.. 
1he decision in 1964 to place priority on natural disaster 
1.vas certainly long overdue and, in fact, it stands as a measure 
of this countryw s concern for the problem that such a decision had 
to be made at: alL. But even then the dectsion did not appear to 
have been based on any comprehensive reappraisal of the country's 
\Yulnerability to the th:ceat:, but resulted instead from the growing 
belief that protection against a nuclear attack was no longer 
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necessary. Natural disaster therefore - the most pressing reason 
for an effective emergency organisation - received only de facto 
recognition. 
Thus, although natural disaster had been a consideration in 
civil defence policy since 1959, only after 1964 did an overt 
connection between civil defence and natural disaster gradually 
become established.. Ev·en then, in the absence of publicity the 
connection remained poorly defined and not until the April storm 
and the Inangahua earthquake in 1968 did the public begin to 
rec-ognise that civi 1 defence could be equated with peacetime 
emergency. 
Although this connection now appears to be firmly established 1 
looking back it is difficult to understand why successive Govern-
ments in the past were so indifferent to the need for a 
permanent emergency organisation to cope with natural disaster. 
The time scale against which disasters take place may be part 
of the explanation~ and furthermore, such events are transient and 
very soon forgotten in the minds of the public and politicians 
' 2 
alike., 
The particular circumstances surrounding certain past 
disasters may also have been a contributing factoro The Napier 
earthquake, which should have provided a~ple warning of the need 
for a permanent emergency organisation, occurred at a time when 
1~n Blenhe~m, for e.x~:-:; was found that 66 percent of the 
respondents knew that civil defence was concerned with natural 
disaster. For full details see Appendix B~ Question I. 
2
rt was found in Blenheim, for example, that 77 percent of the 
respondents remembered feeling the Inangahua earthquake, but only 
54 percent could recall the year in which it had taken place. 
For full details see Appendix B, Questions V and VI0 
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the country 1 s attention was focussed on the chronic economic 
·situation. Similarly, the Wellington-Wairarapa earthquake of 
1942 took place when the country was suffering acute anxiety over 
the possibility of a Japanese attack. Both these events were 
therefore overshadowed by the extraordinary circumstances prevai-
ling at the tima~ But this is only to offer palliativ·es for a 
tradition of Government, local authority and public indifference 
to the problem@ 
Indifference, however, cannot be equated with ignorance. 
On four occasions in the past - 1932, 1940, 1953 and 1959 -
successive Governments hav·e shown themselves to be aware of 
natural disaster. Yet, not only in each case has it required 
the additional stimulus of either the threat of enemy attack or 
civ·il disorder to promote Government action, but only in the most 
recent case has this taken the form of a permanent emergency 
ryr·ganisa tion .. 
Even New Zealand's apparent preoccupation with the threat of 
enemy attack has, for the most part, been something of an :illusion. 
Only during the war period~ when there was a sense of impending 
crisis, was a c ivi 1 defence scheme pursued with any \7'igour.. The 
inadequacy of emergency planning in the 1950 8 s and the failure to 
press the development of civil defence in the early 1960's 
betrayed a complete lack of conviction in the belief that the 
country was vulnerable to attack. 
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As twelve years have now elapsed since the present civil 
defence scheme was implemented, it seems appropriate to ask in 
conclusion, is the country now adequately prepared to cope with 
any form of emergency? 
If the response to the Inangahua earthquake can be taken as 
a guide, civil defence undoubtedly has the ability to cope with 
1 
any future emergency on that scale. Unfortunately, it is not 
the small emergency which presents the real p:eoblem, but rather 
the threat of a major disaster in one of the main centres or 
large provincial towns. It is here that the credibility of 
ci\l'il defence remains in greatest doubt .. 
Little attention has been given, for example~ to the special 
civil defence probl~ms of the commercial and industrial areas of 
the metropolitan and larger urban centres~ Yet, it is here in 
the event of a severe earthquake that the greatest danger to life 
exists. Also in view of the present lack of recognition for 
civil defence as an emergency organisation, it is doubtful whether 
any local organisation would be able to exercise the level of 
social control necessary for the effective implementation of 
rescue and relief measures in a major disaster@ 
Clearly then, if civil defence is to raise its credibility 
as an emergency organisation within the next decade, urgent atten-
tion must be given to such problems0 Lack of recognition can only 
be remedied through a carefully conceived and continuous public 
relations and education campaign~ No effort should be spared to 
no "7tiu; -=~·"",..,_ ..._,..,.""r-=e" 
1During 1970 the local civil defence organisations at Whakatane 
and Nelson demonstrated their ability to cope with se'lrere 
flooding. While the floods in both areas did not reach disaster 
proportions early declarations of states of civil defence 
~mergency enabled preventative measures to be taken .. 
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convince an indifferent population that familiarity with civil 
defence is essential if it is to be effective. Further organisa-
tional development could ideally be directed to the establishment 
of trained emergency teams in every block, factory, shop and 
office. But only when this is combined with widespread public 
recognition of the role of civil defence will it be possible to 
claim that the country is adequately prepared. 
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APPENDIX A 
In August 1969, use was made of a Political Science Depart-
ment pre-general election opinion poll in the St. Albans electo-
rate to briefly question residents on civil defence. The poll 
covered a random sample of 162 residents drawn from the 
Parliamentary electoral roll. 
Question I 
Could you tell me where your nearest civil defence warden 
post is located? Correct answer: The nearest state primary 
school. 
Response 
Correct 
Indeterminate (school but 
undefined) 
Don't know 
Tota 1: 
29 
1 
70 
100% 
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APPENDIX B 
In August 1970, 103 residents of Blenheim were interviewed 
in an attempt to gauge public awareness and knowledge of the local 
civil defence organisation. Blenheim, a town of 12,000, 200 
miles north of Christchurch, was chosen for the survey as the local 
civil defence organisation is generally regarded as being of a 
high standard. 
The random sample was drawn from the Borough District 
Electors' Roll. This had two effects. Firstly, the sample was 
biased towards older residents, very few in the 20-30 age group 
were interv·iewed. Secondly, as the roll was two years old, the 
sample was biased towards residents who had been in the district 
for so me time • 
Question I 
Could you tell me what the purpose of civil defence is? 
Re§..QQnse 
1. War 
2. Natural Disaster 
3. Accidents 
4. Other 
5. No Answer 
6. Don't know 
Combinations: 
Question II 
1' 2 
2' 3 
1' 2' 3 
Total: 
4 
66 
0 
3 
0 
6 
17 
2 
2 
100% 
From the following list, could you tell me which one is 
directly responsible for civil defence in Blenheim? (List 
read out.) Correct answer: Borough and County Councils. 
Response 
Police 
Army 
Fire Brigade 
Air force 
Borough and County Councils 
Gov·ernmen t 
No answer 
Don't know 
Tota 1: 
Question Ill 
54 
10 
1 
1 
25 
4 
0 
5 
100% 
Could you tell me where your nearest civ·il defence warden 
post is located? Correct answer: The nearest state 
primary schoo 1. 
Response 
Correct 
Incorrect 
Indeterminate (school but 
undefined) 
No answer 
Don't know 
Tota 1: 
Question IV 
17 
16 
1 
1 
65 
100% 
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If an earthquake occurred, and a member of your family was 
trapped in the house, and you were unable to rescue him/her, 
where would you turn for help? Only the first avenue of 
help was recordedo 
Response ~ 
Neighbour 27 
Warden post 24 
Police 27 
Hospital 3 
Fire Brigade 1 
Other 10 
No answer 4 
Don't know 4 
Tota 1: 100% 
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Question V 
Do you remember feeling the Inangahua earthquake in Blenheim? 
R~QQnse 
Yes 
No 
Not here at the time 
No answer 
Total: 
Question VI 
77 
17 
3 
3 
100% 
Could you tell me when the Inangahua earthquake occurred? 
Correct answer: 1968. 
Response 
Correct 
Incorrect 
Don't know 
Tota 1: 
_% 
54 
37. 
9 
100% 
